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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to explore the role of agent or ‘user’ intention in the fields of 
Management Science and Systems Thinking. Primarily through the use of various 
modelling approaches these fields seek to provide assistance to organisational 
stakeholders who are looking to intervene in situations with a view to dealing with 
problems and/or bringing about some form of ‘improvement’. Although the literature 
acknowledges that the various methodologies, techniques and tools of MS/ST can be 
used flexibly depending upon user intention, to date, intention itself has not been the 
subject of detailed investigation. The thesis seeks to plug this gap in the literature. 
 
In exploring intention in some detail the thesis interlinks philosophy, theory and 
empirical work. The philosophical and theoretical components allow us to 
conceptualise intention and better understand how it might work in concrete settings.  
The empirical component, conducted with a team of action researchers, grounds the 
discussion in practice. 
 
The main proposition of the thesis is that intention is a dual-sided phenomenon, i.e. 
“we do things intentionally, and we intend to do things” (Bratman, 1997). Thus 
intention has a present and a future side.  The research reported on through the thesis 
shows how, through language and actions, both sides of intention can significantly 
shape the nature of interventions.   
 
This being the case, the value of the work is that it provides new ways of accounting 
for and learning from interventions; in particular, it provides new frameworks for 
practitioners to better reflect on and guide their actions. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
1.1 Intervention and Intention 
We intervene in situations to produce changes and improve them.  There are many 
kinds of situations that can benefit from an intervention. They can be for stabilizing an 
economy or helping somebody with an addiction. They can be for humanitarian 
reasons or related to areas such as law, education or health. Here I am concerned with 
interventions informed by Management Science/Systems Thinking. This kind of 
intervention is aimed to improve organizational situations, and on those interventions 
I want to focus on the role of intention. 
 
Intention seems a very desirable concept to understand and take into account in an 
intervention context.  After all, we attach to intentions the power to cause, affect and 
guide our actions.  Intentions let us change the meaning of words and actions.  For 
instance, the word hello can be pronounced in a welcoming or a threatening manner. 
Additionally, intentions let us consider actors, the people holding them. However, in 
the field of Management Science/Systems Thinking intentions are taken for granted, 
and their understanding is underdeveloped. This is perhaps due to the nature and 
purposes of the field. 
 
Management Science/Systems Thinking (hereafter MS/ST) deals with problematic 
situations not only in commercial organisations but also in contexts such as the public 
sector or the community. It is concerned with a very diverse range of factors, 
including structures, processes, data, resources, relationships, people, world views, 
goals and aims, controls, actions and reactions, uncertainties, conflicts and structures 
(Daellenbach & Flood, 2002, p.210). Due to the range of factors, it logically follows 
that MS/ST must draw upon many fields of knowledge (such as mathematics, physics, 
sociology, linguistics, philosophy, or biology), and from different paradigms 
(functionalist, interpretive, critical, post-modern) (Jackson, 2000).  MS/ST´s 
foundational diversity reflects on the diversity of tools that can be used to inform/act 
in a situation. For instance, it is possible to use elements such as theoretical and 
philosophical assumptions, prefigured activities, models, recommendations, 
principles, guidelines, methods, or methodologies.  
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Obviously, it is possible to take action based only in gut feelings, namely on intuition 
rather than rationality. However, MS/ST is built on the assumption that you can 
advance ways to inform action (Jackson, 1991).  Consequently, it pays to develop, 
test, and learn from the application of tools. For instance, Learning is embedded and is 
an integral part of proposals such as Soft Systems Methodology (Checkland, 1981) 
and Total Systems Intervention (Jackson, 2000).  What is learnt during their 
application is feedback to the methodologies. In this way, the knowledge is improved 
and then codified on them (Keys, 1997). 
 
Ideally, this reflection on the use of tools and systematic learning from experience 
improves the chances of success at intervention.  With the passage of time and the 
iterative building on accumulated experiences, tools mature, and, as a result, standards 
about how they might ‘properly’ be used can be defined. This is specially the case in 
methodologies.   
 
In simple terms, methodologies encompass steps and guidelines used in MS/ST to 
guide action for improving problematic situations. Those steps or guidelines could 
include recommendations about how to get the relevant data, how to deal with the 
participants, how to build models to represent the situation, and how to implement 
changes in the situation.  With such standards covering the different stages of the 
intervention, it can be expected additional benefits such as facilitating understanding 
between actors or increasing the confidence in the quality of the work that is going to 
be carried out. 
 
Formulating standards is also a way to manage the diversity of existing tools. For 
instance, when confronted with a huge variety of approaches, how can the agent know 
what tools to use?  One response to this has been to define standard uses that identify 
what tools best assists what kind of problem situations (e.g. Mingers & Gill, 1997; 
Jackson, 2000). 
 
However, it can be argued that the drive for standards pushes the actor away.  The 
idea is that standards are possible if we are objective, and we get rid of actors’ 
“interferences” and “intrusions”. For the sake of the standard, along with the actor 
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their intentions are also thrown away.  However, there is evidence in the literature that 
standard uses are not being achieved in real-world interventions.  Reasons for this 
situation include tools “being used wrongly” (Jackson, 2003a, p.1300), the dynamics 
and complexity of the situation (Midgley, 2000; Taket & White, 2000),  different 
understandings of the methodology (Brocklesby, 1995) and the influence of the 
practitioners own reflections (Kay & Halpin, 1999).  
 
If standard uses are not achieved, there are cracks in the notion that perhaps can allow 
us to reinforce the idea that actors are important. I am focusing on one of the cracks 
hindering the possibility of standards: the influence of the actor on the intervention. 
The way in which I want to contribute to the discussion of this influence is through 
actors’ intentions. The assumption is that when the actor is embedded in a situation, 
s/he can have a unique understanding of the context.  Based on that understanding the 
user intent can, if so desired, help to shape, modify or guide the actions and tools used 
in order to make them more relevant and potentially useful given the distinctive nature 
of the situation at hand.  This assumption triggers the purpose of this research.  
 
This thesis is a preliminary exploration of the relevance of intentions for the practice 
of interventions. Due to the exploratory nature of the research, intention is examined 
here considering discussions linking philosophy, theory and empirical work. 
 
The philosophical component of the thesis helps to elucidate how to understand some 
of the concepts.  The process of intervention and the conceptual tools used on them 
such as methods and methodologies are understood using the concept of Language 
Games in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. The basic understanding of intention is based on 
Philosophy of Action. On this ground, intention is then conceived as a dual-sided 
phenomenon. “We do things intentionally, and we intend to do things” (Bratman, 
1997). While one aspect of intention focuses on the present, the other does it to the 
future. 
 
The theoretical component helps to develop and explain each side of intention.  The 
present-oriented side is explained in terms of Boundary Critique Theory and 
Relevance Theory. The future-oriented side is explained on terms of complexity 
theory.  The present-oriented side helps to describe how the actors arrive at some 
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particular situation, and the future-oriented side helps to answer why the actors 
arrived at that situation. Consequently, it is show that both sides of intention provide 
different and complementary perspectives of an intervention process. 
  
The empirical component guides but also provides grounding to the reflection on the 
other dimensions. For this part of the work, I followed a team of Action Research 
practitioners. I interviewed, attended their meetings, and read documentation related 
to their work projects. Based on these I also provided some feedback that was 
requested as part of my arrangement with the group.  These terms allow me the 
possibility to reflect not only about the intention of my participants but also about my 
own. 
 
This introductory chapter is structured as follows: First I present some personal 
antecedents and the reasons that led me to this research. Next I explain the research 
process that was conducted.  Then I explain why the research is important for MS/ST. 
Finally I present the overall structure of the thesis. 
 
1.2 My Antecedents and Why I am Interested in Intention 
My interest in intention came from the idea that actors are central and their role is 
decisive in how tools are used.  My own experience as a computer programmer, 
information technology manager and academic has convinced me of that. On many 
occasions regardless of the aforementioned practice’s domains, I saw always the 
possibility to adapt the tools at hand. It does not matter if they were for developing 
software as in my earlier experiences or MS/ST methodologies in my later career. 
 
It felt strange when I started on my Master’s degree to study some of the ideas on 
MS/ST. On one side, the arguments about the right way to use a tool and/or the right 
context for their application always inspired me additional ways for application. 
However, it just did not seem desirable to circumscribe their possibilities to a 
prescription. I always felt that it was possible to be flexible when dealing with 
computer programming. It was possible to produce a solution using the tools in many 
different ways. Consequently, I did not see why this was not applicable even in a 
greater extent to human activity systems. 
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In my development as an academic I saw different ideas that were supporting my 
intuition.  For instance, you can be pragmatic, change the aim of truth or central 
criteria to judge situations (the standard), for “an attempt to serve transitory purposes 
and solve transitory problems” (Rorty, 1999, p.xxiii). You can be critical as Foucault 
(1982), and distrust the idea of objectivity and value free knowledge. You can be 
interpretative and accept that objectivity is not enough for understanding human 
action, and that meaning and intentions are fundamental (Schwandt, 2000). 
 
A very important influence on my ideas was constructivism and those branches close 
to systems thinking, such as Second Order Cybernetics, Radical Contructivism and 
Autopoiesis.  In first order cybernetics the purpose of the system is given by a higher 
order or external system.  In second order, the system can define its own purpose. 
Accordingly, for Von Foerster (2003), human social systems need to be understood 
from this perspective, because humans can define their own purpose.  Radical 
Constructivism goes farther stating that “observations are made by an experiencing 
subject and therefore depend on that subject’s ways of perceiving and conceiving” 
(Von Glasersfeld, 2003, p.7). 
 
On similar lines Maturana and Varela (1992) develop the theory of Autopoiesis. In his 
theory of the observer Maturana (1988) states that human beings cannot have direct 
access to reality. What we can do is to construct with others agreements about it. 
There is not a way to establish what is ultimately real. On this view defining a 
standard for a methodology is just a convention, and the convention could be the other 
way around, namely not having a standard.  
 
One important aspect of Autopiesis theory is language (Maturana & Varela, 1992). 
Language is not a series of symbols that have a correspondence with objects or action 
in the “reality”, but simply an elaborate way in which complex organisms can co-
ordinate behaviour in recurrent interactions. The power of language is that it enables 
the user to use past elaborations in language to construct more elaborate co-ordination 
of behaviour with others or even with ourselves. It is through language that we can 
create complex co-ordinations of behaviour such as intervening and using tools.   
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Autopoiesis triggered my interest on language (Vélez Castiblanco, 1999). On this 
path, I discovered Wittgenstein’s (2001) idea of conceiving language as a tool. 
Accordingly, the meaning of a word is not intrinsic. Its meaning derives from the use 
that we gave them.  I wondered if this idea could be applied to conceptual tools. If so 
this could be a way to show that actors intrude on the supposed objectivity of the tool 
when applied.  
 
Taking the decision to explore intentions on this research is a step on the way to how 
by our intentions, actors can produce different uses on their tools.  Based on 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy, different uses imply that in action, the tools will obtain 
different meanings and possibilities. Finding ways to enhance our possibilities in an 
intervention can be seen as the intention triggering the research.  
 
Note that Wittgenstein’s ideas impose on me a caveat. At the end of the research, I 
will not find the true meaning or nature of intentions. I will just develop another tool, 
another “language game”. It is not about finding a final solution to the problem 
(Fogelin, 1996). Consequently, the aim of my research is not the search for the 
essential nature of intentions.  This cannot be done from Wittgenstein’s perspective.  
Instead, this is a search for useful ways, for tools to understand intentions in MS/ST 
practice. 
 
1.3 Exploring Intentions on Intervention 
My research process involves a conceptual component (reading about intention in 
philosophical and theoretical literature) and an empirical component (fieldwork, 
interviewing, witnessing meetings and giving feedback to my participants about their 
work). This is mediated by my reflections about the whole process, not only while on 
the field but also after my involvement with the Team Of Practitioners (hereafter 
referred as TOP) was done.  The interplay of concepts and empirical experiences 
provided me with ways and ideas for inquiring, making sense of the data, and 
developing my understanding of intention.  
 
One fundamental part of this research is the constant testing of ideas about what 
intention could be. The testing involved matching explanations derived from different 
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ways to understand intention in philosophy and theory with events on the field. These 
events referred to my own actions, those of others and the interactions with my 
research participants. In those interactions, my participants even help me to evaluate 
the usefulness of the explanations for practice. 
 
Broadly speaking this process matches a deductive logic (Blaikie, 2000, 2007) in 
which the researcher formulates hypotheses about a phenomenon and then seeks 
disconfirming empirical evidence. Hypotheses that survive this process are then 
considered better explanations of the phenomenon than those that are rejected.  The 
process of formulating the hypothesis in itself can be considered hermeneutic.  “The 
meaning of a part can only be understood if it is related to the whole…Conversely, the 
whole consists of parts, hence it can only be understood on the basis of these” 
(Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2007, p.53).  In this way, I was producing understanding on 
the matter reflecting on the overall experience and its relations to the “parts” of it.  
The understanding was then put to the test. 
 
The overall research process is illustrated on Figure 1.1.  The figure shows a two-part 
research process.  The first part refers to activities carried out when on the field.  The 
distinctive features here were the feedback sessions delivered to the group.  These 
served as converging points of the different research activities such as interviews, 
attendance to meetings, or theoretical readings.  The information produced by these 
activities was used as the topics for discussion on the feedback as it is shown on the 
figure on the left side of the feedback square.  The input at the top of the feedback 
boxes shows ideas used to inform the way to conduct the session.  The bottom side of 
the feedback squares shows the learning about the session that flows to help in the 
conduction of other feedback sessions.  Detailed descriptions about this part of the 
research can be found on Chapter Five. 
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Figure 1.1. Overall research process. 
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The output of the feedback sessions (how the mixtures of ideas worked out) is part of 
the input for the work carried out in the second part of the research, after the 
fieldwork.  The work involved reflecting in a series of cycles about the experiences 
and the ever increasing amount of theoretical readings.  In this part, the work was 
progressively making sense and integrating all the aspects explored about intention in 
this thesis.  The diagrams and names of the intermediate reflecting processes (doing 
things intentionally and intending to do things) match the contents in Chapters Six and 
Seven. 
 
In the following subsections, first I briefly introduce the empirical work carried out 
(the fieldwork part of the research on the Figure 1.1).  Then, I identify relevant 
philosophical and theoretical ideas used to guide my formulation of the intention’s 
concept.  Although, this work was initiated on the field, most of the achievements 
were obtained as an outcome of my reflections after the fieldwork. 
 
1.3.1 The Empirical Work 
The key participants in this research, TOP are a team of ten researchers.  Members of 
this team are experienced in dealing with social issues and working towards 
improving the conditions of communities in New Zealand.  Crucially for my research 
they were using, among their intervention tools, MS/ST methodologies such as Soft 
Systems Methodology (Checkland, 1981), Creative Design of Methods (Midgley, 
2000), Theory of Constraints (Davies, Mabin, & Balderstone, 2005), Systems 
Dynamics (Rouwette & Vennix, 2006), and Critical Systems Heuristics (Ulrich, 
1983). 
 
There were some characteristics that made TOP an especially good setting for this 
research. They were informing their intervention with MS/ST, and they asked my 
feedback as compensation.  This last aspect pushed me to look for ways to make the 
research relevant for the improvement of their work, and I was encouraged to 
intervene as well.  Additionally, they were reacting and commenting about the quality 
of my feedback.  I was also receiving feedback.  Part of this feedback was used to 
improve the feedback sessions themselves, and part was feeding later reflective 
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process as shown in Figure 1.1.  Having TOP to crosscheck and improve the ideas 
developed, was for me an important asset for the research. 
 
Because the team was intervening with its various participant communities, and I was 
intervening with my feedback, I could contrast their understanding and my 
understanding on the actions and intentions.  Their understanding was mainly based 
on experience. My understanding was initially based on the literature.  In fact, I was 
even drawing from the literature on intention to present my feedback to the group. In 
this way, I was evaluating the relevance and usefulness of these ideas for TOP. 
 
The characteristics of intervening and reflecting on their and my actions enabled me 
to draw parallels with Action Research (Dash, 1999; Dick, 1993; Fals Borda, 2006; 
Reason & Bradbury, 2006c).  Action Research is a family of approaches that follows 
a process in which initial ideas about a situation are used to intervene, and then, in 
successive cycles, these ideas are refined by reflecting on the taken actions and their 
effects (Dash, 1999). Under this view, Action Research resembles the iterative 
process of deduction mentioned above.  In Figure 1.1 it can be seen that there were 
three feedback sessions corresponding to two learning cycles. 
 
Drawing from the idea of Action Research also allowed me to support the intervention 
process and my data collection on the feedback sessions, using other methods (Reason 
& Bradbury, 2006b).  Accordingly, I draw from interviews, transcriptions of recorded 
meetings, and documents produced by TOP accordingly to the feedback as is shown 
on Figure 1.1.   
 
In the interviews, I looked to understand the stance of each one of the participants 
regarding intervention and the use of tools. In addition, I looked at how they were 
making sense of their intervention process. In their meetings, I was allowed to make 
audio recordings that I complemented with notes about the interaction. This proved to 
be important to reconstruct the way in which their intervention process was evolving. 
Additionally, I used documentation generated by TOP such as reports, plans, 
reflections, papers and emails. 
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It is important to note that Action Research was not the only set of ideas that I sued to 
inform the feedback sessions.  As is shown on the Y axis of the feedback boxes on 
Figure 1.1, I also used ideas from a methodology call Soft Systems Methodology 
(explained on Appendix 5), and ideas from Language Games in Wittgenstein 
philosophy as is explained in more detail on Chapter Five. 
 
Although my research is not a full blown Action Research project, it does resemble it. 
The difference can be noticed pointing out that Action Research is participative 
(Coghlan & Brannick, 2001), and consequently, involves a research problem that 
concerns the whole team.  However, I started by researching TOP on an issue of my 
concern; the research was on them not with them (Herr & Anderson, 2005).   
 
Nevertheless, I always made the effort to make my feedback relevant to TOP’s work. 
I was looking to contribute to their work. I also benefited from their feedback to my 
research but also as a professional interested in research. We engaged in a mutual 
learning relationship.  At the end of my engagement my relationship with them was 
more one of a participant than an observer. 
 
1.3.2 The Philosophical/Theoretical Work 
Since the fields of MS/ST have not themselves focused on understanding intention, in 
order to delve into and better understand this concept I had to look elsewhere. My 
background and investigations led me to philosophical and theoretical explorations. 
Especially I used Language Pragmatics and Philosophy of Action.  Wittgenstein’s role 
as a precursor of both fields weighed importantly for the decision of use them. 
 
Language Pragmatics studies meaning in relation to how language is used.  This is in 
line with the notion of a language working as a tool and in general with the 
importance of Wittgenstein as “philosopher of language use” (Kopytko, 2007, p.792).  
One of the central concepts is that every use of language implies locutionary, 
illocutionary and perlocutionary acts (Bertucelli Papi, 1996).  The locutionary 
involves the technical problem of producing the communication (phonetic, syntax). 
The illocutionary, the force and intention put on it, is the one that let us use a word 
such as ‘hello’ in a welcoming, neutral or threatening manner. The perlocutionary 
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refers to the effects produced on others. It can be seen then that Language Pragmatics 
is identifying intentions as an intrinsic component in the use of language.  
 
This research employs a branch of Language Pragmatics that is known as ‘Relevance 
Theory’ (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). Relevance Theory considers that the main 
problem for communication is the “expression and recognition of intentions” (Wilson 
& Sperber, 2002a, p.249).  Additionally, it explores the links between intentions and 
their effects.  This is important because the purpose in this thesis is to look for ways to 
understand how intentions can be pertinent or applicable to interventions.  This 
theoretical exploration supports the reflection on “Doing things intentionally” as 
shown on Figure 1.1.  This reflection cycle is explained on Chapter Six, where is also 
expanded how other philosophical and theoretical perspectives such as Boundary 
Critique and Language Games were also involved. 
 
The second field, ‘Philosophy of Action’ is a branch of Philosophy of Mind (Ginet, 
1989; Mele, 1992, 1997b; Searle, 2004).  A useful way to describe its central question 
is through the aphorism: “What is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up 
from the fact that I raise my arm?” (Wittgenstein, 2001, §621).  As Mele (1997a) 
points out our actions are interesting because they carry intentions. Actions without 
intentions are merely bodily movements.  This theoretical exploration supports the 
reflection on “Intending to do things” as shown on Figure 1.1.  This reflection cycle is 
explained on Chapter Seven. 
 
There are many approaches to trying to explain the nature of intentions in Philosophy 
of Action. Two ideas were important for my process of sorting out how to approach 
them and establishing links with Language Pragmatics.  In other words, they were 
important for deciding the initial two reflecting processes after the fieldwork shown 
on Figure 1.1.  One is that intentions are not a single phenomenon.  They can be 
conceived as a two-faced phenomenon. “We do things intentionally, and we intend to 
do things” (Bratman, 1997, p.178). There is an aspect of intentions that is directed to 
the present and one that is directed to the future. The two faces of intentions are the 
major themes of the research. 
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The second idea is that it was easier to approach intentions through their perceived 
usefulness.  According, to the Philosophy of Action they have a variety of uses 
(Baldwin & Baird, 2001; Enç, 2003; Mele, 1992). They enable us to make sense of, 
explain and rationalize our actions and those of others. They are fundamental in 
helping to coordinate the interactions between groups of agents. Finally, they can 
cause, sustain and guide action. These ideas about what intentions are useful for, help 
to flesh out the workings of present and future faces of intention and make easier to 
establish their relevance for intervention. 
 
After working out, both sides of intention there comes a final synthesising reflection 
effort.  “Entwining explanations” as shown on Figure 1.1, combines both threads of 
discussions on intention, mainly with the help of philosophy of explanations.  The 
basic argument is that both threads correspond to different kind of explanations that 
can complement each other.  This last reflection is developed on Chapter Eight. 
 
1.4 Why It Matters for Management Science/Systems 
Thinking 
Authors on the field such as Churchman (1979), Ulrich (1983) and Checkland and 
Sholes (1990) have pointed out the importance of intentions for intervention.  
However, their work does not develop the notion. Additionally, core concepts in the 
field such as methods, methodologies and the idea of there being a ‘standard use’ are 
suggestive of the notion of intention. This situation points out a first reason for 
studying intention: the concept is just taken for granted and, consequently, there is a 
gap in the knowledge. 
 
A second reason for studying intentions follows from what potentially intention can 
do to the actions and tools applied in the intervention, namely change them. This 
becomes important when it is considered that flexibility and creativity have been 
recognised in MS/ST as crucial for tackling complex situations (Jackson, 2003b; 
Midgley, 2000; Mingers & Brocklesby, 1997; Ormerod, 2002; Rosenhead, 1980; 
Torlak, 2001).  
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Because problem situations can be very complex, no methodology can deal with every 
possible scenario. Consequently, practitioners need to react and adapt (Midgley, 1989; 
Ulrich, 2001). They need to be flexible to adapt/bend the rules of the tools used. They 
need to be creative to conceive whole new meanings and uses. Figuring out how 
intentions affect, modify and change a tool or action can be a way to understand how 
to obtain more flexible and creative uses. 
 
A third reason for studying the effect of intentions on interventions is to produce new 
kinds of intervention accounts for learning about the process.  The current dominant 
way to tell those stories in MS/ST is through methodologies.  However, this leaves 
actors out of the picture.  What it is pursued here is to weave those intervention stories 
in relation to intentions.  Centring those stories on intentions can let us incorporate 
and reflect on the actions guided by formal tools, any kind of action, and of course, 
actor’s perspective. 
 
Intention is a topic close to the interpretative tradition (Schwandt, 2000). From the 
interpretative point of view, the goal is to understand how subjective reality is 
constructed. “This is often referred to as the principle of verstehen (Weber, 1949) 
whereby understanding meaning and intentionality is emphasized over and above 
causal explanations” (Prasad, 2005, p.14).  What matters is to identify the meaning or 
intention that actors are attaching to their actions.  
 
From the point of view of Philosophy of Action, our actions are interesting because 
they carry intentions; actions without intentions are merely bodily movements 
(1997a).  From this view what is interesting about the tools used in an intervention is 
not how they lead actions but how they interplay with the intentions and meanings of 
the actors using them. 
 
My final reason for studying intentions, the ethical, is perhaps the most important. If 
the practitioner’s intentions do not matter in the intervention, methodologies will have 
the central stage for the understanding of intervention processes. If, on the contrary, 
their intentions have effects, it will mean that methodologies are not objective tools.  
It will mean that actors and how their values affect the use of those tools need to be 
 25 
accounted for.  This implies giving the practitioner a more central role in the 
understanding of the intervention process. 
 
The literature (Kay & Halpin, 1999; Romm, 2001; Taket, 1994), has identified 
problems that arise from MS/ST practice when methodologies are emphasised at 
expenses of the actor/practitioner. For instance, methodologies can be presented as 
scientific. Consequently, through their use, power exercises are seen as applied 
rationality (Rosenhead & Thunhurst, 1982).  Alternatively, they can be presented as a 
tool that takes decisions without the intervention of the actor, serving as a kind of 
scapegoat for the manager’s decisions (Beer, 1994).  In both cases, the methodology 
is manipulated, in one case to pursue some particular interest and in the other to evade 
responsibilities.  
 
The topic of how intentions play a role in interventions can show that the use of a 
methodology is not neutral, that partly, it depends on the actor. Consequently, people 
can be more aware of how the methodology can be used to pursue some interest or for 
evading responsibility. What is more, as an actor applying methodologies, I can be 
more aware of how my own biases affect the way in which I use them. 
 
“How individuals think critically about dealing with potential ethical dilemmas 
remains unexplored” (Córdoba, 2006, p.1028).  This is another gap in our knowledge 
in which the topic of intention may open ways for exploration. 
 
1.5 The Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is organised in Three Parts (Figure 1.2). The First Part establishes a 
conceptual framework underpinning the research. This covers the disciplinary area 
MS/ST to which thesis aims to contribute (Chapter Two), the research methodology 
(Chapter Three) and the philosophical basis for understanding intention (Chapter 
Four). The Second Part involves a single chapter presenting the empirical part of the 
work on the field (Chapter Five). In the Third Part, each chapter (Chapters Six, Seven 
and Eight) discusses elements of the fieldwork and advance contributions.  
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Figure 1.2. The Structure of the Thesis. 
 
Let me now briefly introduce each chapter.  Chapter Two introduces the field of 
MS/ST. Some of its branches are presented, especially the Boundary Critique Theory, 
an important piece of the argument here.  Additionally, the core concept of 
methodology as a way to learn about interventions is examined. Next, it builds the 
case of the importance that intention has for the field.  Because the topic in itself has 
been underdeveloped, its importance is shown indirectly.   
 
For instance, standard and non-standard uses of methodologies make use of the 
concept of intention (although intention in itself is not developed).  Nevertheless, this 
provides openings to introduce the importance of intention.  Other openings are ethics 
and alternative ways to learn about the intervention process.  Both offer opportunities 
to introduce actors and their circumstances in the intervention process.  Additionally, 
it is shown the gap in the MS/ST literature, and the research questions towards filling 
the gap. Finally, this chapter presents Wittgenstein’s philosophy as a foundation to 
understand an MS/ST intervention process. This allows conceptual space to consider 
actors and with them, their intentions. 
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Chapter Three (Research Methodology), considers how to approach the research. It 
presents my first approaches with my participants on the case study site. Then, based 
on those characteristics and on the research problem, it shows how I decided to 
approach them. The basic idea was to combine an empirical and a 
philosophical/theoretical exploration, and in this way learn about intention contrasting 
the different sources. This approach involves the logic of deduction as well as tools 
drawing mainly from Action Research. The chapter also deals with my stance as a 
researcher, my ethical guidelines, the literature reviewed and a justification of the 
narrative voices used in the thesis. 
 
After showing how to approach the empirical, Chapter Four shows the philosophical 
and theoretical foundations for the exploration. Two paths are presented. One derives 
from philosophy of language and is based on Language Pragmatics and specially the 
Theory of Relevance. The other is based on Philosophy of Action. It shows intention 
as a two-faced phenomenon with present and future oriented faces. These faces are 
proposed as the organising themes of the research and are developed in Chapters Six 
and Seven. 
 
In the second part, Chapter Five describes the research procedures. This description 
works as a central hub. It gathers ideas from all the previous chapters showing how 
they were actually performed in practice and is the foundation for later chapters. It 
complements the methodology on Chapter Three. Following Holliday (2007), on one 
hand, Chapter Three defines how I planned to carry out the research before my 
involvement on the field.  On the other hand, this chapter presents an account and 
catalogue of what was actually done.  The account shows how the work used MS/ST 
and Language Games ideas (Chapter Two), and it shows the activities carried out to 
test and develop the ideas on intention introduced on Chapter Four. Finally, it shows 
how I proceed to organise the data, and the learning gained on the field. 
 
Moving now to the third part of the work, Chapter Six develops ways of 
understanding how we do things intentionally. Here I am relying in understanding 
language as action as in Wittgenstein philosophy. On this base, I show how these 
actions can have effects on what is considered relevant in a situation. I call this 
approach, boundary games, a synthesis of ideas in Relevance Theory and Boundary 
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Critique Theory. It draws heavily from the analysis of interactions of the field 
(Chapter Five) and the ideas about the present directed intention (Chapter Four). 
 
Chapter Seven shows the process that I followed to arrive at a way to understand how 
we intend to do things.  Here different alternatives introduced in Chapter Four are 
confronted against my own experiences on the field (Chapter Five). At the end, to 
understand this face of intention, I combine ideas from complexity theory and 
Philosophy of Action. Consequently, the future-oriented intentions are understood as 
emergent complex adaptive systems. 
 
Chapter Eight works on how to combine the views on intention in Chapter Six and 
Seven. It argues that they are different kind of explanations that are needed to have a 
better picture of how intentions intrude on interventions. Finally, Chapter Nine the 
concluding chapter shows how the work answers the proposed questions, summarizes 
the arguments, examines what is the overall contribution of the thesis and proposes 
possible future research. 
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PART ONE: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
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Chapter 2 Management Science/Systems Thinking 
and Intentions 
Exploring the overall importance of intentions in Management Science/Systems 
Thinking interventions was presented as the purpose of this thesis in Chapter One. 
The task is now to build some foundations in order to carry out the research. This 
chapter starts the process by focusing on the field of knowledge to which this research 
aims to contribute and the current place of intention in it. 
 
Management Science/Systems Thinking (MS/ST hereafter) is a label for a field that is 
referred to in different ways.  Sometimes it is described using  individual labels such 
as Operational Research (OR), Management Science (MS), Systems Thinking (ST), or 
various combinations of these such as OR/ST, MS/ST and OR/MS.  The label ‘OR’ 
stresses the origins and tradition of the discipline.  The label MS stresses the relevance 
to a specific kind of activity.  ST emphasises a way to approach the problems.   
 
As Midgley (2000) points out, every history has a point of view.  Here, the point of 
view leading to use of the label MS/ST is based on writers from the Critical Systems 
Thinking tradition.  It follows ideas from authors such as Jackson, Keys and Mingers 
(Jackson, 1982, 1987, 1990; Jackson & Keys, 1984, 1987; Keys, 2002a; Mingers, 
1992, 1997a, 2000, 2003).  
 
The combination used in this thesis MS/ST stresses two sets of ideas.  The first draws 
attention to the broad aim of the discipline, which is to assist stakeholders in 
managing situations that are perceived as problematic through the use of models.  
Models are seen a “way in which human thought process can be amplified” 
(Churchman, 1968, p.61), and although the use of mathematics is frequent in this 
model, they are not restricted to this.  Second, a holistic approach is employed in 
helping to make sense of these situations.  These two sets of ideas are explained in the 
first part of the chapter. 
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Then, there is the problem of intention. Although mentioned, intentions are not 
directly managed by the MS/ST literature. Consequently, I take indirect routes: 
methodology and their standard and non-standard use, and ethics. Methodologies are a 
core concept in MS/ST. They are used among other things to codify the learning about 
intervention. Additionally, methodology is based on the concept of intention despite 
the fact that the concept in itself is taken for granted. The main argument here is that 
standard uses are unlikely and that actors and their intentions could be one of the 
reasons for this. Ethics is included because it suggests that actors have a say in how an 
intervention process develops. If they do not, ethical discussions would not be 
necessary. 
 
The indirect arguments show that there is a place for intention and that perhaps 
learning about the intervention using methodologies without taking into account the 
actor is limited. Although there are arguments about the need of standards in order to 
learn of the interventions, they are not the only way to gain knowledge of the process.  
It is suggested that intentions can contribute to these other ways to learn about 
interventions. 
 
All this suggests a gap in the knowledge; this gap is then used as a base to propose the 
research questions.  The main idea is that the knowledge about intentions in the field 
is underexplored so it is necessary to develop ways to approach the concept to make it 
pertinent and useful for MS/ST. 
 
The chapter ends showing the concepts of Language Games in Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy and how they can be a foundation to think about interventions in MS/ST 
considering actors and their intentions. 
 
2.1 Systems Thinking 
Systems Thinking is usually defined in contrast to Reductionism (Checkland, 1981; 
Flood & Jackson, 1991).  The basic idea of Reductionism is to split complex 
phenomena into their component parts, with the aim of understanding these 
independently of one another.  The aim is to find the essence that defines and lets us 
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have an understanding of the thing itself.  Consequently, everything that is not the 
thing itself is ripped out as not essential, including the observer (Fuenmayor, 1991a).   
 
Following Fuenmayor (1991a) reductionism can be described as a process of 
establishing and shrinking boundaries around an object of study.  The process reduces 
this object to an essence.  Having the essence, reductionist science ideally looks to 
express it in mathematical terms. 
 
Whereas Reductionism goes for the essence, Systems Thinking proceeds in the 
opposite direction.  If reductionism is about shrinking boundaries, systems thinking is 
about expanding them and understanding things in a context, part of which includes 
the observer (Córdoba & Midgley, 2006; Churchman, 1979).  However, this process 
is tricky because boundaries cannot be expanded forever, so a big concern is how to 
stop the expansion of boundaries before losing sight of the object of understanding 
(Ulrich, 1983). The other problem with this process is that sometimes this expanding 
boundary does not include the observer (Midgley, 2000). This is a problem that some 
systems thinkers, particularly those working within the second-order cybernetics 
tradition such as Von Foerster (1989), Von Glasersfeld (1996) and Maturana (1988), 
believe is essential and are particularly keen to emphasise. 
 
When objects and/or situations are observed using systems thinking, relationships 
between the different components and observers have to be considered. Observers co 
arise with the world that they are trying to understand (Maturana, 2000).  When 
boundaries are expanded instead of essences, the search is for patterns and for 
emergent properties that arise from the interactions of all the components, including 
us as observers (Georgiou, 2007). 
 
This particular systemic way of approaching and thinking about situations extends 
beyond any particular field.  Systems thinking has been used to think about different 
disciplines (e.g. biology, geography, physics), to study systems in their own right (e.g. 
cybernetics, autopoiesis, chaos theory, general systems theory) and for problem 
solving (Jackson, 2000).  Here, the focus is on this third use, problem solving, 
especially under the name Management Science which is the focus of the next section. 
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2.2 Management Science 
One of the defining features of Management Science is that it nearly always involves 
constructing and using models of some kind (Maani & Cavana, 2000).  However, 
what these models are taken to represent how they are constructed, the information 
that is used and the purpose that is pursued with them varies (Mingers, 2003).  What  
is constant is that they are used as a basis for some intervention.  That is to say, they 
are devices or tools that play a key role in “purposeful action by an agent to create 
change” (Midgley, 2003, p.77). For example, models in MS can help tackle perceived 
problematic situations such as those in the organizational processes, in the 
organizational structure, the organizational culture or dealing with issues of power 
and conflict (Flood, 1995). 
 
It is important to note that the name Management Science does not limit the activities 
to commercial organizations.  In fact, the need to manage also extends to the public 
sector, consumer groups, political parties, charities, resident associations (Rosenhead, 
1986), the community (Wong & Mingers, 1994) and lately the environment (Alvarez 
& Emery, 2000). 
 
The next section provides a brief historical description of some of the branches in MS.  
The aim is to show some of the breath and extension of the field as well as its constant 
evolution. 
 
2.2.1 Classic Operational Research 
Contrary to many disciplines, the origins of OR are very easy to track down (Keys, 
1991).  The early stages of the discipline are linked to the British Second World War 
efforts from 1935 to 1945.  The term OR itself started to be used in 1937.  At that 
time, the military was employing different groups of scientists.  Some of them were 
developing technologies such as radar.  However, using radar in an effective way 
required new and interdisciplinary approaches from the scientists. 
 
The distinguishing feature of these new approaches was that they were concerned not 
on the machine in itself but about the best ways to manage the operations around the 
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machine.  So the label “‘Operational Research Section’ was a natural choice” (Keys, 
1991, p.13).  In the case of radar, the operations included elements such as direct 
observations, location diagrams, information filtering systems, operation rooms, 
tactical purposes, strategic purposes, coordination, men, and squadrons.  The problem 
to solve: “to find out how best to use the radars in what we would now call the total 
systems for intercepting and destroying enemy aircraft” ((E. C. Williams, 1968) cited 
by Keys (1991, p.13)).  The activities were perceived as successful and, consequently, 
they expanded. 
 
The methods used by the Operational Research Section to confront this task were 
based on the scientific method: observation, analysis of mainly quantitative data and 
experiments to support the conclusion of the analysis.  As a matter of force the 
experiments were not carried out in laboratories but in the field (Keys, 1991).  These 
experiments were, in fact, what would now be called interventions. 
 
After the war, some of the scientists who were working for the military started to 
work for industry.  They were applying the ideas of Operational Research to problems 
in organizations.  Exploration and problems such as organizing shipping schedules, 
accident prevention, production planning, and control systems, were characteristic of 
this transition (Keys, 1991). 
 
Over time, some recurrent problems were found, so standard techniques and methods 
were developed to deal with them.  They were aimed at problems such as inventory 
processes, allocation processes, waiting-line processes, replacement processes, and 
competitive processes.  The models and solutions produced for these problems draw 
from mathematics ranging from probability, calculus to game theory.  The reliance on 
mathematics is a defining characteristic of what is now called ‘Hard OR’. Because 
mathematics and the models are seen as objective, there is no need to take into 
account an observer. 
 
At this time, the influential book Introduction to Operations Research by the key 
authors Churchman, Ackoff, and Arnoff (1957) presented the first comprehensive list 
of problems and models used, and additionally a general methodology for ‘Classic 
OR’.  The way in which the methodology is pictured, shows OR as a problem-solving 
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process. Central to this methodology is the use of mathematical models to represent 
and predict possible actions in the context of the situation.  The stages of the process 
were defined as: problem formulation, model construction, solving the model, testing 
the model and the solution, establishing controls over the solution, implementing the 
solution. 
 
During the 1950s OR began to consolidate thanks to OR groups, publications and 
instruction.  Around this time there were efforts to expand the initial concerns of OR, 
and the label Management Science was applied to these efforts.  However, in the 1960 
both labels and both disciplines generally were seen as the same (Daellenbach, 2002).   
 
2.2.2 Soft Systems Thinking 
Toward the 1970s there was the perception among some practitioners that the 
discipline was in crisis (Keys, 1987). The initial interdisciplinary character was lost in 
mathematical prowess.  Additionally, the Classical OR approach was criticised for its 
weakness when dealing with the human aspects in organizations. This was due to the 
use of single uncontested representations and the assumption of always legitimate 
decision makers (Ackoff, 1974, 1976, 1979; Rosenhead, 2006; Rosenhead & 
Thunhurst, 1982). Single representations excluded the possibility of different views 
and, therefore, participation. The assumption of always legitimate decision-makers 
helped to perpetuate unfairness. 
 
Consequently, new approaches allowing different perspectives, qualitative 
information and the possibility to contest the assumptions on the intervention’s 
conditions were developed (Eden, 1982; Jackson, 1987).  From this perspective, there 
is space for subjectivity and with it for the observer. Contrary to the classic OR, here 
on many occasions the problems are ill structured and defined.  
 
All these characteristics required a shift in the way in which problems were tackled. 
The move was from a functionalism to an interpretative paradigm (Jackson, 1982, 
2000).  In classic OR (functionalist) the boundaries of the system were seen as given 
by the structure of reality. Now it was important to see that these boundaries were 
social and personal constructs (Midgley, 2000). 
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The focus now, at least in the first instance, was to structure problems and construct 
relevant boundaries.  Hence, these approaches are also known as problem structuring 
methods.  The system idea moves from using models as representations of reality to 
models as devices to encourage debate, negotiation and agreement (Checkland & 
Sholes, 1990; Eden & Ackermann, 2006). 
 
These approaches retain the traditional MS/OR reliance on rational analysis and the use of 
representations to capture the meaning of situations.  They differ in that the data used within 
the representations are qualitative and consequently the tools and analysis are non-
mathematical. (Keys, 2002a, p.140) 
 
2.2.3 Critical Systems Thinking 
The 1980s brought new concerns to the MS/ST community.  One concern was that 
methodologies were perpetuating unfair social situations, strengthening powerful 
stakeholders at the expense of the weak.  Soft OR was ignoring social and political 
structures (Brocklesby, 1993; Jackson, 1982; Mingers, 1992).  A second concern 
revolved around a big increase in the number of methodologies.  This diversity not 
only in the number but also in the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings was 
seen as a weakness.   
 
On this background, Critical Systems Thinking emerges not as a consensus about 
what it is but as an “evolving debate around a set of themes that are considered 
important” (Midgley, 1996, p.12):  
 
• Critical awareness ― examining and re-examining taken-for-granted assumptions, along 
with the conditions that give rise to them 
• Emancipation ― ensuring that research is focused on “improvement,” defined temporarily 
and locally, taking issues of power (which affect the definition) into account 
• Methodological pluralism ― using a variety of research methods in a theoretically coherent 
manner, becoming aware of their strengths and weaknesses, to address a corresponding variety 
of issues. (Midgley, 1996, p.11) 
 
Ulrich (2003) identifies two strands.  The TSI strand focuses on developing 
frameworks to make informed choices of methodologies and take advantage of the 
diversity of methodologies and methods, seeing diversity as a strength not a weakness 
(Jackson & Keys, 1984).  These frameworks look to be exploit complementarism and 
pluralism.  Complementarism looks at meaningful ways to support the weakness of 
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one approach with the strengths of others. Pluralism is not necessarily looking for 
coherence but emphasises that the different nature of the approaches provides 
different views to inform action (Zhu, 2006).  
 
Overall, the argument is that one strategy cannot win in every scenario. Having 
alternatives lets us choose what is the best way to tackle a problem or if there is none, 
how to tailor one.  Some of the frameworks produced for this tradition are explored 
with more detail in relation to the standard use of methodologies in Section 2.4.2 for 
this reason now I turn to the second strand. 
 
The second strand, is called Critical Systems Heuristics by Ulrich (2003).  Although 
Ulrich seems to argue that his position is too different to other contemporary efforts in 
CST, there is the alternative view that he is part of what Yolles (2001) calls Boundary 
Critique Theory, view that will be use here. 
 
The theory of Boundary Critique can trace its roots to Churchman work and especially 
his understanding of boundary. “From the point of view of ideal-planning, the 
question of the proper boundaries has no plausible, common sense answer.  It’s like 
all the other questions, about clients, purposes, measure of performance, etc.  The idea 
is not to find an answer but to foster the process of unfolding” (Churchman, 1979, 
p.91). 
 
Consequently, boundaries are not really given by nature.  They need to be constructed 
and “unfolded” by the participants. How they are marked will have a decisive 
influence in how the issue or system under focus will be tackled (Midgley, 2000).  
Churchman approaches the process of unfolding the boundary as a dialectic process as 
in Hegel philosophy (Jackson, 2000).  It is a cyclical process where we strive for 
being more comprehensive and take more and more issues into consideration.  
 
On this basis, Ulrich develops the notion of Boundary Critique.  The aim is “to make 
visible the ways in which any specific claim is conditioned by boundary judgements 
and how the facts and values it asserts change when the boundary judgements are 
modified” (Ulrich, 2003, p.333–334).  In a nutshell, his work takes Chuchman’s ideas 
of Boundary and couples it with the critical philosophy of Habermas, an approach to 
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develop theoretical approaches to improve the conditions of others (Brocklesby & 
Cummings, 1996, p.741). 
 
Ulrich (1983) assesses the boundary of a system through twelve critical questions. 
The questions explore sources of motivation, control, expertise and legitimisation. 
Each of the questions is posed in is and ought mode, enabling contrast and critical 
evaluation of the current system. Ulrich (2003) sees these questions as fundamental 
before engaging in intervention with other methodologies. 
 
Midgley’s work builds up from Churchman and Ulrich.  Philosophically, he uses 
Whitehead’s process philosophy to show that any attempt to gain knowledge requires 
first a judge about the boundary. How or on what we gain knowledge depends on how 
boundaries are marked. On the intervention side, Midgley focuses on the problem of 
marginalisation, namely how actors are included, excluded and the resultant conflict. 
He uses Douglas’s sociological work to show how different groups of stakeholders 
mark different boundaries making some elements and values important or not, in 
Midgley (2000, p.143) terms “sacred or a profane status” is imposed. 
 
The issues of inclusion and conflict have been later expanded by authors such as 
Yolles (2001) and Córdoba (2007).  The first draws from Management Cybernetics 
while the second does it from the biological ideas of Autopoiesis.  Both aim to expand 
the explanatory power of the theory and the possibilities to guide interventions. 
 
Boundary Critique is important for this research because independently from the way 
in which an intervention is informed, even if boundaries are not explicated used to 
reflect in the situation, every intervention process is conditioned and change them.  
This will offer in later chapters ways to link Boundary Critique with intention, 
establishing a conceptual space in MS/ST for the contribution. 
 
2.3 Methodology 
As has been mentioned, MS/ST interventions involve the use of models. Learning 
from them involves discerning technical aspects of the process of “how models 
constructed using MS/OR techniques are built, validated and used in the situations 
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they aim to represent” (Keys, 2002b, p.212). These aspects are collected and 
expressed by statements or methodologies. MS/ST learning is codified in 
methodologies. 
 
Despite it being a vital element in MS/ST practice, the concept of methodology is 
frequently misunderstood.  Many meanings are attached to the word, some of which 
are somewhat contradictory.  Lehaney and Vinten (1994) show that the term is 
currently applied in MS as: scientific methodologies, ways in which techniques are 
chosen, ways in which problems are chosen, method or techniques, modelling process 
and chronological planning of events. 
 
Here I will discuss the concept to clarify it and show that intention appears as one of 
the supporting ideas for the notion of methodology. 
 
2.3.1 Tracing the Term 
The roots of the term methodology can be traced to Greek language, not directly as 
methodology but as method (Kotarbiński, 1966).  The concept of method has suffered 
many transformations.  It started as “the path of a person who follows or pursues 
another person”.  Later the meaning changed to a path to something, or the way to do 
something.  In a more modern interpretation, it is “expert behaviour in the field of 
analysing, bringing out ideas, formulating one’s thoughts” (Kotarbiński, 1966, p.439). 
 
Kotarbiński (1966, p.446), defines method as: “a mode of action used with the 
consciousness of a repetition of its application in similar cases”.  It refers to actions 
from which we are aware of their potential to be used repeatedly.   Actions can be 
described in innumerable ways.  In a method “All the respects which play a role in 
determining the method used in a given action are determined univocally by the 
intention of the agent” (Kotarbiński, 1966, p.449).  The definition is concerned with 
the stages that are seen as important for the description of the mode of action, and in 
this description the intention has the central role. 
 
Now, ideas about the meaning of methodology are in some way different derivations 
from the concept of method.  Checkland (1981) working from a MS/ST perspective, 
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suggests following what Kotarbiński calls a praxiological (action oriented) approach 
to methodology.  A methodology is then a “set of principles of method” (Checkland, 
1981, p.161).  Consequently, a methodology:  
 
Would cover such recommendations as the proper order of actions, the principle that earlier 
actions should be the best possible preparations for later actions, distinctions as between 
synthesis (when a whole is being built of elements) and analysis (when elements are being 
extracted from the whole). (Kotarbiński, 1966, p.439) 
 
Additionally, the methodology’s principles “are used to underlie, justify and inform 
the things which are actually done in response to a particular human problem 
situation” (Checkland, 2000, p.36). 
 
It is important to clarify that for Kotarbiński, methodology is a discipline in its own 
right. Consequently, there is only one methodology.  However, Checkland’s 
interpretation carries the possibility of many possible sets of principles. Therefore, 
there can be many possible methodologies. 
 
Another important clarification is the difference between method and methodology.  
The concept of method conveys the idea of following a course of action in a 
systematic way.  Methodologies are not prefiguring courses of action, they propose 
frameworks of ideas that can be used to decide how to prepare for action and 
consequently, can be used to decide what and how methods can be applied. 
 
2.3.2 An Iceberg View of Methodology 
The image of an iceberg has been a popular way to present different components of a 
culture and has been alluded to in relation to the ‘culture’ of using methodologies 
(Brocklesby, 1995).  This section looks to develop this view by following arguments 
about how different methodology components are related. 
 
The following argument takes as a base Checkland’s notion of methodology.  When a 
methodology defined on these terms is used to reflect how to act in a situation, over 
time some “modes of action”, using here Kotarbiński’s language, will arise.  If these 
modes of action become systematized and applied to similar cases, a method arises.  
Now if the method when applied can guarantee an outcome it becomes a technique 
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(Checkland, 2000).  Considering how these chains develop, it can be argued that 
methods and techniques can be considered part of the methodology. 
 
The next piece in the iceberg view is provided by Checkland (1981).  He states that 
methodologies have an intermediate status between philosophy and techniques.  
Techniques are useful to answer questions of how.  Philosophy is an entirely different 
level, letting us inquiry about what. It leads to identification of what situations can be 
tackled.  Consequently, from this point of view, methodologies share a little of both 
kinds of answers.  It deals with how to do something showing modes of action, but at 
the same time it reflects about what to do with those modes of action. 
 
The idea of different layers in a methodology is also implied by other authors.  For 
Mingers and Brocklesby (1997) the different layers are philosophy, methodology and 
techniques.  They add to the “methodological vocabulary” the term “methodological 
stages” that in some way alludes to the “proper order of actions” in Kotarbiński.  They 
also use the term “tool” to mean an artefact (usually computer software) that can be 
used to assist with the task of performing the techniques. 
 
Jackson (2003b) in describing the components of different methodologies or 
approaches uses perhaps the most complete list of terms.  He starts from the 
philosophy and theory, and then the methodology is used to translate these into 
practical applications through the use of methods, models, tools and techniques.  
Here, models are representations constructed under the guidance of methods or 
methodologies. 
 
However, it is not always possible to find all the elements in every methodology.  
Jackson (2003b), for example, states that for some methodologies it is difficult to 
establish the philosophical and theoretical assumptions, as they are not always 
explicit.  Checkland (2000) argues that due to the interpretative nature of his 
methodology (Soft Systems Methodology) it is unlikely that its methods will achieve 
the status of techniques. 
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Figure 2.1. Iceberg view of Methodology. 
 
Although definitions of methodologies focus on the idea of principles, it cannot be 
denied that elaborating on these principles starts to create ramifications.  These 
ramifications, as it has been shown, go from philosophy to tools. Consequently, note 
that in Figure 2.1 the term methodology is applied to the whole iceberg.  The usual 
place of methodology between philosophy-theory and methods is occupied by the 
terms principles and methodological stages. 
 
One effect of all the ramifications is that the different definitions around methodology 
blend or confuse the concept with “neighbouring” ones.  This could explain the many 
meanings attached to the concept of methodologies as shown by Lehaney and Vinten 
(1994).  Consequently, it is useful to understand the differences between the concepts 
but with the awareness that they are intermingled.   
 
Considering that concepts blend, mastering a methodology could be a daunting task, 
as Figure 2.1 may suggest.  Usually people develop skills on the most visible parts of 
the iceberg (techniques, models, tools). Methods are more difficult; they entail 
intentionality and sometimes the relationship to the principles that gave rise to them is 
under the ‘waves’.  Methodological stages share the level of methods, and without a 
reflective framework, they are also a mode of action.  Finally, the principles, theories 
and philosophy on which all the rest is based, encompass most of the volume of the 
iceberg which remains hidden. 
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Methodologies are complex because they try to manage complexity, but they suffer 
from “syndrome of sophisticated software, where only 10% of it ever get used” (Eden 
& Ackermann, 2006, p.767).  By the way, that number corresponds almost exactly to 
the visible volume of real icebergs. 
 
2.4 Standard Use of Methodologies 
Reviewing the idea of ‘Standard’ or ‘pure’ use of methodologies is important for this 
research because it is another concept where the intention pops up.  It seems that 
standards relied on the definition of formal or constitutive rules
1
 (Checkland & 
Sholes, 1990; Jackson, 2000).  The drive to standardize and create rules can become 
so exaggerated in some cases that rules aim “to think for the practitioner…”, 
something that in practice “…will never be achievable” (Kay & Halpin, 1999, p.277). 
 
The definition of the concept of standard uses in itself leads to a kind of paradox.  
Midgley (1997, p.317) uses the term pure to mean “in the form its creator intended”.  
Standard use is defined as “the way that they were originally intended” (Mingers, 
2006, p.236).  So although with standards the push is for trying to get rid of actors’ 
interference, the definition of standards shows that methodologies still depend on 
actors and their intentions.  It is like Kay and Halpin’s (1999) argument that the 
existence of methodology requires the presence of practitioner’s use. 
 
This section will show first how in MS/ST these standard uses are brought forth.  
Next, I will start to argue that these kinds of uses are unlikely. To this aim, I will 
introduce the concept of multi methodology, a concept that will help me to show how 
you get contradictions when the concept of standard uses is pushed forward. 
 
                                                 
 
1
 When grouped and interrelated, constitutive rules allow the recognition of an activity as one 
belonging to a specific kind of activity.  For example, football can be recognised as a kind of game 
because rules such as the number of players, the size of the playground, the legal and illegal ways to 
use the ball, etc.  If some of the rules are not followed, it can be argued that the activity is not really a 
football match.  Appendix 5 contains a list of constitutive rules for SSM. 
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2.4.1 How Standard-Uses Come to Be   
In the first instance, the obvious answer for the origin of a methodology’s ‘standard 
use’ is to refer to its original creator.  Accordingly, it is expected that through 
apprenticeship with the creators people can learn use the methodologies in the most 
‘appropriate’ way (Eden & Ackermann, 2006).  The next step is that methodologies 
are appropriated by a community.  As any community MS/ST will develop patterns of 
behaviour, namely cultures that make the practices of this community recognizable to 
other members (Brocklesby, 1995). 
 
There is also the issue about professionalization of the discipline (Keys, 1998b).  If 
the discipline is going to be recognised and respected, steps to formalize these 
practices need to be taken.  These steps take the form of establishing journals, 
associations, and formal bodies of education.  All these steps help in the process of 
declaring a segment of market and a set of recognised problems as competence of the 
discipline.  In this way, the discipline looks to legitimise to the wider community.   
 
Then there is the issue of applying for funding. Here projects are compared against 
standards and, consequently, approval and/or funding is decided (Goles & 
Hirschheim, 2000).  In general it is very difficult to move away from these standards 
because going against the conventions implies huge costs for the researchers (Law, 
2004). 
 
Additionally there is the problem of clients.  They need to understand what is being 
offered by the discipline and what to expect from the practitioners in intervention 
(Stainton, 1987).  Perhaps this lead to the tendency identified by Ulrich (2001) 
(although he strongly opposes this) of justifying the work in relation to the “good” use 
of methodologies (Ulrich, 2001).  “Good” use in this context will be application that 
is defensible by MS/ST community standards. 
 
Grand narratives are another factor in standard use.  Grand narratives aim to explain a 
big range of different theories or fields of knowledge in terms of a particular rationale.  
They produce standards because possible differences or variances inside the approach 
(or among approaches) are subdued and subsumed by the dominant rationale. 
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In Management, positivism has been the predominant narrative and for a while it 
seemed the only one (Nodoushani, 1999).  In the field of MS/ST, White and Taket 
(1996)
2
 identify other grand narratives that they broadly name Kantian 
Transcendentalism (two versions), Narratives of Human Emancipation (two versions) 
and one appeal to Universal Rationality. One way in which these narratives produce 
standards in MS/ST is through how they manage pluralism, the topic of the following 
section. 
 
2.4.2 Pluralism 
The topic of pluralism in MS/ST refers to how to manage the diversity of 
methodologies available to the practitioner.  As it was described in Section 2.2, it is 
possible to recognise at least three broad traditions in MS/ST and in each one of the 
traditions, many methodologies that are seen to belong to them.  Although this can be 
seen as a weakness of the approach, the argument is that such diversity presents an 
opportunity to practitioners as introduced in Section 2.2.3 regarding Critical Systems 
Thinking.  Accordingly, practitioners can now choose what methodology is more 
appropriate for the problem at hand, using more than one methodology in the process; 
it is even possible to make combinations of different parts of them.  This way to 
proceed has been gaining importance in MS/ST (Munro & Mingers, 2002; Paucar-
Caceres, 2003). 
 
In Pluralism the main problem is how to find a common ground to decide the best 
way to combine different approaches.  There is a good number of methodological 
proposals
3
 about how to accomplish this.  Some of them are: Total Systems 
Intervention (Flood & Jackson, 1991; Jackson, 1991), Pragmatic Pluralism (White & 
Taket, 1997a, 1997b), Systemic Intervention (Midgley, 2000),  Local Systemic 
                                                 
 
2
 Actually the text itself does not identify any author or concrete school of thought.  The text is build 
around a series of dialogues between mythological muses that represent characteristics present in 
different positions in the literature. 
3 It is also important to state that additional to these reflective ways to combine approaches, there are 
also those who combine them without theoretical assistance (Mingers & Brocklesby, 1997).  
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Intervention (Flood, 2001),  Critical Appreciation (Gregory, 2000),  Diversity 
Management (Flood & Romm, 1996), Critical Pluralism (Mingers, 1997b; Mingers & 
Brocklesby, 1997).   
 
Here I want to raise the issue of these approaches affecting the standard intention.  For 
the sake of the argument, I will focus on just two of them: Total Systems Intervention 
(TSI hereafter) and Critical Pluralism (CP hereafter).  I choose these because they are 
widely explained and influential in the field, and also because they share some 
similarities.  Both draw from Habermas (although from different parts of his work), 
and both use a kind of matrix in order to qualify the characteristics of the 
methodologies.  Finally, both aim to use methodologies in the standard way. 
 
I will focus my description on just two aspects: 1) how these approaches decide the 
particular utility of a methodology, and 2) their description of the methodological 
stages.  
 
2.4.2.1 TSI  
TSI is the predecessor (Flood & Jackson, 1991; Jackson, 1991) of what Jackson 
(2006) now calls ‘Creative Holism’.  I refer to the old version (Jackson, 1991) 
because this is better known and because, despite many attacks and arguments against 
its assumptions, in Jackson (2003b) some of the examples of creative holism still rely 
on TSI. 
 
Habermas’s ‘Theory of Human Interests’ is the common ground used by Jackson to 
mediated differences among methodologies.  The idea is that no matter what we 
humanly do we always orientate our action to one or a combination of three interests: 
‘the technical’, ‘the practical’ and ‘the emancipatory’.  According to the kind of 
interest is then possible to classify three kinds of context respectively: unitary, 
pluralist and coercive. 
 
Jackson’s argument is as follows: If there are no tangible differences in how people 
perceive the problem (unitary), a methodology based on prediction and control can be 
used.  If the problem is not clear and there are conflicting views, but it is felt that is 
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possible to reach an agreement (pluralist context), then a methodology based on a 
practical interest can be used to achieve intersubjective understanding.  However, if 
the participants have their own agendas and the context is dominated by power 
struggles (coercive), a methodology based on emancipatory interest is the call. 
 
The different contexts based on the Habermasian interests constitute one dimension of 
analysis.  Another dimension used for analysis is the complexity of the problem.  In 
this way, a table can be constructed showing both dimensions (Table 2.1).  The idea 
of the table is to analyse a methodology and decide (based on the methodology’s 
assumptions) where the methodology can be allocated (Jackson, 1990; Jackson & 
Keys, 1984). 
 
 Unitary Pluralist Coercive 
Simple    
Complex    
  
Table 2.1. Dimensions of analysis for classifying a methodology in TSI. 
 
Now regarding TSI’s methodological stages, three are proposed: creativity, choice 
and implementation.  Creativity is aimed to explore the problem under diverse 
metaphors.  Based on the insights of the first phase and the table, a methodology is 
chosen.  Finally, implementation uses the selected methodology. 
 
2.4.2.2 Critical Pluralism 
It is important to clarify that one of the differences between CP and TSI is that while 
TSI aims to choose the best methodology for a particular situation, CP aims to 
combine different parts of different methodologies. 
 
Nevertheless, as with TSI, CP also has to deal with the problem of finding a common 
ground to mediate differences in methodologies.  Additionally, CP is also based on 
Habermas.  Here the strategy is to consider that in some manner or other all our 
actions (read here methodologies) are related to three worlds: the material world, the 
social world and the personal world (Mingers, 2006).    
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In theory, the material world exists independently from us and refers to physical 
circumstances.  The social world is created by our interaction and refers to the arena 
of social practices and power relations.  The personal world refers to our individual 
thought, beliefs and emotions.  The idea is that some elements in each methodology 
are better prepared than others to deal with each one of these worlds. 
 
For example, mathematical models are regarded as better equipped to deal with 
physical circumstances and hence with the material world. Tools that allow 
understanding and/or ways to alter existing social structures are seen as more relevant 
to deal with the social world. Finally, tools that allow actors to reflect and change 
their view are seen as closer to the personal world. 
 
Here also there is a second axis.  In this case it refers to the intervention as a process.  
Fours generic phases comprise an intervention process.   
 
Appreciation of the problem situation as experienced by the agents involved. 
Analysis of the underlying structure/constraints generating the situation as experienced. 
Assessment of the ways in which the situation could be other than it is; of the extent to which 
the constraints could be altered. 
Action to bring about the desired changes. 
(Mingers & Brocklesby, 1997, p.494) 
 
Combining the different worlds and generic phases of an intervention, Table 2.2 is 
obtained. 
 
 Appreciation of:  Analysis of: Assessment of: Action to: 
Social World     
Personal World     
Material World     
 
Table 2.2. Worlds and Generic Phases of Interventions in CP. 
 
The methodological stages rely again on the appreciation, analysis, assessment and 
action phases (Mingers & Brocklesby, 1997). 
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2.4.3 Whose Standard-Use? Flirting with Intention 
A case can be made then that TSI and CP authors generally accept the idea of having 
standard uses of methodologies and the idea that intention has something to do in it.  
On CP the idea is quite clear.  As it was shown, Mingers defined what is a standard 
use in terms of intention, and he suggests that his work looks to define standard uses 
(Mingers, 2003, 2006). 
 
Now Jackson on the issue of standard uses said:  “It makes no sense to break the link 
between paradigm and methodology.  A methodology that does not serve the 
paradigm that it is meant to serve is a bad methodology or is simply used wrongly” 
(Jackson, 2003a, p.1300).  He does not mention the word standard, but it seems that it 
is important to stick to some rigid idea.  On intention, he have this quote about 
making a different use of a model: “it will have to prove its worth, particularly when it 
finds itself serving purposes very far from those originally intended” (Jackson, 2003b, 
p.311).  So here there is clearly some relation between a standard use and intention.   
 
The following step in this argument is to consider if methodologies under the 
influences of a framework will behave differently.  This question already has been 
considered by Gregory (1996).  She uses the metaphor of a force field to argue that 
methodologies are ‘aligned’ when they are used inside an organising framework as 
TSI.  In the same way that disorganised iron particles are aligned by a magnet, 
methodologies with different purposes are aligned to the purposes of the 
methodological magnets TSI and CP. 
 
How can be known if different frameworks ‘magnetise’ methodologies in different 
ways? Let us consider an example with Soft Systems Methodology.  For this example, 
it is not really necessary to know the details about this methodology.  It is only 
necessary to know how has been classified by TSI and CP, this is shown in Tables 2.3 
and 2.4. 
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 Unitary Pluralist Coercive 
Simple    
Complex  Soft Systems 
Methodology 
 
 
Table 2.3. SSM accordingly to TSI (Jackson, 1991). 
 
 Appreciation of:  Analysis of: Assessment of: Action to: 
Social World Social practices, 
power relations 
   
Personal World Individual belief, 
meanings, 
emotions 
Differing 
perceptions and 
Weltanschauung 
Alternative 
conceptualisations 
and constructions 
Generate 
accommodation 
and consensus 
Material World Physical 
circumstances 
   
 
Table 2.4. SSM accordingly to CP (Mingers & Brocklesby, 1997). 
 
TSI classifies what is the most appropriate context for the methodology as a whole.  
CP looks how to decompose the methodology in different elements in order to 
connect these elements with elements from other methodologies.  For the sake of the 
argument let us say that the methodology will be use as a whole in both frameworks. 
 
So in TSI, SSM will be applied to a pluralist-complex context in an implementation 
stage.  In CP the situation is more difficult to express but, in short, SSM will be 
applied with different intensities (different shadow on Table 2.4) to different aspects 
of three different worlds through four stages of the process. 
 
With these two purposes in mind it can be said that they follow the same standard? 
That is, do they use the methodology with the same intention? And what happens 
when I use the methodology without the guidance of these frameworks, just when I 
follow the intention of the creator of the methodology? Is this a third different 
standard use? Intuitively we can feel that in some way all these uses are different.  
Clarifying what is different there will require a good understanding of what intention 
entails.  Just let me state now that if a standard use is to be followed, choosing whose 
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standard will be tricky, especially under the absence of ways to detail what is the 
intention. 
 
2.5 Non-Standard Uses 
If standard uses of methodologies are the ones that follow the original intention, non-
standard uses are those ones in which the intention moves away from the original one.  
This shows a crack in the idea of standard uses and shows another intrusion on 
intervention by intention. For that reason non-standard uses are of interest for this 
research. 
 
Now, the phenomenon of methodologies being use in different ways to the pre-
designed ones is not new, and has been recognised in the management field.  For 
example, Mingers (2003) describes how something as “hard” as mathematical 
programming or computer simulations has been used to portray subjective 
descriptions or model different perceptions and beliefs.  He also suggests that it is an 
area that requires more research.  In fact, Mingers treat non-standard uses as 
something unusual.  This is in contrast with the argument that I hinted at in the last 
section, and that I will pursue more deeply in this section: that non-standard uses are 
really very common.  
 
In this light, the next section will start to show the different sources of non-standard 
uses.  Although this research focuses on practitioner intentions as a source of non-
standard uses, it is not the only one.  Next, some methodological proposals that aim to 
produce non-standard uses are presented. 
 
2.5.1 How Non-Standard Uses Come to Be 
To this point, the argument is that a ‘non-standard’ use occurs when a methodology or 
part of one is used in some manner that departs from the accepted or conventional 
usage. How might this come about?  
 
Several works provide a starting point to explore this question, for example, Kay and 
Halpin (1999), Checkland (2000), and Taket (1994). These and other authors contend  
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that a methodology-use cannot be understood solely in terms of the methodology 
itself, i.e., it is vitally important to take account of both the people involved in using it 
and the context of application. 
 
Here I will follow Mingers (1997b).  He suggests that in order to understand an 
intervention context it is necessary to reflect on three interacting components:  
 
 Problem content systems: The situations to be intervene. 
 Intellectual resources system: Methodologies and theories that inform the 
intervention. 
 Intervention system: The agents carrying out the intervention. 
 
The next subsections examine how non-standard uses come to be in relation to the 
subsystems in which they arise. 
 
2.5.1.1 Problem content systems 
The iceberg view shown in Figure 2.1 gives an idea of how complex a methodology 
can be.  However, based on Beer (1994) it can be argued that compared against the 
complexity of the problem situations that they aim to manage, they are simple.  Due to 
this complexity, methodologies are not prepared to respond to all the possible 
scenarios that can exist.  So practitioners must react and adapt them in order to 
respond to the challenges (Midgley, 1989; Ulrich, 2001). In addition, as  Bowen 
(1998, p.174) puts it, “no methodology can ever be perfectly followed, since time and 
pressure forces one to cut corners”. Moreover, even if you are determined to follow a 
prescribed route, macro-pressures can hinder your purpose (Gregory, 2000).  As Keys 
(1998a) points out, interventions cannot be described as scientific in nature but as a 
socio-political process in which aspects as actor networks and power have to be taken 
into account (Brocklesby, 2009).  
 
2.5.1.2 Intellectual Resources System 
The idea of standard use of methodologies has been the dominant of MS/ST 
community. However, there are some recent intellectual approaches that are affecting 
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how people use methodologies.  Basically, these influences push for more flexibility 
and creativity when dealing with interventions, causing new non-standard uses. 
 
At the level of methodology perhaps the biggest influence is the concept of pluralism 
and multi methodologies.  The tendency of mixing methodologies to intervene has 
burgeoned and become something usual both for consultants and for more academic 
oriented practitioners, in part as a response to the richness and complexity of the 
world (Mingers & Brocklesby, 1997; Munro & Mingers, 2002; Paucar-Caceres, 2003; 
Rosenhead, 1997).  As a consequence of this tendency it is increasingly difficult to 
connect an intervention process to a single set of principles. This marks “a breakpoint 
– the definitive escape of these methodologies from their inventors” (Rosenhead, 
1997, p.xiv). 
 
The development of each methodology must also be considered.  For example, 
Systems Dynamics started as being functionalist and oriented to computer simulation 
(Forrester, 1961).  However, over time it has developed soft traits suitable for 
managing meaning in interventions (Rodriguez-Ulloa & Paucar-Caceres, 2005; 
Schwaninger, 2006; Schwaninger, Janovjak, & Ambroz, 2006).  In the case of  Soft 
Systems Methodology, although the interpretative character is not in discussion, 
different efforts to develop understanding of its implications draw from other 
traditions such as multi aspectual philosophy (Basden & Wood-Harper, 2006), 
autopoiesis (Brocklesby, 2007), organizational behaviour (M. C. Williams, 1999), 
pragmatism (Attwater, 1999; Ledington & Ledington, 1999).  In SSM another 
problem is that sometimes it is even difficult to understand if the methodology has 
been really applied due to all the different uses (Spear, 2001). 
 
So here it can be argued that these methodological developments have an impact on 
methodologies in the same way that pluralism in Section 2.4.2 also has it.  Having 
different ideas of what SSM or SD represents will have an impact on how people will 
use them.  If they do not have an impact, why care about new developments? 
 
The other big influences in the intellectual resources systems are the new paradigms 
being employed to inform interventions.  Paradigms such as Pragmatism (Rorty, 
1999) and postmodernism reject the idea of grand narrative, the idea that it is possible 
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to have a stable grounding for truth in Management Science.  Instead, they talk about 
local solutions, finding what is useful in a specific situation and using different 
sources of inspiration (Kuhn & Woog, 2005; Ormerod, 2006; White & Taket, 1996).  
In these approaches “theorizing is undertaken not for the purpose of producing a 
theory (or even theories), but for the purpose of stimulating action” (Taket & White, 
1998, p.155).  The purpose is not the production of grand theories.  The purpose is the 
activity of finding local explanations or justifications to guide intervention in the 
particular situation. 
 
2.5.1.3 Intervention system 
Finally, this section deals with the practitioner, the holder of intentions and centre of 
this research.  Of course there are trivial explanations of how practitioners affect 
methodologies such as the lack of knowledge of the actors (Größler, 2004).  More 
complex arguments, however, derive from how our constructions affect what we are 
doing in an intervention (Romm, 2002).  For instance, Brocklesby (1995, p.1289), 
states that how a methodology is used “will depend upon the meanings the researcher 
attributes to it, and what they think about it …no one can mandate what combination 
of meanings will operate for a particular user”.   
 
Checkland and Sholes (1990) make the distinction of using SSM in Mode 1 and Mode 
2.  In Mode 1, the practitioner follows the methodology as a recipe; this happens when 
people are just learning the methodology.  In Mode 2, the practitioner is experienced, 
with an interiorised version of the methodology adapting his actions to what is 
happening in the context.  Bowen argued that at this stage, when the practitioner is 
familiarised and confident about the methodology, “they have molded what they 
started with in their own image” (Bowen, 1998, p.175). 
 
The lesson in these stances is that practitioners affect methodologies, and these effects 
have been recognised.  However, how this works in practice is still a question looking 
for answers.  
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2.5.2 Making Non-Standard Uses 
The last section shows how from the perspective of different subsystems non-standard 
uses came to be.  Here, from a methodological point of view, the focus is on how 
different authors have been operationalising the idea of using methodologies in ‘non-
standard’ ways. This shows in some way that actors can play a role on the 
intervention. If actors can play this role perhaps there is a role for their intentions. 
 
2.5.2.1 Use of Methodologies as Hermeneutic Process 
Watson, Wood-Harper, and Wood (1995) work on the idea that the meaning of a 
methodology depends on both the methodology and the practitioner’s experience.  
According to them, this interaction sets the context for interpretation.  However: 
 
contexts are boundless in at least two senses: (1) Any known context is open to further 
description since there is potentially no limit as to what may be relevant. (2) Contexts are 
unmasterable since attempts to codify them into types and taxonomies create new contexts that 
exceed our prior explanations. (Watson et al., 1995, p.442) 
 
In the first case it does not matter how complete is the description of an issue, it is 
always possible find something relevant to add to that descriptions.  For the second 
case Watson et al. (1995) use an example based on Wittgenstein (1958),  the phrase 
“Can I say ‘bububu’ and mean ‘if it doesn’t rain I shall go for a walk?”.  If we hear 
‘bububu’ alone most likely we will not understand its purpose. However, once we are 
aware of Wittgenstein’s complete phrase it will not be a problem to understand what 
the person wants to do, and a new context is created. 
 
Based on these ideas, Watson et al. (1995) claim that is impossible to fix the meanings 
attached to a methodology, so they always need to be interpreted through a 
hermeneutic process.  With the aim of helping the interpretation, they suggest to 
assume the methodology as a text or metaphor.  The text and metaphors can be then 
re-contextualised in every opportunity that is needed using processes of self 
reflection. 
 
This approach clearly supports the proposition that practitioners have a major 
influence on how methodologies are deployed.  Because interpretations are boundless 
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practitioners will reach uses beyond the intentions of the creators of the 
methodologies.  This approach provides an explanation of why different uses appear. 
However, it does not show how to achieve them in a purposeful way. This situation is 
addressed in the next two approaches. 
 
2.5.2.2 Oblique Use 
Flood and Romm (1995) present their approach as an enhancement of the  TSI
4
 
process described earlier.  Under TSI different methodologies are classified 
accordingly to their usefulness to certain context.  For example, it was shown under 
TSI, that SSM is a good choice for a context that is considered to be fundamentally 
pluralist in nature. 
 
However, Flood and Romm (1995) argued that it is possible to use principles of other 
methodologies to steer another methodology.  Under this logic, an emancipatory 
principle can be used to direct SSM despite this emancipatory principle not being 
supported under SSM.  Flood and Romm (1995) call this an oblique use. Graphically, 
it can be seen in Figure 2.2 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Oblique Use. 
 
 
                                                 
 
4
 Although this argument is really base on a version of TSI usually referred as TSI 2, I will use the 
notions of TSI already explained that in essence do not change the argument.  
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Although this process enhances the possibilities of the practitioner, still requires from 
the practitioner a ‘methodologically’ guided process.  It uses a different set of 
principles for a methodology, but such different principles have as their source 
another methodology.  In a way the practitioner intention is bound to choose between 
the known methodologies. It does not take advantage of the boundless contexts of the 
previous approach. 
 
This work has been very influential in the sense that it is customary in discussions 
about non-standard uses, as can be seen in Mingers (2003), Jackson (2003a) and  
Midgley (1997). 
 
2.5.2.3 Creative Design 
Flood and Romm (1995) based their work on oblique use in re-interpretations of some 
intervention processes.  Midgley (1997) contests their interpretations and suggests that 
instead of oblique use a process of synthesis has more explanatory power and also 
presents more opportunities for practice. 
 
The oblique interpretation focuses on how the principles of one methodology 
‘manage’ methods in another methodology.  The synthesis argument is that principles 
of different methodologies, together with their methods are mixed and synthesised in 
new methods.  In this way, the intervention process can be more responsive.  It is even 
possible from this approach to use principles of other methodologies to construct our 
own.  This is more responsive because new methods are tailored accordingly to the 
need of the context.  Hence the name of Midgley’s (1997) approach: creative design. 
 
Here the critique will be that although a huge range of possibilities is implied, the 
explanation about them is so wide that is difficult to see how they can be used in 
practice.  From the point of view of this research, although intentions are mentioned, 
they are also taken as obvious and not really explained.  
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2.6 Additional Ways to Learn about an Intervention Process 
The whole discussion of standard and non-standard suggests that non-standards uses 
seem common. One consequence of this is that it is necessary to take intentions into 
account in the intervention. However, a concern about non-standard uses is the 
problem of learning about intervention. 
 
The arguments go that if methodologies and methods are used in the way in which 
they are not meant, if they are detached from their respective paradigms, the 
possibility of understanding the practice is hindered (Jackson, 2000).  Finding ways to 
understand practice is important because “it enables practitioners to reflect upon the 
nature of their work…It offers a framework within which general issues of concern 
can be addressed” (Keys, 2002b, p.211). Jackson's concern seems to rest on the idea 
that the only way to reflect and address intervention issues is through methodologies. 
 
However, some authors seem to suggest that intervention accounts based on 
methodologies are overrated.  For example, Brocklesby (1995) states that a lot of 
systems research pays lip service to methodologies.  Westcombe, Franco, and Shaw 
(2006) consider this approach as just weaving anecdotes around the specific use of a 
methodology. Keys (2002b, p.212) points out that “a main disadvantage [of 
methodologies] is that they simplify the work, often to an unrealistic degree, and do 
not formally acknowledge its social aspects”.  Additionally, as it was presented Ulrich 
(2003) criticises the idea of defending the quality of the research based on the 
methods followed. 
 
In this context, it is necessary to ask: are there alternatives to methodology based 
learning?  Keys (1997) identifies three approaches. The theory driven approach (the 
one relying on standards), is expressed mainly through methodologies where 
knowledge about how to intervene is encoded.  The practice driven approach, deriving 
from social science, focuses on concrete cases of intervention.  Finally, a new 
emerging third approach looks to work across the other two circuits of analysis. 
 
The first approach has been already shown. The second, the practice driven, 
“examines in detail particular pieces of MS/OR work and seeks to develop an 
 59 
understanding of how experienced practitioners carry out their work” (Keys, 2002b, 
p.212). This approach pays attention to the social and political as well to the creative 
aspects of intervening, seemingly suitable ground for developing intentions-based 
accounts of intervention. In the third approach what practitioners actually find in 
practice is integrated with the technical aspects of the methodology.  
 
Working on intentions and examining their impact on actions can give us elements to 
link both sides. On the practice led-side, focusing on intentions can lead (as Chapter 
Four shows) to ways to account for: how we make sense, explain and rationalize our 
actions and those of others; how the interactions between actors are coordinated; and 
how actions are caused, sustained and guided. All these can enrich the practice-led 
side. 
 
Intention can also help to link the theory-led approach because methodologies imply 
action and intentions are inextricable linked with actions. Also, the descriptions of the 
action in a method are determined by the intention of the actor (Kotarbiński, 1966). In 
this way approaches for linking theory and practice can be explored giving us new 
ways to tell stories about interventions.  
 
2.7 The Ethical Importance of the Actor in MS/ST 
Methodologies 
If the argument presented up to this point is accepted, then it follows that the actual 
actor involved is a key component in the practical use of MS/ST methodologies and in 
the intervention process.  Yet quite often it seems that this is not the case.  It could 
seem that actors are neglected in MS/ST.  One argument is that this impression is due 
to the dominant role of functionalism in the area (Goles & Hirschheim, 2000).  Under 
functionalism problems exist independently from actors and there is a correct way to 
approach their solution that is independent again from the actor carrying out the 
intervention.  So in this scenario methodology has been the object and centre of 
MS/ST research and practice (Gallo, 2004; Keys, 1997). 
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However, there are streams of thought that support the claim of the centrality of the 
actor in systems thinking. Developments such as appreciative systems (Vickers, 
1983), autopoiesis (Maturana, 1988) and links between systems and phenomenology 
(Georgiou, 2007), put actors to the centre of experience and action in the world.  All 
of these views are important and help to make the case about the centrality of the 
actor in the intervention. However, perhaps the most important argument is ethical. 
 
Ethics is a branch of philosophy, such as ontology or epistemology, which deals with 
reflections about issues such as what is right or wrong, what is good or evil.  Ethics is 
trying to make us aware that our visions of the world, and our actions have 
consequences.  Ethics is “values in action” (Midgley, 2000).  Hence, the actor’s stance 
in a situation is critical.  
 
Ethics certainly cannot be left to others, nor can it be fully dealt with through building 
subjectivity into models in circumstances where that approach arises as an option. Instead the 
argument is that ethics is situated and contextual in character, it is inextricably linked to daily 
practice, and, as a result, it is something that must be engaged within the local context as the 
assignment or intervention unfolds over time. (Brocklesby, 2009, p.1075) 
 
The ethical argument about the centrality of the actor and its intentions for MS/ST 
practice is simple. If our intentions do not affect the modes of actions and our 
reflections about how to guide those modes of action, then we are not responsible and 
accountable for the use of tools, methods and methodologies. In this case, if we do not 
arrive at the desired outcome, we can proceed to blame our tools. 
 
This argument mirrors Maturana’s two ways of formulating and considering 
explanations, what he refers to as “the path of objectivity - without - parenthesis, … 
and the path of objectivity - in - parenthesis” (Maturana, 1988, p.28). On the first one 
“the observer implicitly or explicitly assumes that existence takes place independently 
of what he or she does” (Maturana, 1988, p.28). Consequently “It is in this 
explanatory path that a claim of knowledge is a demand for obedience” (Maturana, 
1988, p.29). In this path, there is no space for an actor’s intrusions on the ideas 
informing their actions.  The only option is to obey what methods and methodologies 
are demanding. 
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In the second path, the path of objectivity - in - parenthesis, the observer accepts “that 
his or her cognitive abilities as an observer are biological phenomena because they are 
altered when his or her biology is altered” (Maturana, 1988, p.29). For this reason, the 
observer cannot claim that situation or knowledge is independent of the way in which 
s/he observes. Here there is space for an actor shaping methods and methodologies.   
 
Some authors are aware of the importance of the role played by the actors. For 
instance, Ulrich (2001, p.9) in a statement that can be extended to methodologies 
affirms that: “it is an error to believe that good practice can be justified by reference 
to the research methods employed.  Methods need to be justified by reference to their 
implications for practice, not the other way round!”.  Rosenhead and Thunhurst 
(1982) points out that sometimes OR practice is presented as scientific, lifting in this 
way the burden to assume responsibility for managerial decisions.  Beer (1994) 
following similar logic argues that, in general, managers are looking for advice that 
will give the answers to problem situations for them.  
 
Nevertheless, “is impossible for practitioners to set aside their identities and become 
‘neutral’ modellers or process facilitators” (Midgley, Ahuriri-Driscoll, Foote, Hepi, & 
et al, 2007, p.234).  Besides, “More than many other scientific disciplines, [OR] have 
an impact on people’s lives and hence society at large” (Gallo, 2004, p.470). 
 
Accordingly, to Córdoba (2006), ethics had been explored in different ways in 
MS/ST.  Related to the idea of improvement, there is the idea of emancipation used in 
Critical Systems (Flood & Jackson, 1991).  If there are some imbalances of power in 
situations it will be a quest for the practitioner to set things right.  These approaches 
are basically based on Kant and Habermas.  They aim to the ideal of the 
enlightenment that is possible through reason to deal with imbalances of power and 
achieve better conditions for everyone. 
 
However, as Córdoba (2006) points out, this approach does not improve how 
individuals deal with their ethical dilemmas.  Yet, there is a long history of works in 
the area that stresses the importance of the ethical dilemmas faced by the actor or 
users of methodologies.  For instance, Churchman (1968; 1979) is an early advocate 
of the importance of actors in intervention processes.  For him, systems exist in the 
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mind of the observer (not in reality). Even “very real” institutions like the use of 
money in our society, depend on social constructions and reconstructions. For 
example, every actor collaborates through buying and selling in the re-enactment of 
the conditions that bring its reality into existence. There is nothing intrinsic in money 
that points to its value; the value is the one given by actors’ agreement (Searle, 1995). 
 
Churchman’s focus on the actor triggered the soft systems tradition (Reynolds, 2004).  
“The systems approach begins when first you see the world through the eyes of 
another” (Churchman, 1968, p.231). If systems are a way to see and different ‘eyes’ 
bring different possibilities, the selection of views will be the responsibility of the 
practitioner.  “The planner is not limited by any conditions in setting the boundaries of 
the social system; he is free to set them according to his judgment” (Churchman, 
1979, p.111).  Therefore, it is fundamental to the practitioner to reflect how others see 
the world.   
 
Being a planner carries an ethical burden, “The planner’s main client is humanity, and 
when a conflict occurs between the contractor’s intentions and what the planner 
judges to be the betterment of humanity, the planner should strive to serve the latter 
rather than the former” (Churchman, 1979, p.111).  For that reason, for Churchman 
the practitioner needs to be a hero, and it is necessary to looks for methodologies “in 
which human bias is a central aspect” (Ulrich, 2004, p.1129).  Churchman’s work on 
boundaries is an important aspect of this research as Chapter Six shows. 
 
Taket (1994; 2002) also emphasizes the responsibility of the practitioner in how 
understanding is constructed in the intervention setting.  In that line, she states that a 
code of ethics cannot be the last word on how practitioners have to conduct an 
intervention.  She shows how her judgement of the situation (distancing herself from 
the ethics codes) has been critical in deciding how to present herself, her expertise and 
the methods and methodologies being use. 
 
Furthermore, in direct relation to the use of methodologies, Brocklesby and 
Cummings suggest Foucault's ideas as an alternative.  From this perspective, as was 
already mentioned, practitioners can organise their own toolkits with different 
methods and methodologies, and they can decide how they can be best used.  If one 
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“wishes to be true to Foucault, … one only need to be true to oneself.” (Brocklesby & 
Cummings, 1996, p.752).  This is again the idea of self-emancipation placing the 
weight of methodology use to the actor. 
 
The aforementioned arguments go in line with the idea that practitioners have a say in 
how methodologies will be applied. This opens possibilities for research regarding 
how methodologies can be affected by practitioners. Specifically, I want to explore 
how the practitioners are having this effect through their intentions.  
 
At this point, a caveat is necessary. Being concerned about ethics is not denying that 
“for some practitioners, having to grapple with complex social relationships, multiple 
interests, and organisational politics, while at the same time being required to conduct 
exemplary analysis, may simply be too hard” (Brocklesby, 2009, p.1075). Under this 
light, although caring for ethics is good for humanity, it can be a heavy burden for the 
practitioner. 
 
2.8 Research Gap and Research Questions  
As has been shown in this chapter, intention is at the core of concepts such as method 
and standard use of methodologies.  Non-standard uses and ethics offer us additional 
ways to think that actors and their intentions are important for an intervention. These 
arguments are indirect about the importance that intention can have for MS/ST. 
 
Direct arguments that can be cited for the importance of intention relied on the 
importance of intention being recognised.  Checkland and Sholes (1990, p.2) working 
on the soft systems paradigm state that “Given the creation of an interpreted, not 
merely an experienced world, we can form intentions, we can decide to do one thing 
rather than another”. Ulrich (1983, p.238) regarding social phenomena asserts: “if we 
want to understand them in such a way that we can eventually change them, we must 
understand them as ‘facts’ produced by the working of human intentionality”.  
Although the reference to the importance of intentions is clear, these authors do not 
develop intention. Based on the importance of intention they develop ideas in relation 
to meaning, taking intention for granted.  
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One concept on the surface seems similar to intention is that one of purpose.  
Although it is an important concept for Systems Thinking, it is difficult to find a 
definition of purpose in the literature.  What we can find is statements that make use 
of purpose without defining it.  “Purpose is imputed to a system by its observer” 
(Beer, 1994, p.13).  When classifying different kind of systems “the critical 
classifying variable is purpose, and purpose can only exist where there is choice, and 
choice is of either means or ends, that is, desired outcomes…An entity is purposeful if 
it can select both means and ends in two or more environments.” (Ackoff, 1999, p.21).  
“Purposefulness [refers] to the critical awareness of self-reflective humans with 
regard to end or purposes and their normative implications for the affected” (Ulrich, 
1983, p.328) 
 
From the above quotes there are some differences with intention that are worth 
mention.  Intention refers to something that belongs to an actor, not something that it 
is ascribed from the exterior as it can be in the case of purpose.  Something that we 
expect from intentions is their capacity to guide, produce and sustain actions (Mele, 
1992).  In Ackoff and Ulrich quotes no reference is done to action.  However Ulrich 
recognizes that is important to move the debate about purpose.  In fact Ulrich criticize 
the concept of purpose in Systems Thinking.   
 
“I suggest that we understand purposefulness as a concept of practical philosophy 
rather that of behavioral science, i.e., as referring to the intentionality and self-
reflectiveness of an agent (agent’s point of view) rather than to systems behavior as 
observed from a spectator’s point of view” (Ulrich, 1983, p.334).  However, this 
quote is missing again the action and the concept of intention is again 
underdeveloped.  
 
Due to its recognized importance and that the concept of intention is behind important 
concepts in MS/ST practice, it is important to develop the concept.  Additionally, as it 
was mentioned on Section 1.4, there are potential contributions for MS/ST that can be 
derived from a work on intentions:  How intentions affect the tools used (e.g. 
methods, methodologies) in an intervention? What possible avenues open for 
achieving flexibility and creativity? How intentions can help us to account for 
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intervention processes? What is the impact of realising the importance of intention for 
ethics?  
 
Because the concept is underdeveloped on MS/ST, there is not much in what to 
underpin its research.  Consequently, what is proposed here is a kind of initial or 
preliminary exploration of intention and what they can offer to MS/ST. 
 
In particular, this research aims to address the following main question: What is the 
relevance of intentions in MS/ST interventions? This is to ask for the pertinence and 
applicability of the concept for MS/ST. I have two supporting questions to the main 
one. First, what are intentions? If we are talking about relevance, we need to know to 
what we are referring.  Second, how can intentions be studied in interventions? If we 
are talking about pertinence and applicability, we need to find ways to describe when 
an intention has been applied.  It is important to clarify here that I will focus on 
intentions on an individual basis, looking what concern to specific actors in the 
process. 
 
Because the topic is underdeveloped I conducted this research covering a broad 
spectrum of ideas from philosophical, theoretical and empirical sources.  The 
philosophical is conducted in the idea that philosophy’s role is to clarify concepts, in 
this case intention. Theoretical exploration is needed to understand how knowledge 
about intention can explain and can be applied to interventions. The empirical is 
because the purpose of the exploration is to develop something useful for intervention 
in MS/ST. Contrasting the knowledge with field experience give reassurance that the 
whole discussion is not only abstract. 
 
2.9 Approaching MS/ST Intervention through Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophy 
As it was already mentioned in Chapter One, Wittgenstein’s philosophy is a strong 
influence in my work. It has shaped and guided the kind of questions, assumptions, 
and developments that I am using to understand what is involved in a social situation 
and, specially, intervention.  
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Here I will deal with some introductory aspects that will be taken for approaching the 
research as well as for developing and supporting the findings of it. I will explain first 
why I see potential in these ideas to understand intervention in relation to the present 
research and for MS/ST. Next, I will discuss the central concept of Language Games 
in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, and due to its importance for MS/ST, I will argue 
that is possible to approach methodologies in terms of Language Games. 
 
2.9.1 Wittgenstein’s Two Ways to Approach Language 
Wittgenstein is one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. His 
philosophy centres on the problem of language, and on that problem he articulated 
two powerful and influential views.  First he constructed language as “the mirror of 
the world” (Wittgenstein, 1922), arguing that the structure of sentences and ideas was 
showing the logical structure of the facts in the world. For instance, these ideas were 
use by the Vienna circle to support their project of achieving the unity of science 
(Nodoushani, 1999). This implied expressing the whole of knowledge in a single 
logical standard language. 
 
However, if it is considered that a methodology must mirror something about the 
world, or that it must agree with a single logical standard language, then neither non-
standard uses of methodologies nor the effect of intentions on them is desirable or 
feasible.  These uses and effects will deviate from the “real” image of the world and 
the logic of a standard language.  This view is unsuitable for research that implies the 
possibility of having multiple non-standards uses for tools. Under this rigid view, the 
task of the actor is simply to assess the ‘facts’ of the situation and then select the 
appropriate methodology. (see, for instance, Jackson and Keys (1984)). 
 
According, to Garfinkel (1981), conceptual frameworks guide the kind of questions 
and explorations that we can make. Consequently, this research requires a conceptual 
framework capable of embracing multiple factors and situations in interventions.  It 
requires abandoning the idea that there is an intrinsic or “true” nature in the tools that 
have to be expressed in particular ways.  It requires a philosophical position where 
 67 
factors such as the actor and its ethical stances and the context, mentioned through 
this chapter, can have a place in understanding such use. 
 
Wittgenstein’s (1958) later view on language meets this purpose. Here the ‘reality’ is 
not out there, so there is no need to mirror it.  The metaphor is now the one of the tool.  
Language allows us to do things in the world. Knowledge is created by social 
interactions or, in Wittgenstein’s terms, ‘language games’.  Knowledge is dependent 
on of the actors involved.  Here it is possible to find a place for intentions. 
 
This view is presented in ‘Philosophical Investigations’ a book that some consider the 
most important book in 20
th
 century philosophy (Stern, 2004).  The views in this book 
are associated with what is now called social constructionism, an influential view not 
only in organization studies but also in broader humanities and social sciences (K. J. 
Gergen & Leach, 2001; M. M. Gergen & Gergen, 2003; Schwandt, 2000).   
 
The influence of Wittgenstein’s view on MS/ST is indirect and not so visible.  
Authors such as White and Taket (1997b) and Jackson (2000) allude to him in support 
of their ideas but without making his ideas central to their claims.  One possible 
exception is Hassard’s (1990) proposal of mediating incommensurable paradigms 
using a meta-language game.  However, it seems that this proposal has not been 
developed or further commented on the literature.  Yet, there are ideas on second 
order cybernetics where the concept of socially constructed knowledge in language 
finds resonances (see, for example, Varela (1979), Maturana (1988), Von Foerster 
(1989), and Von Glasersfeld (1996)). Using Wittgenstein’s ideas to inform MS/ST is 
one of the contributions that this thesis looks to make to the field. 
 
2.9.2 Language Games 
Through a series of thought experiments, Wittgenstein (1958, §43) not only shows 
that meanings are affected by use, but provides the crucial idea that “the meaning of a 
word is its use in the language”.  This implies that meaning does not stem from 
intrinsic characteristics in the word.  Meaning arises from what it is possible to do 
with such a word.  In consequence, words are being seen as tools that can be applied 
to affect interactions in the context.  For example, following Winograd and Flores 
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(1986), a speech act of declaration, can pronounce a couple married, or declare 
somebody as CEO in a company. 
 
This idea of meaning as use derives from perhaps the most famous concept in 
Wittgenstein philosophy: Languages Games.  Accordingly, to Wittgenstein (1958, 
§7), language can be understood in terms of language games. These are defined as 
“the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven” also “the 
term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of 
language is part of an activity, or of a form of life” (Wittgenstein, 1958, §23). 
 
However, it is difficult to apply the concept of Language Games, mainly because 
Wittgenstein explicitly avoids elaborating the concept.  In his own words: 
 
For someone might object against me: “You take the easy way out! You talk about all sorts of 
language-games, but have nowhere said what the essence of a language-game, and hence of 
language, is: what is common to all these activities, and what makes them into language or 
parts of language.  So you let yourself off the very part of the investigation that once gave you 
yourself most headache, the part about the general form of propositions and of language. 
 
And this is true. – Instead of producing, something common to all that we call language, I am 
saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same 
word for all. (Wittgenstein, 1958, §65) 
 
Wittgenstein poses as an example a list of different games: board games, card games, 
Olympic Games, ball games, ring-a-ring-a-roses, and bouncing a ball against the wall.  
Next he invites us to find out if those games have something in common consider 
aspects such as how they stand against luck, skill, losing, winning, amusing, or 
patience.  Wittgenstein’s conclusion is that you can find family resemblances between 
one or other game, but nothing that runs throughout all of them. 
 
Although there is not a central concept that gives strength to the structure of language, 
“the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through 
its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres” (Wittgenstein, 1958, §67).  
Games constitute families, and there are family resemblances between them giving 
some similar characteristics between some of the games, but none that runs in all of 
them. 
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Nevertheless, Wittgenstein’s thought experiments about “all sorts of language-games” 
help us to infer some implications.  For instance, social reality is socially constructed 
and rooted in the “forms of life” of the actors involved. This derives from the idea that 
because in a language game “it is not possible to obey a rule ´privately´” 
(Wittgenstein, 1958, §202), the rules have to be socially constructed. 
 
With the idea of non-private rules, Wittgenstein is contesting Descartes notion that the 
source of incontrovertible knowledge is inside the individual, as is pointed out by the 
phrase “Cogito ergo sum”.  The argument is that prior to the assertion, there must be 
some agreement about the meanings of the terms used, as these agreements are an 
outcome of socially constructed language games (Edmonds & Eidinow, 2001) 
 
Also, Language Games can be iterated.  When people are engaged in interactions, 
successful co-ordinations enable the actors to establish common ground, like, for 
instance, when a group of practitioners develop a method in Kotarbiński’s (1966) 
terms.  This common ground can be used as the base for future co-ordinations 
enabling the apparition of more complex structures such as dialects or structures of 
meaning particular to the participants (Moldoveanu, 2002).  In the MS/ST context this 
could represent communities of practitioners using and developing a methodology 
that becomes a communication medium to facilitate, share and develop further 
experiences. 
 
What is appealing from this approach for this research is that meaning came from the 
language and actions that constitute the use.  Use came from actors and this give us a 
place to think about intention.  Additionally everything on language is a tool.  So there 
is the possibility to consider in an intervention all sorts of tools, word, phrases, body 
language (because actions are covered in the Language Game). Perhaps it can extent 
event to methodologies, point that I argue in the next section.   
 
2.9.3 Methodology Use as Language Game 
Language is an instrument.  Its concepts are instruments.  Now perhaps one thinks that it can 
make no great difference which concepts we employ ... the difference is merely one of 
convenience. (Wittgenstein, 2001, §569) 
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Here, I will use Wittgenstein philosophy to understand methodology. I am looking to 
this for three reasons.  First, in MS/ST, they are an important part of how 
interventions are approached. Second, I need a way to look at methodologies in which 
actors have a say in how they are used and, consequently, allow room for intentions.  
Third, there is a huge variety of methodologies.  Their philosophical and theoretical 
underpinnings in many cases are not necessarily compatible.  Under those 
circumstances, it is needed a philosophical perspective that will be able to refer to all 
of them to argue how intention plays in intervention regardless the tools employed. 
 
The idea of using language games for understanding methodology is possible because 
Wittgenstein treats language as a tool for acting in the world.  Examples of what we 
can do with it are giving and obeying orders, describing objects, reporting, 
speculating, forming and testing a hypothesis, translating, and asking. (Wittgenstein, 
1958).  Wittgenstein also poses the idea that there are innumerable numbers of 
language games.  This opens the opportunity to propose more “tools” in terms of 
language games. 
 
Mauws and Phillips (1995, p.327) argue that the concept is powerful enough to enable 
an understanding of organization science and managerial practice in terms of 
collections of diverse language games or “flexible networks of language games”.  In 
this logic, it is also possible to consider interactions, discourses, practices and 
interventions (a part of managerial practice) in organisational contexts in terms of 
Language Games. 
 
The proposal here is a middle ground between Wittgenstein and Mauws and Phillips.  
A methodology is something not as simple as giving an order (although in the process 
of applying one, orders can be given).  Furthermore, a methodology is not so big that 
it can encompass all managerial practice, (something more likely for MS/ST practice 
or a complex intervention process).  A methodology can be seen as part of this 
network of language games; it is a game among others. 
 
Methodologies in particular are specifically designed language games.  Inventing 
methodologies is like “invent[ing] a language” that “could mean to invent an 
instrument for a particular purpose” (Wittgenstein, 2001, §492).  For instance, 
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consider the following instruments with their purposes and their different 
underpinnings: System dynamics “Explore the operation of a complex real-world 
system to aid understanding and control”; Soft systems methodology “Learn about 
and improve a problematic situation by gaining agreement on feasible and desirable 
changes”; Critical systems heuristics “Provide support for planners and citizens to 
raise, explore and critique the normative implications of plans and designs” (Mingers, 
2003, p.563–564). 
 
However, it is important to clarify that what can be seen as a language game is not 
properly the methodology.  Here I follow Kay and Halpin (1999) when they suggest 
that a methodology is not the written advice, principles or stages.  Methodologies 
appear when they are put into action by actors in a context.  Methodologies can be 
considered as language games when they consist of the “language and the actions into 
which they are woven”. 
 
Perhaps the power and flexibility of the concept derive from Wittgenstein using the 
notion of language games as “objects of comparison which are meant to throw light 
on the facts of our language” (Wittgenstein, 2001, §130).  Using his idea as a 
postulate, other similarities between language games and methodologies can be 
proposed: 
 If language games are “objects of comparison” it follows that they can be used 
to learn and compare against methodology use. 
 The use of methodologies just as language games involves a “whole, 
consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven”. 
 Just as it happens with games, MS/ST methodologies seem to share family 
resemblances between some of them but not a feature present in all.  You 
could argue a family resemblance among the methods in classic OR, or the 
ones in soft approaches.  However, it is difficult to see the family resemblance 
between mathematical programming whose models rely on mathematical 
equations, and Critical Systems Heuristics in which non experts challenge 
experts through critical questions. 
 Methodologies, like language, evolve, change and grow over time. “if you 
want to say that this shows them to be incomplete, ask yourself whether our 
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language is complete; – whether it was so before the symbolism of chemistry 
and the notation of the infinitesimal calculus were incorporated in it” 
(Wittgenstein, 2001, §18). 
 
In addition, there are some interesting ‘side effects’ from working with the notion of 
language games applied to methodologies.  First, for Wittgenstein, rules in language 
games cannot be private, so the understanding of a methodology use needs to be seen 
as a social construction.  Even in the case of a single use by single individual, the 
concepts and understanding from which s/he will draw from have their origin in social 
interactions. 
 
Secondly, apart from methodology use, the interactions, languages, activities and 
“forms of life” in the intervention context can also be considered in terms of language 
games.  So when we are intervening, what we are trying to do using methodologies 
(as a language game) is to affect the language games already in place, which is to say, 
we are using a tool to modify the tools that people in that context had developed in 
order to interact.  What is more, because tools modify tools, it is also likely that the 
language games in place will modify the methodology in use. 
 
Consequently, considering methodologies as language games, is not directed to shed 
light on the underpinnings of each methodology.  It will not help, for example, to 
improve the mathematics behind a methodology that relies on that kind of knowledge.  
Considering methodologies as language games is aimed at understanding the 
possibilities and effects that the use of those tools has on the “activities” or “forms of 
life” of the actors engage in the process.  
 
2.10 Conclusions 
This chapter has provided an introduction to some concepts in the field of MS/ST and 
Boundary Critique.  Areas towards this research aim to contribute.  Additionally, the 
chapter also shows that, mainly by implication, intentions are already an important 
component of the field, yet at the same time are seriously under-researched. 
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For instance, concepts central to the field such as method, standard use of 
methodologies, and non-standard use of methodologies are or can be defined in terms 
of intention.  Despite these links, and that it seems inescapable to produce non-
standard uses in which the actors and their intentions can be directly involved, the 
concept of intention although recognised as important has been taken for granted in 
MS/ST. 
 
All of this presents an opportunity for research that this thesis seeks to exploit: 
exploring the relevance of intention for MS/ST interventions.  It has been stated that 
the main motivation for researching intentions is ethical.  If actors follow their 
intentions, the intervention processes and the methodologies employed, the 
importance of their role and their accountability take a central stage. On this account, 
they cannot hide behind the supposed objectivity and impartiality of the tools that they 
use. 
 
I proposed to use as philosophical ground for understanding intervention the notion of 
language games in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. As a consequence, actors and their 
intentions became important because they give the uses to the different tools that 
language offers.  Additionally, the concept of language games is all pervasive. It 
allows the possibility to talk about any methodology regardless of its underpinning 
assumptions; all of them require language to be of use.  Moreover, Language Games 
covers the use of words and actions up to complex social interaction. Consequently, 
this argument allows to consider as Language Games not only the use of 
methodologies but also all the tools used to intervene in the setting.  
 
It is to note that hereafter, I am not using the word tool in the technical sense given to 
it in MS/ST as is shown in Section 2.3.2.  Based on Wittgenstein, I favored the use of 
the word tool to describe any instrument used to intervene. This includes tools such as 
methods, methodologies, models but also words and gestures.  All of them are 
different, with different levels of complexity in their conception or proposed aims, but 
all of them are Language Games tools from the perspective advanced here.  
 
Having outlined this basis proposition, the next chapter defines better the research 
problem. It will also show how I planned to go about the research process itself.
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Chapter 3 Research Methodology 
Chapter Two presented the field of MS/ST and the paradoxical status in which it held 
intentions, central but taken for granted. It introduced the philosophical framework of 
Language Games as a way to underpin the understanding of interventions. 
Additionally, it presented the knowledge gap in MS/ST, and the main and supporting 
questions set to guide the exploration of intention on intervention. What is the 
relevance of intentions for MS/ST intervention? What are intentions?  How intentions 
can be studied?  
 
As it has been stated this research comprises philosophical, theoretical and empirical 
components. This chapter focuses on providing the rationale for the guidelines of the 
empirical exploration in the field. It deals with how I planned my involvement and 
decide guidelines for the fieldwork. In other words, this chapter shows the research 
methodology.  It is about the methodology to be use. 
 
A methodology refers to the philosophical framework and the fundamental assumptions of the 
research.  Because the philosophical framework one uses influences the procedures of 
research, we define methodology as the framework that relates to the entire process of 
research. (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007, p.4) 
 
Despite the fact that Creswell is referring to research methodology, these ideas are in 
line with the discussions of the meaning of methodology on Chapter Two.  Based on 
Kotarbiński (1966, p.439) it can be said that the purpose of the chapter is to reflect on 
“the proper order of actions” and what “should be the best possible preparations for 
later actions”.  In both, research methodologies and intervention methodologies, we 
need to reflect about our actions.  However, their main concern differs. In one the goal 
is to improve a situation (intervention methodology).  In the other, the research 
methodology (topic of this chapter), the bottom line is how to act in the field and how 
to make those actions productive to generate knowledge for the research. 
 
In order to guide action, as a researcher, it is necessary to explicit some of the 
assumptions about the nature of reality and the phenomenon to be studied (Blaikie, 
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2007). Broadly, this involves defining what kind of research is conducted,  qualitative 
or  quantitative. 
 
Qualitative researchers stress the socially constructed nature of reality, the intimate 
relationship between researcher and what is studied, and the situational constraints that shape 
inquiry. Such researchers emphasize the value-laden nature of inquiry. They seek answers to 
questions that stress how social experience is created and given meaning. In contrast, 
quantitative studies emphasize the measurement and analysis of causal relationships between 
variables, not processes. Proponents of such studies claim that their work is done from within 
a value-free framework. (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p.10) 
 
The central question of this research explores the relevance of intention for 
intervention.  Having this in mind the choice clearly tilts toward the qualitative side.  
It is suggesting that intervention processes are not value-free. Advocating this shows 
that the nature of my inquiry is “value-laden”.  I privilege actors.  Additionally, the 
topic deals with the “socially constructed nature of reality” in which the social 
experiences of intervention are created and given meaning. 
 
Qualitative research puts the researcher in natural settings to interpret and make sense 
of social phenomena and the meanings that people bring to it (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2005). Because of this, it needs to deal with the researcher, his situation in the world, 
his connection with the sites, the people and the relevant material (documents, 
archives).  Also, like any other kind of research, it demands guidelines to connect 
theory to strategies of inquiry and methods to collect empirical information. Finally, it 
needs to deal with the issues of how to present the material and how to assure the 
quality and trustworthiness of the research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p.25). 
 
The role of this chapter is to show my guidelines and general approach used on the 
field. As Holliday (2007) suggests it deals with topics such as why the approach taken 
is relevant for the research, or why the setting make sense for this research. 
 
The first part of the chapter presents a brief historical account about the origin of this 
project and the contacts and agreements with the participants.  At the time of my first 
contact there was not an established research question but an idea of an area of 
inquiry.  This was my actual involvement on the field, but this encounter help me to 
think how go about the research.  It shows how my feedback to the team of 
researchers was required.  Consequently, I started to focus the research in very 
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reflective way exploring my own intentions in each phase of the research, even the 
planning of the research. 
 
How to approach to the questions is treated on the rest of the Chapter. This is done by 
discussing the research logic, how I assembled my approach drawing from Action 
Research, my stance and ethics as a researcher, the validity of the inquiry, the 
literature reviewed and finally, a justification of the narrative voice of the work. All 
these elements are reflected in relation to the advantages and constraints offered by 
the specific case study site. 
 
3.1 Connecting with the Case Study Site 
According, to Schein (2006) projects can be originated by the subject/client or by the 
researcher/consultant.  However, the origin of this project can be considered more like 
being opportunistic and taking advantage of the situation (Holliday, 2007). 
 
The starting point of my research project can be traced to 2001. At that time, I begin 
to consider the idea of studying for a PhD.  However, I felt that I did not own a 
research topic.  Perhaps I could have taken on a question given by somebody else but 
this was not what I wanted.  Around 2002 I was developing a strong inclination for 
Wittgenstein’s ideas and for language in general.  Consequently, later in 2003 I 
decided to study honours on linguistic interaction but looking at this as a preparatory 
step for a possible PhD.  
 
At this point, I was toying with the idea of understanding methodology use as a 
language game.  In language games the meaning of words attaches to the way in 
which they are used, not to something intrinsic. What attracted me to this approach 
was the possibility of giving different uses to a methodology.  This sounded 
interesting because I liked the idea of flexibility when using a tool.  This was a topic 
for which I could embark on a PhD.  
 
I contacted one lecturer that I met while studying my masters in England. In fact, he 
was responsible for putting the idea of studying for a PhD in my head.  Previously I 
had decided to ignore the possibility, but now I was ready.  For different 
 77 
circumstances, I could not start a PhD in 2004.  One year later the situation changed 
significantly.  My old lecturer moved to New Zealand, so I looked for a PhD there.   
Now he was not in the position to be my supervisor.  Instead he was now the scientific 
leader of a research group in New Zealand.  He offered me the possibility of work 
with his research group in New Zealand.  He was my committed strong contact inside 
of the organisation, something that Sarah et al. (2002) see as a key part of the research 
process. 
 
In 2005, now enrolled for a PhD in Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, I 
started to work on my research proposal.  As part of this preparation I had some initial 
contacts with the research group.  Let us call this group TOP (Team Of Practitioners).   
 
TOP was a very attractive group of participants for my research for two reasons.  
First, they were applying a big range of areas of knowledge to their work (systems 
thinking and modelling, Action Research, sociology, kaupapa Māori5, management, 
psychology, biculturalism and water science).  This made it promising for the research 
because different disciplines could mean different ways to use concepts, and this 
could imply different intentions in play.  
 
Second they were looking at how to engage communities to participate in the 
formulation of policies for local water management.  This means that they were 
involved in intervention.  So they were applying their disciplinary knowledge, and 
with it, the application of MS/ST methodologies was likely. 
 
Additionally they were a group of experienced researchers, many of them with PhD 
degrees, working in similar areas of interest to my own MS/ST.  Since the beginning, 
I was aware of my status of junior researcher, researching senior researchers.  TOP 
                                                 
 
5
 Most of the research on Māori communities has been done by non- Māori researchers using western 
ideologies.  This has produced research that has imposed alien values and narratives on Māori 
communities. An additional effect is that most of this research has not benefited the community.  
Kaupapa Māori research aims to regain spaces for indigenous research.  These spaces are for the 
indigenous researcher, for the indigenous world views and especially for the benefits of the Māori 
community.  It is research done by Māoris for Māoris (Bishop, 2005; Smith, 1999). 
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presented a challenge and a very exciting opportunity.   The challenge: working with a 
team with the knowledge and the experience to understand and to be critical about the 
technical aspects of my work. My relationship with them is explored in detail on 
Chapter Five. 
 
They were fulfilling several criteria posed by Holliday (2007, p.34) regarding the 
selection of a research setting: a sense of boundary, “variety of relevant, 
interconnected data” such as “People to watch or interview, artefacts”, richness 
through “different instances, facets and viewpoints”, Sufficiently small and 
manageable, and the possibility of access to collect the data. 
 
My first contact with them was in June 2005.  They were having a two-day retreat to 
discuss the state of their projects and to reflect about their practice.  One slice of time 
was assigned to the presentation of my project.  At this stage, my research question 
was not yet formed. Consequently, I only presented generalities regarding the topic 
(how methodologies could be used in different ways) and the kind of philosophical 
ideas supporting this view (language philosophy, language games). 
 
The purpose with this first contact was to meet each other and to see if my research 
was appealing for the group.  I suppose that the group also needed to have a check on 
the researcher (me).  After this encounter, while I continued the work on my research 
proposal, they were discussing the implications of my involvement.  I was not present 
in these discussions, but I heard that there were some concerns about it. 
 
First, they were worried about my presence in the sense of being an obstacle to their 
work. On one hand, they did not want me to be present in their actual workshops with 
their clients.  The argument is that my presence will have to be explained and that was 
an additional variable in an already difficult process in itself.  On the other hand, even 
in the case in which clients were not present, they were afraid that my lack of 
understanding of the issues, could lead me to ask for clarifications and on the way 
obstruct the flow of their work.  
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Second, they wanted from me some contribution to the team.  If I was going to use 
their time and resources what could I give in return?  There were discussing my 
contribution in terms of additional funding or feedback. 
 
In the light of these debates, I had my second contact in October 2005.  In the 
meeting, I elaborated on my research project.  My aim for the meeting was to involve 
the group in the decisions and planning of my fieldwork (Rowan, 2006).  I presented 
some handouts but I stated that the points were not fixed, and they were open to 
debate.  The topic of intentionality was a possibility, but it was not dominant yet.  My 
presentation focused on the kind of work that I needed to do.  The members of TOP 
were inquiring about every aspect during the presentation, but also proposing and/or 
advising elements.  We were heading to defining a kind of research contract. 
 
I mentioned their concerns, the ones raised previously to the meeting, and I offered 
not to attend the meetings with their clients, not to be a burden with my questions in 
the meetings.  We discussed my contribution to the group in the way of feedbacks.  
My organisational contact has previously presented my work as a formative 
evaluation.  This is a way to improve the practice reflecting on descriptions of the 
work from a different point of view, in this case mine. 
 
This appeared as a good idea at the time because improving their practice was a 
concern for them.  In fact, they held regular meetings with the sole purpose of 
reflecting on their practice and discovering new avenues of improvement in it.  I 
pointed out that my research was focusing on understanding how people were using 
methodologies in non-standard ways.  I suggested that my feedback on how 
methodologies were used by them could be interesting for their reflective practice. 
 
They appreciated and accepted the feedback.  Then it was decided that my feedback 
could be periodic.  This gave me the advantage of bouncing and testing ideas with 
them before further analysis.  It was also decided that the right space for my 
feedbacks was their reflective practice meetings.   
 
Moreover, a fundamental boundary was decided for my research.  My research was 
not going to be really about TOP but about one of their projects.  That means that a 
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big part of their activities was not to be included in my analysis.  This condition 
covered even the reflective practice meetings in which my feedback was going to be 
given.  I was allowed of course to use the part of my feedback in my study, but other 
matters discussed in this scenario were beyond my reach. 
 
Confidentially was another issue.  That is the reason for which I use pseudonyms for 
the project, their clients, the organization in which TOP is based, and, of course, the 
identities of the participants.  The issues of confidentiality also covered discussions 
about how the information was going to be gathered, handled and stored.  
 
The duration of my involvement was set for around nine to ten months.  The idea in 
my head was that six months would suffice to collect information about the project.  
The information was to be gathered from a range of sources including: observation, 
access to files in their computer network, emails, and additional documentation used 
in the development of the project.  The sources included the ones that for me were the 
most important: interviews and attending their planning meetings.  On both occasions, 
I was allowed to take notes and make voice recordings.  This is fundamental because I 
was planning to follow their use of language and also because I was aware of my 
limitations as a non-native English speaker. 
 
After the six month period, I was planning to use the remaining time to write, polish 
and complement details about the setting receiving feedback from the group. 
 
The meeting was very insightful for me.  Not only did we develop a research contract, 
but I had a first “taste” of the group dynamics.  I saw how they debated ideas around 
my project.  I saw them use their experience to suggest how methods could be used, to 
show how my ideas resonated with some of the dynamics that they were experiencing, 
and how my presence was in itself an intervention that could affect their dynamics. 
 
At the end, although there was a set of agreements, it was clear that they were not 
fixed.  The nature of the research, studying how the dynamics of the group was 
changing in the process of intervention, required my adaptation and consequently, 
further negotiation with the team during the process,  specially taking into account 
that I did not know what their intentions were. This was also clear in the light of my 
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research proposal. It was still under construction, and I did not have a concrete 
research question at that point. 
 
3.2 Based on the Case Study, How to Approach the 
Research? 
3.2.1 Some Considerations 
Up to this point, some key elements for the empirical work have been defined: MS/ST 
the area of research, the guiding questions, the group of participants, and part of the 
philosophical underpinnings (more will be explained in Chapter Four). A very 
important one has been left pending, the approach to intention.  This situation is 
deliberate. 
 
One approach to answer the research question is to have a predefined way to 
understand intention and from this position give an explanation of how methodologies 
are affected.  This presupposes to have clarity and faith on a particular approach to 
intention.   At this stage as a researcher my experiences gave familiarity with MS/ST 
(I held a master’s degree on the subject) and Wittgenstein philosophy and language 
pragmatics (I held an honours degree).  However, I cannot say the same about 
intention; I never thought about the matter before the present research.  When I started 
to confront this issue in my fieldwork, I did not even know about the existence of the 
Philosophy of Action (important topic for my research presented on Chapter Four). 
 
Due to my background, my take on the problem of intention was based on Philosophy 
of Language.  My basic assumption was that it was not so important to know what 
intention was because in the end this notion was relying on language.  You can have 
an intention, but if you want to accomplish something with it, you will need to act 
with that intention in order to do it.  The philosophical framework of language games 
is useful here.  It let me see actions tied with language.  So although I was not sure 
about the meaning of intention, the way to understand it was to get involved in the 
language games in place. 
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So in this way arose the second way to approach answering the question:  not 
presupposing what was intention but learning about intention in the field to show 
afterwards how that intention was expressed in language.  This approach gained 
strength after my agreements with TOP, especially because one of the agreements was 
to give them feedback. 
 
Giving feedback means acting and intervening in the situation.  According, to my own 
research assumptions, interventions are affected by the intentions of the practitioners. 
Consequently, for understanding what intention is and how intention intrudes on the 
intervention process, the first and the most at hand case of intention was my own. 
 
Another implication of the agreements is that in giving feedback, I was in turn 
receiving feedback as well.  As I explained TOP is a group of experienced 
practitioners.  Any feedback that I can provide, I had not doubted it would be received 
in a critical way.  TOP comments on my feedbacks can be seen as an opportunity to 
improve and tune up my understanding of my research problem.   
 
3.2.2 Choosing a Logic for Inquiry 
After picturing a broad idea of how to proceed in the research, the next step is how to 
support or ground the actions in some research tradition or strategy.  Blaikie’s (2000) 
work on social research provides such a foundation. 
 
For Blaikie (2000, p.8), it is necessary to “recognize that there is no such thing as the 
scientific method, that there is a variety of logics of inquiry available in the social 
sciences, and that, in order to conduct social research, it is necessary to choose from 
among them”.  Those logics referred are induction, deduction, retroduction and 
abduction. 
 
The inductive strategy produces generalizations from data; the deductive strategy test theories 
by testing hypothesis derived from them; the retroductive strategy proposes causal mechanism 
or structures and tries to establish their existence; and the abductive strategy generates social 
scientific accounts from everyday accounts. (Blaikie, 2000, p.10) 
 
These differences make each strategy appropriate to distinct aims.  Induction aims “to 
establish universal generalizations to be used as pattern explanations”;  deduction “to 
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test theories to eliminate false ones and corroborate the survivor”; retroduction “to 
discover underlying mechanism to explain observed regularities”; abduction “to 
describe and understand social life in terms of social actors’ motives and accounts” 
(Blaikie, 2000, p.101). 
 
It can be argued that answering the questions posed by my research will give me tools 
to generate “scientific accounts from everyday accounts”. This implies an abductive 
logic.  However, how I will arrive at those tools? What I infer from the process 
described in the preceding section is a process to learn about intention. Here different 
possibilities are stated and later tried.  This process allows not only testing different 
possibilities but also polishing and improving the most promising.  
 
This involves an interactive and iterative process of being aware of myself, of 
observing TOP, continuing my readings about relevant themes, constructing and 
giving feedback for TOP, and tuning my ideas of intention based on all the 
aforementioned and on TOP’s “feedback”. This process fits to a deductive strategy. 
 
Using the literature on intention and my own learning on the field I will try different 
theories and hypotheses regarding my research questions, eliminating the ones that do 
not seem fruitful and looking for a survivor.  “While the testing of hypotheses 
commonly involves the use of quantitative methods, it need not do so.  The deductive 
strategy can also use qualitative methods, in which case hypothesis testing is more in 
terms of a discursive argument from evidence” (Blaikie, 2000, p.10). 
 
In the field, the general idea with the deductive strategy was, through my feedback, to 
use some assumptions about the nature of intention drawing from the literature and 
fieldwork (observations, audio recordings, interviews or documents) in a way similar 
to Strauss and Corbin (1998).  Then, on the interaction produced by the delivery, I 
would co-construct and check with TOP if the ideas conveyed were relevant for their 
practice. All this information is the base for the production of the “discursive 
arguments”. 
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It is a process of imposing theories on the world and in “a process of trial and error, 
us[ing] data to try to reject theories.  Theories that survive this critical process are 
provisionally accepted, but never proven to be true” (Blaikie, 2000, p.105). 
 
Knowing what kind of logic is going to be used gives a direction on how the research 
methodology is going to be used.  The next section focuses on explaining this 
methodology and explaining how it can support the aims of the research and the logic 
in the first phase of the research. 
 
3.3 Tailoring the Methodology 
The qualitative researcher is a bricoleur and a quilt maker.  He produces a bricolage, 
“a pieced-together set of representations that is fitted to the specifics of a complex 
situation”. To this aim, the researcher uses all the tools of his/her craft and all the 
“strategies, methods, and empirical materials at hand”.  Yet, “if the researcher needs 
to invent, or piece together, new tools or techniques, he or she will do so” (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2005, p.4). 
 
My quilt is based on the idea is that I do not know what can happen in the field. 
Therefore, I needed a fairly open and loose approach to be to be able to adapt to 
unexpected conditions. I thought more about guidelines for the field than concrete 
actions, methods or techniques. I saw those arising from the work in the field (as 
shown in Chapter Five).  
 
It is already said that the engagement in the field can be considered a learning process, 
an iterative way to gain and refine knowledge about intention.  An iterative approach 
to research “involves you going out into the field, collecting data, and subjecting these 
data to a critically reflective process of preliminary data analysis to determine ‘what is 
going on’ in order to build up a picture of the data emerging and to guide you in the 
next set of data collection” (Grbich, 2007, p.21).  According, to Grbich (2007) there is 
a good number of approaches that can be termed iterative such as grounded theory, 
ethnography, or phenomenology.  However, a big omission that also responds to these 
criteria is Action Research.   
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Action Research combines the possibilities of the bricolage with iterations. Under this 
perspective, the iterations allow deciding and tuning the use of “multiple qualitative 
approaches” to gather information along the process “depending on how best to 
accomplish practical and other outcomes deemed necessary by those involved in the 
research” (Reason & Bradbury, 2006b, p.xxiv).  Consequently, if methods such as 
interviews, participant observation, and document analysis are deemed relevant they 
can be integrated in the Action Research Process. Additionally, “the process, method, 
and content of each action cycle are essentially emergent since we are learning our 
way forward into the future” (Sarah et al., 2002, p.540).  
 
This implies that the research can be adapted to the requirements and changing 
conditions of the fieldwork.  This is useful in the light of the agreements with TOP 
and to study dynamic language games.  “The only certain object of research becomes 
the change itself” (Checkland & Holwell, 1997, p.11)”.  We have to act “on the 
assumption that social reality is continuously being created and recreated in a social 
process” (Checkland & Holwell, 1997, p.12).  
 
Checkland and Holwell’s words are a good closure to this Action Research 
introduction, because their work joins Action Research, MS/ST and contructionism.  
Constructionism as it was shown earlier is strongly influenced by Wittgenstein. So, 
their work shows precedents of links between the research methodology, the area of 
contribution and the philosophical assumptions in this research.  The empathies in 
these areas are further explored by Flood (2006) (MS/ST – Action Research) and 
Lincoln (2001) (Action Research – constructionism).  
 
The importance of drawing from Action Research for my research is that while there 
is a range of other iterative approaches, they do not deal with intervening and 
generating improvements on the participants’ conditions.  Aiming to produce 
improvements for TOP in the way of feedback was the most distinctive characteristic 
of my empirical approach. 
 
There are some specific ideas in Action Research that deserve more attention for their 
special relevance to intention and, therefore, to this study: the cyclical process and 
first and second person Action Research. They are explained in the following 
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sections. After them, I will discuss why I cannot call this a full blown Action 
Research project. 
 
3.3.1 A Cyclical Process 
Action Research literature, instead of using the term iterative, uses cyclical. The 
cyclical process in Action Research has been expressed in different ways:  planning, 
taking action, and evaluating the action for Coghlan and Brannick (2001);  plan, act, 
observe, and reflect for Altrichter, Kemmis, McTaggart, and Zuber-Skerritt (2002);  
observe, reflect, act, evaluate, modify, and move in new directions for McNiff and 
Whitehead (2006).  Dick (1993) argues that essentially the “action research cycle 
consists at least of intention or planning before action, and review or critique after”.   
 
Although all of them are very similar, Dick’s conceptualisation of the cycle brings to 
the foreground the notion of intention.  Based on this I can conceptualised my Action 
Research process as one in which the same object of my research is in turn one of the 
stages of the process for learning about it.  As Dick (1993) further states “You are 
more likely to learn from an experience if you act with intent”.  If I can clarify with 
which intent I am acting, my process of reflection can help me to understand how 
intention is affecting on my intervention.  
 
It is also here that the logic of deduction finds its expression.  Having an intention to 
act based on a particular understanding of intention can be seen as the hypothesis 
ready for testing.  The review and critique after action serve to “eliminate false ones 
and corroborate the survivor”.  It is important to clarify, though, that I was not looking 
to have a theory in scientific terms.  I was looking forward to generating an 
understanding of the problem of intentionality in methodology use.  
 
3.3.2 First and Second Person Action Research/Practice 
Accordingly, to Reason and Bradbury (2006b) the practice of Action Research can be 
understood in terms of the focus of the inquiry.  There are basically three ways to 
focus practice: first, second and third person Action Research.  The first person 
practice focuses on the researcher.  The second person practice focuses on the face to 
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face interaction in a group of people.  The third person practice deals with third 
persons that are not necessarily known to the researcher, in an effort to expand the 
outcomes of a piece of research (Chandler & Torbert, 2003).  
 
In this thesis, I deal with the first and the second person practice.  They hold direct 
relevance to the research process.  Accordingly, to Reason and Bradbury (2006b, 
p.xxv):  
 
First person action research/practice skill and methods address the ability of the researcher to 
foster an inquiring approach to his or her own life, to act awarely and choicefully, and to 
assess effects in the outside world while acting.  First person research practice brings inquiry 
into more and more of our moments of action – not as outside researchers but in the whole 
range of everyday activities. 
 
Using first person Action Research/practice enabled me to trace my own actions.  In 
the process of studying intention I was like Young (2005, p.152), realising that I was 
“the most accessible person I have to hand!”.  Inquiring on my own actions and 
choices let me understand and clarify my own intentions and the effects that they can 
have in the outside world, namely on TOP.  This is further expanded by the possibility 
that Action Research provides to enquire in the present time (Chandler & Torbert, 
2003).  I can reflect on my actions on the site at their occurrence.  
 
However, according to my framework of language games, grasping an idea of the 
effects of my actions requires social construction.  There are not private rules 
(Wittgenstein, 2001).  Here is where second person Action Research/practice enters.  
Second person practice focuses on our interaction with others to deal with issues of 
mutual concern (Chandler & Torbert, 2003).  “Second person inquiry starts with 
interpersonal dialogue and includes the development of communities of inquiry” 
(Reason & Bradbury, 2006b, p.xxvi).  From the perspective of second person practice, 
we can reflect about language and intention in the social interaction.  
 
“Language ceases to mean anything if its relation to intent, performance and outcome 
become random, and people lose trust in us if they interpret us as generating 
systematic incongruities that we are not willing to explore”.  We can explore the 
intent through “content and conduct”. (Torbert, 2006, p.211). 
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To summarize:  The first person let me explore my intentions.  The second let me 
check my understanding of my intention and other people’s intentions through the 
coherence between intentions and actions.  
 
3.3.3 This is not Action Research 
So far, I have shown how my approach resembled Action Research.  It is iterative, 
emergent, making use of different methods on the way and reflecting using first and 
second person Action Research. However, this is not a fully blown out Action 
Research project. There are basically two big differences that are central to Action 
Research’s nature: the kind of knowledge generated in the process and the role that 
the participants of the research have on the research itself. 
 
On the first issue, consider the following definitions of Action Research: 
 
An approach to research which aims at both taking action and creating knowledge or theory 
about that action. The outcomes are both an action and a research outcome, unlike traditional 
research approaches which aims at creating knowledge only. Action research works through a 
cyclical process of consciously and deliberately: (a) planning; (b) taking action; (c) evaluating 
the action, leading to further planning and so on. (Coghlan & Brannick, 2001, p.xi) 
 
Action research is the process of systematically collecting research data on an ongoing system 
relative to some objective, goal, or need of that system; feeding these data back into the 
system based both on the data and on hypothesis; and evaluating the results of action by 
collecting more data. (Akdere, 2002, p.340) 
 
 
As the first definition states, Action Research creates knowledge about the action.  In 
my case, my action could be the feedback sessions.  However, my plan was not to 
improve knowledge about how to deliver feedback sessions. I planned to use the 
session as a medium to reflect on my intention and to crosscheck that knowledge with 
TOP. Similarly, in the light of the second definition, my research problem of intention 
is not an objective, goal or need of the system TOP. It is a research problem, but 
although I considered it useful for practitioners (among them TOP), it was a problem 
independent of them. 
 
Now let us consider the second issue, the role of the participants of the research. 
Action Research is a participative approach. 
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The second dimension of action research is that it is participative, in that the members of the 
system which is being studied participate actively in the cyclical process. (Coghlan & 
Brannick, 2001, p.xi) 
 
action research is inquiry that is done by or with insiders to an organization or community, but 
never to or on them. (Herr & Anderson, 2005, p.3) 
 
I planned to give feedback and see TOP’s reaction. However, the cyclical process is 
centred on me. They served as an instance to crosscheck intermediate results of my 
research.  This research is more a research on them. That is not to say that my work 
could not be relevant to them. I aimed to make it relevant and in this way gain more of 
their involvement. 
 
For the aforementioned reasons I consider that this project is not Action Research but 
that can be better understood in the wider realm of qualitative research. 
 
3.4 Researcher Stance  
The stance refers to how I position myself in relation to the participants of my 
research. Blaikie (2007) suggests three kind choices in order to define this 
relationship: 
  
1) On, for or with people, similarly to Herr and Anderson (2005) in the last section 
2) Outsider or insider and  
3) Expert or learner. 
 
I do not think that you are necessarily fixed on these categories on the field.  I 
consider, like Hammersley and Atkinson (1995, p.41), that the boundaries of a 
research setting “are not fixed, but shift across occasions, to one degree or another, 
through process of redefinition and negotiation”. Part of the responsibility of the 
researcher is looking actively for some of these shifts.  
 
Consequently, I know that my research is on people for advancing knowledge about 
intention. However, I aimed to find how to involve them on my research. I started as 
an outsider, but I looked forward to being seen more on the insider side through my 
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work. However, in the field I did not want to abandon my condition of a learner. My 
stance, therefore, is related to the kind of shift that I was looking for. 
 
3.5 Ethics 
From the onset of the research, I felt that intentions and ethics were intermingling.  I 
wanted to be helpful for my participants. I wanted my ideas to be useful. I wanted to 
safeguard my standing as a researcher, and obviously I did not want to do something 
detrimental to the work or the people participating on my research.  Are these 
intentions? Are these ethical commitments?  These questions just make clear that it is 
necessary to prepare to reflect about ethics during the fieldwork. 
 
How to prepare?  The simplest way to go about this is to follow some code of 
conduct, ethical code or rules, and design some rules of engagement (Brydon-Miller, 
Greenwood, & Eikeland, 2006; Gallo, 2004).  For instance, in this research I agreed 
with TOP to rules such as not interfering with the normal work, not getting involved 
with the clients of my group of participants and not giving the information obtained 
from them to others without their consent (see Section 3.1).  Other rules were 
enforced by Victoria University were my research is based.  In the Appendices to this 
thesis, two letters addressed to the participants are presented.  One presents the 
project, the other asks for consent to participate in the research (Appendix 1 and 2). 
 
However, what underpins this project is the idea that intentions change and affect our 
processes and tools for involvement.  If that is true, it can be true also for ethical 
codes and rules, as Taket’s (1994) work suggests.  Consequently, under this 
perspective, “simple declarations are obviously not enough”.  They cannot cover 
every possible situation, and, even if they do, intention can change how the rule is 
applied.  The way here is to “strive to make ethical practice manifest in every micro-
decision in the work we do” (Brydon-Miller et al., 2006, p.129).   
 
Paying attention to every micro-decision in the field is what is also called critical self 
reflection.  About this matter Midgley (1995, p.547) says: 
 
 91 
There is an onus on the researcher who wants to think critically, not just to look at things from 
different angles, but to do so in a way that will be considered right or useful–and the 
judgement of what is right or useful can be made by the researcher, other interested parties, or 
both in communication together. 
 
Applying Brydon-Miller et al. (2006) and Midgley (1995) arguments to what it was 
already said regarding the research methodology, it seems that the connection of 
intention with ethics strengthens further.  In this light understanding intention in an 
Action Research process is an ethical process in itself. 
 
Looking to be aware of my intentions is to have in view the micro-decisions in the 
field.  Looking at the different hypothesis of how intention is affecting my 
intervention it reflects the idea of different angles.  The co-construction of 
understanding about intention with my reflection and the interactions with the group 
creates conditions to judge more transparently (ethically?) about right and useful 
choices. 
 
Although the choices are co-constructed, I cannot deny that my intention has a saying.  
As I see the situation, I will be balancing the drive for getting all the possible 
information for the research with the well-being of the participants.  At the end I feel 
that is more ethical to prioritise the latter. This also makes sense from an Action 
Research perspective. 
 
3.6 Can I Act on the Findings? 
There are many concepts that refer to the quality of qualitative research, for instance, 
internal and external validity, reliability, objectivity, credibility confirmability, 
structural corroboration, rhizomatic validity. (Creswell, 2007).  Guba and Lincoln 
(2005, p.205) argue that what all this terminology is trying to answer is that whether 
we can have such confidence in the findings that we can act on them.  For “we” I 
mean obviously me and others.  How can I feel confident myself and how other 
people can be confident on the outcomes in such a way that we all can act on their 
implications? 
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As it was already explained, this is research uses the logic of deduction. How is 
confidence obtained here? Strictly speaking under the logic of deduction you are not 
gaining confidence about knowledge.  The process is one of the falsification of 
hypotheses in a Popperian sense.  You find reasons to discard ideas or hypothesis.  
The confidence about what it remains arises because it had survived our efforts to 
discredit it. 
 
How does this relate to the Action Research components from which I am drawing?  
To start with it has been said that Action Research is experimental research (Styhre & 
Sundgren, 2005).  This means that every Action Research cycle can be used to 
develop hypotheses in the shape of our understanding of the concepts and/or situation. 
Next, these hypotheses can be cross-checked with the participants in order to test 
them.  The test here is not necessarily an experiment in the positivistic sense, as 
qualitative research applies testing as argumentation (Blaikie, 2000).  In order to 
construct this argument some evidence is necessary. This evidence comes can come 
from “the experiments” and other sources such as interviews or the same interaction 
on the feedback sessions. 
 
Although I argued that my project cannot be seen as a full-blown Action Research 
project, I can use some of its criteria of quality. The criteria aim to give confidence on 
the process and the evidence.  Consequently, the evidence and the process can be 
valued in a better light if there is evidence of an overall process accompanied by: 
evolving actions, a good quality in the relationship with the participants, 
collaboration, a research that energises researcher and participants (Herr & Anderson, 
2005), a research validated by the participants, the extension of ways of knowing, and 
significant work (Reason & Bradbury, 2006a). 
 
Debating the arguments in this way will allow to what Checkland and Holwell (1997) 
refer as the possibility for “interested outsiders” to recover the process.  Making 
visible the “epistemology (the set of ideas and the process in which they are use 
methodologically) by means of which they will make sense of their research, and so 
define what counts for them as acquired knowledge” (Checkland & Holwell, 1997, 
p.20). 
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If the concepts tested survive the attack that does not necessarily translate as their 
validity, but certainly it is easier to act on concepts that we find difficult to disproof. 
 
3.7 About the Literature Reviewed 
This research involved going through mainly three bodies of literature: MS/ST, 
Language Pragmatics, and Philosophy of Action.  In general, the process of finding 
the relevant literature followed a snow ball technique.  I used some terms derived 
from previously known texts to search the databases.  Those terms hit some articles 
and journals.  Sometimes, the articles produced more terms.  Eventually, the journals 
found, turn out to be “mining fields” that were examined for several years.  Here, I am 
showing those journals that were explored at least four years.  However, there were 
some specificities in each one of the bodies of literature. 
 
MS/ST from the perspective of Critical Systems Thinking was a body of literature that 
was familiar to me before embarking on the research.  I was familiar especially with 
the top Journal in the area Journal of the Operational Research Society, covering the 
work from the mathematical to the philosophical.  Additionally I was familiar with 
journals related to the work at Hull University in UK: Systems Practice that later 
became Systemic Practice and Action Research and Systems Research that later 
became Systems Research and Behavioral Science. 
 
Through searchers I also became acquainted with other journals in the area such as 
Omega and the European Journal of Operational Research.  Those are similar in 
nature to the Journal of the Operational Research Society.  Additionally I found 
useful some of the work in Kybernetics a journal focused on cybernetics one of 
branches in systems thinking. 
 
The way in which I proceeded was looking first to some leading figures on the field 
such as Jackson, Midgley, Mingers, Ulrich and Checkland.  As the research 
progressed I was looking for information about the history and development of the 
area, but also about some central concepts such as methodology, methods and 
standard and non standard uses of them.  In this exploration topics about meta 
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methodologies and pluralism were also important.  I also explored Boundary Critique 
theory in depth to help me make the link with the specific work on intentions. 
 
Soft Systems Methodology was an important search term not only for the theoretical 
discussions on some of the topics mentioned above, but also for their methodology for 
intervene.  This was useful for my own work on the feedback sessions.  Finally in this 
body of literature was important to look for making accounts of the intervention 
process and ethics. 
 
The following body of work was that of Language Pragmatics.  I was familiar with 
this body of work, mainly thanks to the reading of seminal works in the area but in 
Spanish translations.  I did not know of any Journal but with some work, the Journal 
of Pragmatics emerged as the undisputed reference.  I devoted a lot of energy on this 
Journal checking work from 1997 to 2007.  I planned to use several of the ideas of 
how to analyze communicative interactions.  However, I ended developing my own 
way so it is not apparent in my text how much I own to the readings here.  I also have 
to say that based on the readings of this Journal, I tried different underpinnings for my 
proposal before settling for Relevance Theory (as it will be introduced in Chapter 
Four).  
 
In this area, I was looking mainly for intention because I knew that this topic was 
treated from this perspective.  Additionally, because I was aware of the need to 
understand interaction, consequently, I looked for interaction, pragmatic 
interpretations, and context.  I also look for specific ideas in philosophy and theory 
such as Wittgenstein, Philosophy of Language, Relevance Theory and Blending (topic 
that I considered for long time, but it did not make it). 
 
The final main body of literature was that of Philosophy of Action.  I was not aware 
of the existence of this area.  I came across with it thanks to Enç’s (2003) book How 
We Act: Causes, Reasons and Intentions.  Finding this book was more the work of 
serendipity.  Before this book, my search for intentions was not giving me interesting 
results.  After the book, I learnt some vocabulary, and some authors that made my 
searchers easier and allowed my vocabulary to grow.  I used terms such as intentional 
action, plans, belief, desire, wayward chains, deviance, luck, experimental philosophy, 
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side effects, trying, agent causation, causation, reasons explanations.  On the author’s 
side, I focused on Bratman for the clarity and wide acceptance of his ideas and on 
Mele because he reviews all the debates on the field.  
 
Although I found a very scattered literature, the main Journals for my work were: 
Analysis (a good mix of philosophy of action and language), the Journal of Cognition 
and Culture (dealing with experimental philosophy) and Philosophical Psychology 
(philosophy of action from a more theoretical line). 
 
I also have to mention that in broader philosophical themes concerning action, 
language, systems thinking, complexity and intention, the journals Philosophical 
Studies and Philosophy of the Social Sciences were important sources of insight. 
 
Out of the Journals I consider that these books were crucial for this thesis: 
 Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein, 2001) 
 Relevance: Communication and Cognition (Sperber & Wilson, 1995) 
 Systemic Intervention: Philosophy, Methodology and Practice (Midgley, 
2000) 
 Dynamics in Action: Intentional Behavior as a Complex System (Juarrero, 
1999) 
 Forms of Explanation: Rethinking the Questions in Social Theory (Garfinkel, 
1981) 
 
3.8 Narrative Voice 
I am using a number of narrative voices in this thesis.  Each one of them has a 
purpose.  In general, I use third person to explain other’s people concepts or 
presenting arguments that are not involving my personal state.  I use the first person 
of the plural in two cases.  One case refers to the fieldwork when I am talking about a 
situation involving both my participants and I.  However, I also use this person 
following the example of authors in the different fields from which I am drawing such 
as Philosophy of Action or Boundary Critique Theory.  When they use this person, 
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they are trying to show a phenomenon or situation that is applicable to all of us as 
human beings. 
 
Perhaps the use that some can find more controversial is that one of the first person 
singular (I).  However, there is a good number of reason to justify this choice.  For 
instance, as it can be seen from the quotes in this work, the disciplines from which I 
am drawing, make use of it.  So there is support from the academic community to the 
idea.  Second as this chapter argues this is a qualitative research, consequently, there 
is an “intimate relationship between researcher and what is studied, and the situational 
constraints that shape inquiry.”  And as Denzin and Lincoln (2005, p.10) continue to 
express researchers in this tradition “emphasize the value-laden nature of inquiry.” 
 
This is especially true in a research about intention where as I declare following 
Young (2005, p.152) I was “the most accessible person I have to hand!".  As I had 
shown in this chapter being aware of my own choices, actions and biases using my 
own experiences is an important source of data.  Because I stated that this is not a full 
Action Research project, I cannot use it as argument to justify a first-person narrative.  
However, I can point out that I am drawing from one of its aspects: first-person 
practice.  Additionally, the description of my own circumstances is coherent with 
Auto-Ethnography (Holman Jones, 2005).  Together with Self-Study, they had been 
even recognized as fruitful approaches for Action Research (Herr & Anderson, 2005).  
All of them allow a first-person narrative. 
 
Basically, in the process of disentangling intention, I was avoiding the problem of 
hiding myself behind the researcher (Becker, 2007; Law, 2004; Simpson, 2006).  The 
understanding of my own intention is fundamental for the research, and the account of 
my own intentions will be obscured if narrated from a perspective different from 
mine. 
 
3.9 Conclusions 
This chapter defines the guidelines and general approach for the research. These are 
based on contacts with the participants of my research.  It was shown how my initial 
agreement with them shaped the methodology to be followed in the field. This 
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methodology is iterative, and looks to learn in successive cycles about intention 
following a deductive logic. It works testing different ideas about what is an intention 
and its suitability to explain what happens in the field. 
 
The sources for the ideas or hypotheses tested are literature about intention and my 
own insights in the situation.  This testing process generates evidence that can be used 
in “discursive arguments” to filter ideas of intention.  If the ideas are not strong 
enough they will be dropped or improved. 
 
Without being a full blown Action Research project, I draw from it for several 
reasons. It allows me to incorporate the feedback that TOP demanded from me as part 
of the research. In this way, I can have opportunities for participation and co-
construction of knowledge for my research. Also, Action Research through its first 
and second person Action Research practice let me reflect not only on other people’s 
intentions but also on my own. 
 
Additionally, Action Research let me respond and adapt to changes that are likely to 
occur in the field. In fact, changes are expected.  Dick (1993) points out that  if you do 
not change the approach why use Action Research? It has also been described as 
“Designing the plane while flying it” (Herr & Anderson, 2005, p.69).  
 
The chapter also discusses my stance as a researcher and my ethical position.  
Regarding my stance, I was looking to involve my participants in my research, 
planning to shift an initial status of an outsider for an insider and keep my position as 
a learner through all the process.  On ethics, I start from the idea that intentions and 
ethics are necessarily intermingled. Consequently, it is necessary to take ethics into 
account.  It is shown that despite following some codes, these are not enough in light 
of the idea of intention.  I follow the notion that reflection about every micro-decision 
is important for understanding the implications of my decisions on the field.  
 
Finally, the topic of criteria for quality is discussed, reflecting on how we can have 
confidence to act on the findings of the research. This validation takes criteria usually 
applied to Action Research in which the relationship and the way in which the 
knowledge is constructed with the participants are central. 
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The next chapter presents ideas from philosophy of language, language pragmatics 
and philosophy of action. They are the philosophical and theoretical source of the 
hypotheses to be tested in relation to intention. 
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Chapter 4 Preliminary Philosophical and 
Theoretical Exploration 
Chapter Three shows the research methodology. The core idea in it is to learn about 
intention contrasting the empirical experiences in the field with conceptual 
approximations to intention from philosophy and theory. The role of this chapter is 
present those preliminary philosophical and theoretical concepts needed to feed the 
contrasting process on the field. 
 
I follow Benett and Hacker (2003, p.439) in their understanding of philosophy:  
 
It is concerned not with the description and explanation of empirical facts, but with the 
elucidation of the forms in which we describe empirical facts – that is, with the description of 
our conceptual scheme.  It does not add to our knowledge of the world, but contributes to our 
understanding, … of the knowledge we already have.  For its results are not, and cannot be, 
startling new facts and theories, but only the clarification of the forms of thought that we 
employ. 
 
Lundberg and Young (2005) state that “Research without theory is meaningless; 
theory without research stagnates”. Theories are used to explain the phenomenon. 
Without theory, it cannot be seen how intentions can be pertinent and useful for 
MS/ST. Without research, there is no basis for theory development. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore some forms of thought, and some ways to 
explain intention. In this regard, the chapter is working towards answering the 
supporting questions: what are intentions? And, how to study intentions on 
interventions. The perspectives used are Language Pragmatics and Philosophy of 
Action.  
 
Because the grounding for the concept of intervention is based on language, the first 
approach to intention explored is also based on it. Language pragmatics is a field of 
knowledge strongly influenced by philosophy of language and especially the work of 
Wittgenstein. Additionally, as will be explained through Relevance Theory, it 
provides a way to consider intention linking it with communication and its effects on 
 100 
a situation. This is important because the purpose here, is to look for ways to 
understand how intentions can be applied in interventions and how to study them. 
 
The second way to consider intention relies more strongly in philosophy.  In 
philosophy the intentionality has two different meanings (Malle, Moses, & Baldwin, 
2001).  The first sense of intentionality lies in the realm of phenomenology. It is “the 
aboutness or directedness of mind (or states of mind) to things, objects, states of 
affairs, events” (Siewert, 2007, p.1).  In other words, certain states of the mind such as 
belief, hope, and desire are directed or can be directed towards something.  For 
example, I can desire a new car.  The state of mind (desire) is directed to something, 
the new car. 
 
The second meaning falls in the field of philosophy of action, which as pragmatics 
also has Wittgenstein as a forerunner.  This meaning refers to the property of actions 
that make them purposeful, (Malle et al., 2001).  A casual event is different from an 
event that we produce on purpose.  “What is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm 
goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?” (Wittgenstein, 2001, §621). 
 
The kind of intentions that are implied in the first meaning have been explored in 
MS/ST, mainly through phenomenology and the work of authors such as Fuenmayor 
(1991b; 1991c) and Georgiou (2003; 2007).  However, if the problem to consider is 
intervention, philosophy of action, the second meaning, seems a more suitable field 
for exploration.  One reason is that the notion of intervention implies purposeful 
action (Midgley, 2000).  This matches with the importance of action in philosophy of 
action mentioned earlier (Malle et al., 2001).  A second reason is that concepts such as 
‘modes of action’ and ‘standard uses’ imply action no a mental state.  Despite these 
points in common the second meaning has not been explored in MS/ST. 
 
Consequently, this chapter starts an exploration of different ways to understand 
intention from the perspective of Philosophy of Action. As it will be shown, there are 
different ways in which this concept has been conceptualised in the field.  At this 
point, the purpose is not to define which one of them is best for this research.  The 
purpose instead is to have a pool of options for assisting in the interpretation of 
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fieldwork data. Much of my understanding of what is presented here was gained 
through my fieldwork and further studies and reflections after my involvement.  
 
The chapter starts showing how Language Pragmatics relates to Wittgenstein 
philosophy and how, using this approach, there is a way to link intentions, 
communications and effects. Afterwards, intentions are explored from the point of 
view of Philosophy of Action. With two different fields of knowledge approaching 
intention, the last section explores the question of the kind of relationship that they 
could have. Finally, some implications for the work on later chapters are presented. 
 
4.1 Intentions in a Language Game 
Ideas about language can not only give us a grounding to think about methodologies, 
as in the case of the last section.  It can also give us ways to think about intention.  In 
this section I will explore some work on language pragmatics that connects with 
Wittgenstein philosophy and ways to understand intention. 
 
Wittgenstein influence is notorious in language pragmatics.  “Ludwig Wittgenstein is 
not only a proto-pragmatician, but also the first modern pragmatician” (Kopytko, 
2007, p.807). Language pragmatics follows some of the assumptions in Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy.  For instance, the field can be defined as “the systematic study of 
meaning by virtue of, or dependent on, the use of language” (Huang, 2007, p.2). 
 
This section will continue to explore some Wittgenstein’s ideas, specifically the rules 
present in a language game.  This will open the way to talk about intention and 
Relevance theory, a way to relate intention, communication and effects. 
 
4.1.1 Language Games and Rules 
In philosophy we often compare the use of words with games and calculi that have fixed rules, 
but cannot say that someone who is using language must be playing such a game. 
(Wittgenstein, 2001, §81) 
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If we play with fixed rules, the likely outcome is that we will refer to standard uses of 
methodologies.  However, Wittgenstein is suggesting that this is not the only way to 
play.  However, what exactly can it mean not playing with fixed rules? 
 
According to Wittgenstein, rules can be changed, created, or eliminated, “as we go 
along” (Wittgenstein, 2001, §83).  “The rule may be an aid in teaching the game. The 
learner is told it and given practice in applying it.  —Or it is an instrument of the 
game itself. —Or a rule is employed neither in the teaching nor in the game itself; nor 
is it set down in a list of rules” (Wittgenstein, 2001, §54). Under those circumstances, 
the rules on many occasions are not clear, incomplete, or even incoherent, but 
nevertheless people are able to accomplish tasks (Fogelin, 1996).  This idea is also 
suggested by empirical research (Galantucci, 2005). 
 
Wittgenstein’s view also involves the notion that rules have multiple uses.  So it is 
possible to use rules to communicate and to condition behaviours.  Sometimes we are 
aware of their existence but we choose not to follow them, and, even if they are not 
explicit, they can be inferred from the context.  In this picture: 
 
A rule stands there like a sign-post ... is there only one way of interpreting them? – So I may 
say, the sign-post does after all leave no room for doubt.  Or rather: it sometimes leaves room 
for doubt and sometimes not. (Wittgenstein, 2001, §85) 
 
So basically rules guide but not rule.  They help to make sense of what is happening 
and not necessarily are determining an outcome. 
 
Language pragmatics, which is a field in which Wittgenstein is regarded as a pioneer 
(Bertucelli Papi, 1996; Huang, 2007), has proposals that work along these lines.  One 
of them looks to move the understanding of communication from rules to code-
decode information to principles that help to infer it. 
 
In the first model, in order to understand a message, the actors need to code and 
decode based on a common code (Littlejohn, 1999; Van Der Wiele, 1995).   In 
contrast, in the inferential model proposed by Grice (1989), the speaker tries to show 
her/his intentions, and the hearer will try to make inferences based on his/her 
knowledge, the context and the evidence provided. 
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It is possible to profit from inferential communication without talking.  For instance, 
if work has to be done, I can leave the documents on somebody’s desk.  In fact, it is 
also possible to take advantage of inferential communication by breaking rules when 
trying to convey a meaning.  For example, people can be aware of X’s knowledge 
about etiquette, so if X is not following the etiquette possibly X is using that 
knowledge to convey a special meaning, perhaps a joke, irony or a low opinion of the 
host.  So etiquette here does not behave as a rule but as a principle that conveys 
Wittgenstein’s idea that rules work just as a guide. 
 
What is novel in this way of conceptualising communication is we are not restricted to 
singular ways to compose and understand messages.  “Meaningful sentences 
necessarily have lots of predictable inferential connections with lots of other 
meaningful sentences” (Rorty, 1999, p.37), and what is more, body language and 
behaviours can also be meaningful (Wilson & Sperber, 2002a) and, consequently, can 
connect with lots of other meaningful gestures, behaviours and sentences. 
 
Understanding communication based on inferences and principles offers us the 
possibility of meanings conveyed in different ways and, consequently, suggests the 
possibility of different uses.  For instance, Leech (1983, p.8) proposes that principles 
used to study language can display the following characteristics: 
 
a) Principles/maxims apply variably to different contexts of language use. 
b) Principles/maxims apply in variable degrees, rather than in an all-or-nothing way. 
c) Principles/maxims can conflict with one another. 
d) Principles/maxims can be contravened without abnegation of the kind of activity which 
they control. 
 
Furthermore, approaching this research understanding the use of methodologies as 
language games, the rules in terms of pragmatic principles, and communication in 
terms of inferences, opens an avenue to the problem of intention as the next section 
explains. 
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4.1.2 Communicative Intentions 
As was already mentioned, a way to approach language pragmatics is looking it up 
through principles.  Additionally and according to Kopytko (2007), pragmatics 
follows Wittgenstein ideas on contextual language games, family resemblance and the 
project of weakening the notion of rule.  However, Wittgenstein is not the only strong 
philosophical influence in the field.  Grice a ‘fellow’ philosopher also makes part of 
what is known as the school of ordinary language philosophy, and is responsible for 
the introduction of the notion of principles in Language Pragmatics (Huang, 2007).  
Grice’s work has led to a “philosophically inspired pragmatic theory of language use” 
(Huang, 2007, p.3). 
 
The central concern of his work is to understand how utterances with the same 
syntactic and semantic structure can have multiple meanings.  People can say “please” 
but the different intentions on the use of that word can have different effects in the 
context.  Just to mention some possibilities, please can be a command, a request, or a 
beg.  Consequently, meaning is related to the intention of the speaker.  In turn the 
intention of the speaker can be seen through the effects that the speaker is looking for.  
According to Grice (1991, p.92): 
 
“U meant something by uttering x” is true iff, for some audience A, U uttered x intending: 
(1) A to produce a particular response r. 
(2) A to think (recognize) that U intends (1). 
(3) A to fulfill (1) on the basis of his fulfillment of (2). 
 
Obviously, it is possible to achieve effects without people realising that the speaker 
has that intention.  This can be called deception (Wilson & Sperber, 2002a).  
However, Grice (1991) refers to a communicative intention.  This kind of intention is 
achieved when the audience A produces the response that the Speaker U is looking for 
in part because the audience recognises the intention.  This form of conceiving 
intention takes into account a socially constructed understanding of the phenomenon 
because “to communicate effectively participants in conversation must take each 
other’s perspectives” (Albright, Cohen, Malloy, Christ, & Bromgard, 2004, p.291). 
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Developing on these ideas, Relevance Theory, proposes a pair of distinctions: 
 
a. The informative intention: The intention to inform an audience of something. 
b. The communicative intention: The intention to inform the audience of one’s informative 
intention. 
 
Understanding is achieved when the communicative intention is fulfilled – that is, when the 
audience recognises the informative intention. (Wilson & Sperber, 2002a, p.255) 
 
As an illustration, consider two ways for obtaining water from your host. In one you 
put your empty glass in the line of vision of the host. You have the informative 
intention of informing your host that your glass is empty. Not necessarily are you 
letting know your host that you want to inform him about the fact that you want water. 
This is an informative intention without communicative intention (Sperber & Wilson, 
1995). For communicative intention, you need to ask directly or make a clear signal of 
the fact that you want water. You let others know that you want to let them know 
something. 
 
These ideas of considering intention in relation to impacts and letting other people 
know about our intentions are coherent with Wittgenstein’s ideas.  For him, there is 
no way to access people’s internal states.  This is not denying the existence of mental 
states, but it is suggesting that they cannot “be taken to be merely referential” 
(McHoul & Rapley, 2003, p.509).  People can observe behaviours and, based on how 
rules are followed, they judge their degree of understanding.   Consequently, people 
can adjust intentions and their manner to convey messages, hence changing the 
language games in place.   
 
4.1.3 Relevance Theory 
The concepts of language pragmatics introduced so far show us a way to understand 
flexible rules for language games through principles (Leech, 1983), and crucially it 
also shows a way to relate intentions and effects. As it was shown, Grice (1991) 
proposed that meaningful communication required the need of a response of an 
audience, the recognition of the audience of some intention by the speaker, and the 
production of the response based on the recognition of the intention of the speaker. 
This idea enables us to see intentions as something that produces some effects. 
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However, Grice’s work is not explicit about ways to define those effects in 
communications. For this reason, I turn now to Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 
1995; Wilson & Sperber, 2002a, 2002b). “Relevance theory may be seen as an 
attempt to work out in detail one of Grice's central claims: that an essential feature of 
most human communication, both verbal and non-verbal, is the expression and 
recognition of intentions” (Wilson & Sperber, 2002a, p.249). In other words, 
communication is about “guessing” the intention of the speaker and building on that 
to infer what they are trying to say. Relevance theory proposes an explanation of how 
communicative intentions are recognised by the hearer, and how the speaker takes 
advantage of how the recognition process works to convey ideas. 
 
Sperber and Wilson propose two reasons for which most communications are 
intentional: the first, “by producing direct evidence of one's informative intention, one 
can convey a much wider range of information that can be conveyed by producing 
direct evidence for the basic information itself”. For instance, from a gesture or from a 
stressed word in a phrase we can infer a lot of information. The second reason, “to 
modify and extend the mutual cognitive environment they share with one another” 
Sperber and Wilson (1995, p.64). 
 
Relevance theory starts from the assumption that individuals possess a cognitive 
environment. This is a sort of background knowledge encompassing all the 
assumptions that individuals use to make inferences about a communicative stimulus. 
 
This set of assumptions, the cognitive environment, is always affected when a new 
stimulus arrives. New stimulus can weaken or strengthen old assumptions according 
to their relevance. In the communication process, we “alter the cognitive environment 
of your [our] addressees” and as a consequence the “actual thought processes” are 
also affected (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p.46). The process of communication 
produces changes. These are important because “a change in the mutual cognitive 
environment of two people is a change in their possibilities of interaction (and, in 
particular, in their possibilities of further communication)” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, 
pp.61–62). 
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Cognitive environments are affected because “the human cognitive system has 
developed in such a way that our perceptual mechanisms tend automatically to pick 
out potentially relevant stimuli, our memory retrieval mechanisms tend automatically 
to activate potentially relevant assumptions, and our inferential mechanisms tend 
spontaneously to process them in the most productive way.” (Wilson & Sperber, 
2002a, p.254). In other words, it does not matter how strange is a stimulus, we look 
for the piece(s) of knowledge that let us make the stimulus more meaningful. This is 
what Wilson and Sperber (2002a) call the cognitive principle of relevance. 
 
Two conditions are defining then if it is productive (relevant) to consider a stimulus in 
a communicate interaction: 
 
a. Other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects achieved by processing 
an input, the greater the relevance of the input to the individual at that time. 
b. Other things being equal, the greater the processing effort expended, the lower the relevance 
of the input to the individual at that time. (Wilson & Sperber, 2002a, p.252) 
 
Basically, something is relevant to somebody if it is possible to obtain many 
inferences from the stimulus, and it is not difficult to reach such as inferences. In 
other words, when we are trying to communicate something, we show others that they 
can connect our messages with their cognitive environment, and that they do not have 
to work much in order to do it. 
 
Relevance is in this way a cost-benefit measure. The cost is the effort involved 
resolving the implications. The benefit is the amount of contextual effects obtained. 
The audience is looking through relevance to obtain the maximum productivity for the 
effort. However, the process of evaluating those effects is not quantitative. You 
cannot measure the productivity of an assumption by a number. Sperber and Wilson 
(1995) argue that relevance is a comparative criterion. We can know that an 
assumption is more relevant than another one.  Without something against which to 
compare and judge, we cannot say if an assumption is relevant. 
 
This approach has a methodological implication regarding the empirical work. From 
the idea of communicative intentions in Relevance Theory “How does one recognise 
another individual’s intentions?”: 
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One observes his behaviour; using one’s knowledge of people in general and of the individual 
in particular, one infers which of the effects of this behaviour he could have both predicted 
and desired; one then assumes that these predictable and desirable effects were also intended.  
In other words, one infers the intention behind the behaviour from its independently observed 
or inferred effects. (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p.32) 
 
These are basically the same assumptions used by Torbert (2006) (Chapter Three), 
regarding why we can rely on our observations of intentions. If the predictable and 
desirable effects were not intended, we will lose confidence in that actor, making it 
difficult for that actor to pursue further engagements. 
 
4.2 Intention in Philosophy of Action 
The fact that MS/ST has not explored this sense of intention is not strange.  The truth 
is that the concept has been neglected at large in human sciences and philosophy.  
Bruner (2001) exposes two reasons for this situation: 
 The dominance of positivism means that mental states as intentions were seen 
as subjective and without explanatory power. 
 According to psychoanalytic theory people really do not know what their real 
intentions are. Intentions are unconscious.  Psychoanalytic therapy set to 
uncover these hidden intentions.  Therefore “the transparency of intentions 
was seen as deeply problematic” (Bruner, 2001, p.x) 
 
However, currently there is a significant body of work that challenges these views in 
areas such as philosophy (Benett & Hacker, 2003; Bratman, 1987; Mele, 1997b; 
Saaristo, 2006), psychology (Malle et al., 2001), cognitive science (Baldwin & Baird, 
2001; Stone, 2004), law (Audi, 1994; Malle, 2006), child development (Meltzoff & 
Brooks, 2001), primatology (Zelazo, Astington, & Olson, 1999), language (Astington, 
1999; Borg, 2004; Gibbs Jr., 2001), artificial intelligence (Hendriks-Jansen, 1996; van 
der Hoek, Jamroga, & Wooldridge, 2007; Wallis, 2004), and education (Sinatra & 
Pintrich, 2003). 
 
Because the purpose of the chapter is to make a conceptual-philosophical exploration, 
I will use Philosophy of Action, the branch of philosophy that studies action and 
intention.  Actions are important in the effort to produce explanations of intentional 
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human behavior.  In explaining action, philosophy of action pays special attention to 
notions in “folk philosophy”.  “Much of our understanding of ourselves and others is 
rooted in commonsense psychological framework” (Bratman, 1987, p.1). 
 
Every person relies on intuitive concepts such as beliefs, desires, plans, reasons, 
intentions and so forth to explain other people actions.  For instance, a mere 
description of movements does not make much sense, unless we attach them to an 
intention.  Philosophy of action aims to clarify what is behind of all these concepts 
(Mele, 1997a). 
 
Intentions play important roles in human action.  Without them actions will not be 
interesting and “perhaps there would not be actions at all” (Mele, 1997a, p.16).  
Intentions can cause, sustain and guide action.  They can “get reality to match the 
content of the intentional state” (Searle, 2004, p.168). They enable us to make sense, 
explain and rationalize our actions and those of others.  Consequently, they are 
fundamental in helping to coordinate the interactions between groups of actors 
(Baldwin & Baird, 2001; Enç, 2003; Mele, 1992). 
 
In the light of these ideas, explorations of the concept of intention seem very relevant 
to MS/ST intervention.  Intervention is about acting purposefully to produce change 
(Midgley, 2000); as in Philosophy of Action, merely causing action is not enough: 
action needs to be guided by actors. The use of a methodology requires sustained 
action. Additionally, the application of interventions methodologies requires 
coordinating my actions or the coordination of my actions with those of others. All of 
this is showing potential contributions from Philosophy of Action for the theory and 
practice of MS/ST. 
 
However, approaching the concept of intention entails some difficulties.  First, in the 
realm of philosophy of action there are many competing viewpoints on the concept.  
Second, there is not the advantage of previous works on intention in MS/ST.  Having 
previous work can simplify the exercise of building a critique on what has been done.  
Because this avenue is not open, the option here is to show some of the approaches to 
intention, not aiming to take a side yet, but only as a way to sensitize to the different 
possibilities. 
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The section is divided into three parts.  The first part is aimed to sensitize the reader 
with some of the debates and theoretical difficulties to identify when a situation was 
shaped by intentions. This shows also that intention is not a clear or obvious term. The 
second part shows how intention is double faced; referring to it, it is to deal with two 
problems at once. The third part explores some of the literature and identifies some 
approaches to understand intention. This will serve as a pool of resources to contrast 
against the experiences in the fieldwork.  
 
4.2.1 Some Problems for Pinpointing an Intention 
When do we have the intention of doing something? When are we acting 
intentionally?  In looking for answers to these questions, the tradition in philosophy of 
action has been to construct and examine cases.  Some of these have attracted long 
debates.  They are used to support, challenge or refine definitions of intention or 
broad approaches to the issue.   
 
Now, I will show some cases to illustrate the difficulties in pinpointing and knowing 
if the situations developed due to an actor’s intention, when luck, side effects, 
wayward chains, and moral issues are considered or present. 
 
Take for instance, the problem of luck in this case explained by Mele and Moser 
(1994).  The situation here is about a nuclear reactor about to explode.  The only way 
to stop the explosion is to type a 10 digit code in a terminal.  The operator does not 
know the code.  Nevertheless, he types something, and is lucky that it is the right code 
and prevents the explosion.  It was his acting intentional?  Typically, we are reluctant 
to think that an action is intentional if luck plays a huge role in the outcome. 
 
Side effects are a second problem.  In this case by Harman (1997) a sniper is about to 
kill an enemy soldier.  However, he knows that the noise of the shot will alert other 
enemy soldiers.  He thinks that is a sensible trade-off.  He fires his weapon, kills the 
enemy soldier but now everybody knows that he is around. Alerting the enemy will be 
a side effect.  But, did he intentionally alert the enemy? 
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Wayward chains, the third problem is concerned with the appropriate path to the 
outcome (Enç, 2003).  It refers to those sequences of actions or events that deviate 
from the prefigured course that the actor has in mind.  Consider this case explained by 
Mele and Moser (1994).  Somebody shoots to kill a person.  He aims at the heart but 
by a minor deviation the bullet hits the head.  Here the deviation from the prefigured 
course is small, and we tend to think that effectively the killing was intentional.   
 
However what happens when there is a big deviation? For instance, this case by 
Bennet cited by Schlosser (2007, p.188): “A sniper has the intention of killing an 
enemy by shooting him. He carries out the intention, but misses. By producing the 
noise of the shot, though, he stampedes a herd of wild pigs, which trample the poor 
enemy to death”. This case can be seen in Figure 4.1 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Wayward Chain. 
 
The white circles represent the sequence or chain of actions in the sniper’s mind. The 
black circles represent the deviation, the stampede that was not prefigured. The chains 
share the beginning (shot by the sniper), and the end (death of the enemy). However, 
it is a matter of discussion for philosophers of actions the role of the sniper's intention 
on the death of the enemy by the stampede. Did he kill intentionally? In fact, wayward 
chains are seen more as a problem than a concept useful for understanding intention. 
 
It is easy to see these problems arising in intervention processes. A practitioner could 
be really bad in applying a methodology, but he can cross with a very supportive and 
engaged group and because of this, the intervention is a success. In pursuit of a greater 
good a practitioner has to compromise with some side effects. The practitioner can 
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also imagine a sequence of actions to achieve one outcome and, however, achieve that 
outcome through a very different unplanned sequence. 
 
In the light of these kinds of problems, analyses of intention try to specify all the 
necessary conditions that allow us to call something intentional.  Definitions then 
come to be highly complex.  Consider this definition of intentional action by Mele and 
Moser (1994, p.63). 
 
Necessarily, an agent, S, intentionally performs an action, A, at a time, t, if and only if: 
 
(i) at t, S A-s and her A-ing is an action; 
(ii) at t, S suitably follows – hence, is suitably guided by – an intention-embedded plan, P, of 
hers in A-ing; 
(iii) (a) at the time of S’s actual involvement in A-ing at t, the process indicated with 
significantly preponderant probability by S’s on balance evidence at t as being at least partly 
constitutive of her A-ing at t does not diverge significantly from the process that is in fact 
constitutive of her A-ing at t; or (b) S’s A-ing at t manifest a suitable reliable skill of S’s in A-
ing in the way S A-s at t; and 
(iv) the route to A-ing that S follows in executing her action plan P, at t is, under S’s current 
circumstances, a suitable predictively reliable means of S’s A-ing at t, and the predictive 
reliability of that means depends appropriately  on S’s having suitably reliable control over 
whether, given that she acts with A-ing as a goal, she succeeds in A-ing at t. 
 
Here the authors are defining intentional action in a way that requires: skill (no luck 
involved), appropriate guidance of the action, and actions really contributing to the 
goal. However, even this complex analysis does not consider moral issues.  Consider 
these cases by Knobe and Burra (2006, p.117): 
 
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, ‘We are thinking 
of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but it will also harm the 
environment.’ The chairman of the board answered, ‘I don’t care at all about harming the 
environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program. ’They 
started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was harmed. 
 
And now let us contrast this vignette with another – the help vignette – that is 
constructed by replacing the word ‘harm’ with ‘help.’ 
 
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, ‘We are thinking 
of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, and it will also help the 
environment.’ The chairman of the board answered, ‘I don’t care at all about helping the 
environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.’ They 
started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was helped. 
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When the intentional actions and intention of the chairman are considered, it makes a 
difference to think about these cases in terms of harm or help.  In a survey, people 
were asked if the chairman intended or acted intentionally in each one of the cases.  
The following results were obtained (Knobe & Burra, 2006). 
 
Percentage saying ‘yes’  Intention Intentionally 
Help 0% 20% 
Harm 29% 87% 
 
When the environment is helped it is easier to think that the chairman does not intend 
to do it and is not intentionally helping the environment.  However, when the 
environment is harmed the judgement changes drastically.  Now it is easier to blame 
him. 
 
4.2.2 Present and Future: The Dual Face of Intentions 
It can be noticed from the explanation above, that Philosophy of Actions is a highly 
contested area.  There are few agreements. One of the few is Bratman’s distinction of 
intentions as a two-faced phenomenon: “We do things intentionally, and we intend to 
do things” (Bratman, 1984, p.375).  Doing things intentionally is about the present 
and is referred to as intentional action.  Intending to do things is about the future and 
is what it is specifically called intention.  So talking about intentions seems to imply a 
duality and a kind of relationship between both sides. 
 
There are several ways to think about the relationship between these two sides of 
intention.  The simpler one, called simple view, states that it is necessary that a 
Subject (S) intended to do an Action (A) in order to do A intentionally (Bratman, 
1984).  This means that, for example, if I take the bus intentionally is because I 
intended to take the bus. 
 
However, the simple view is not always clear.  For example, in an example by 
Harman (1997), a sniper knows that in killing an enemy at the same time he is alerting 
the enemy.  This is not very different from a practitioner purposefully acting for a 
change and having to deal with some side effects on the way. In both cases, although 
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the action is intentional is difficult to say that he intended to alert the enemy or the 
side effects.  Under this view, an agent that does A intentionally is intending 
something, not necessarily A.  This view is called the single phenomenon view 
(Bratman, 1984). 
 
Basically, the debates between the single view and the single phenomenon view are 
the main ones about the nature of the relationship between intention and intentional 
action (Adams, 2006; Adams & Steadman, 2004a, 2004b; Knobe, 2003a, 2003b, 
2004; Knobe & Burra, 2006; McCann, 2005; Mele, 2003, 2006; Nadelhoffer, 2006).   
 
4.2.3 Some Approaches to Understanding Intention 
4.2.3.1 The Belief-Desire Model 
The belief-desire model is perhaps the most popular approach to intention.  It sees 
intentions as mental states but not mental states on their own.  Intentions can be 
decomposed and reduced to ‘simpler’ parts.  This way to conceive intention figures 
prominently in how everyday people understand intention (Malle & Knobe, 1997).  
Furthermore, it is an important approach in philosophy of action, “According to a long 
tradition, intention can be analyzed into cognitive and motivational components” 
(Davis, 1997, p.132).  Belief is the cognitive component, desire is the motivational. 
 
The problem is then how to explain the relationship between them (Bratman, 1987; 
Davis, 1997).  Let us briefly describe Davis’s (1997) analysis of this relationship to 
explain the intention to do something in the future. 
 
One requirement of intention is rationality.  This is provided by the component of 
beliefs.  I know that I cannot intend to win the lottery.  It does not matter how strongly 
I desire to win the lottery, I know that my desire will not suffice to win it.  I can 
realise this based on my beliefs that represent my understanding of the world.  
However, obviously believing that something can be done is not enough to cause my 
actions to move in that direction.  So a second, now motivational component with 
causal power such as the desire is also necessary (Davis, 2005). 
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Davis also explains that I can have the belief that a tennis player has a chance to win a 
tournament.  I can also have the desire of his winning the tournament.  However, it 
cannot be said that I intend for him to win the tournament.  The problem here is that 
“the belief and the desire are not connected in the appropriate way” (Davis, 1997, 
p.141). 
 
Davis (1997, p.147) argues that an appropriate way to connect these elements is: “S 
intends that p iff[if and only if] S believes that p because he desires that p and believes 
his desire will motivate him to act in such a way that p”.  For example, I intend to 
finish my PhD, if and only if I believe that I will finish my PhD because I desire to 
finish my PhD, and I believe that my desire will motivate me to act in a way that I 
will finish my PhD. In short, my belief, is based on my desire, and I believe that my 
desire will impel me to act. 
 
Intentional action also can be explained in terms of the belief-desire model.  Audi’s 
(1997) approach can be seen as an indirect approach to intentional action.  It is 
indirect because he bases his argument not on the actions but on the analysis of the 
reasons for acting. 
 
Reasons are fundamental to what has been called theories of mind, which refer to our 
capacity to infer what is on other people’s mind (Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, 
Chiavarino, & Samson, 2006).  This theory is essential for competent social 
interaction (Friedman & Leslie, 2004).  “If we do not know for what reasons a person 
acts, we do not fully understand that person” (Audi, 1997, p.75). 
 
Acting for reasons has a strong link with the notion of intention.  “To know a primary 
reason why someone acted as he did is to know an intention with which the action 
was done” (Davidson, 1963, p.689).  “The connection with reasons is the first and 
most widely accepted mark of intentional action, even if there is disagreement about 
how to spell it out” (Setiya, 2003, p.342).  Let us see now how Audi spells it out. 
 
For Audi (1997), reasons have different roles.  They help to explain action to others 
and to ourselves.  When we have a reason to act, we believe in something.  The action 
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is a response to the reason.  When we act, we have the sense that we are doing it 
because of a reason.  There is a degree of control of the action. 
 
In particular Audi defines an action for a reason in the following terms: 
 
S’s A-ing is an action for a reason, r, at t, if and only of , at t, S A’s, and there is a connecting 
relation, C, such that (1) S wants to r and believes C to hold between her A-ing and r, or 
believes something to the effect that C holds between her A-ing and r; (2) S’s A-ing is a least 
in part explained by this motivating want and at least one connecting belief, and is guided by 
the belief(s); (3) S is noninferentially disposed, independently of seeking reasons she has had , 
or might have had, at or before t, for A-ing, to attribute her A-ing to the want and (explaining) 
belief(s); (4) S’s A-ing is nonaccidentally produced by the want and (explaining) belief(s); and 
(5) the want and (explaining) belief(s) do not bring about (or sustain) S’s A-ing via an alien 
intermediary. (Audi, 1997, p.98) 
 
In simple terms Audi is suggesting the following: the way to connect an action and a 
reason is via wants and beliefs.  So using wants and beliefs it is possible to explain 
and attribute the actions of a subject.  Finally, the outcomes are really produced by the 
subject without appealing to luck or external alien intermediaries.     
 
It is interesting to see here something very similar to Davis.  The beliefs gave a kind 
of coherence to the action while the wants – desires have the mission of motivating.  
Finally, Audi makes us aware that although it can be said that an action for a reason is 
an intentional action, not every intentional action is an action for a reason.  This will 
become important later in my argument because I also offer a partial explanation for 
intentional action in the context of interventions.  
 
4.2.3.2 The Planning Approach 
The planning approach emerges in part as a critique to approaches seeking to reduce 
intention to desires and beliefs.  Bratman (1987) argues that we are basically planning 
creatures and that the complexity of the things that we have to confront is not 
adequately managed just by beliefs and desires.  He argues that the traditional model 
“ignore[s] the central place of intention and action in our understanding of mind and 
intelligence” (Bratman, 1987, p.166). 
 
For Bratman the idea is that, in general, mental states are embedded in a set of 
regularities.  “These regularities connect these various states with each other, with 
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associated psychological processes and activities, and with characteristic ‘inputs’ and 
‘outputs’: perception and action” (Bratman, 1987, p.9).  These regularities form a web 
of relations.  What intention is doing is helping us to adjust the coherence of all these 
elements. 
 
Elements such as beliefs and desires can be part of the web and, consequently, they 
need to be adjusted in relation to other elements of the web.  So beliefs and desires are 
not now central.  What is central is the way to organise the entire web.  Hence a 
distinctly mental state, a pro attitude toward plans arises as the defining characteristic 
of this approach. 
 
Organizing my actions around plans helps to coordinate my activities.  This demands 
an internal consistency of such plans.  However, plans are rarely complete.  They are 
partial, requiring constant adjustment.  They are also embedded in larger plans 
hierarchically organized.  I can have an intention to accomplish something complex as 
writing this thesis.  Although this is a complex plan, writing the thesis is embedded in 
more complex plans such as completing my PhD and advancing my professional 
career.  At a lower level writing the thesis involved sub plans for each chapter, for 
analysing the data, and even for writing this paragraph. 
 
Our capacity is limited, we cannot possibly work out all the implications of all these 
plans and sub plans.  My intentions help me to define standards and ways to approach 
action.  They provide “framework reasons - whose role is to help to determine the 
relevance and admissibility of options” (Bratman, 1987, p.34). 
 
These framework reasons are linked in chains of practical reasoning.  Practical 
reasoning refers to the “process of modifying antecedent beliefs and intentions, 
perhaps adding some new ones, perhaps by deleting some of the original ones— 
normally by adding some and deleting others”.  “Practical reasoning is concerned with 
what to intend” and with the explanations of why the actor intent that (Harman, 1997, 
p.149). 
 
Practical reasoning can be the base for familiar theoretical concepts such as logic, 
deduction, induction, explanations, but that does not mean that there is a formal way 
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to do practical reasoning.  In deciding what to intend, beliefs, desires, plans, and 
intentions enter in the refining process that leads to our intentions and plans.  Plans 
can be vague, but they can be modified and extended as suits the situation.  In this 
view intention is a “whole evolving system” (Harman, 1997, p.163). 
 
The role of practical reasoning is to achieve the coherence of the system.  “One can 
increase coherence by adopting means to already existing ends – but that is not the 
only way.  One can also increase coherence by adopting new ends, either because the 
adoption of those ends will help get one something previously wanted, or because 
adopting those ends gives a significance to things one has already done or plans to do” 
(Harman, 1997, p.177). 
 
Now, van der Hoek et al. (2007, p.267) draw from Bratman to suggest the following 
implications for the planning approach to intentions: 
 
1. Intentions pose problems for agents, who need to determine ways of achieving them. 
2. Intentions provide a “filter” for adopting other intentions, which must not conflict. 
3. Agents track the success of their intentions, and are inclined to try again if their attempts 
fail. 
4. Agents believe their intentions are possible. 
5. Agents do not believe they will not bring about their intentions. 
6. Under certain circumstances, agents believe they will bring about their intentions. 
7. Agents need not intend all the expected side effects of their intentions. 
 
According, to Mele (1992, p.145), understanding that plans have a role in intention 
helps to explain that “Intention initiates and motivationally sustains intentional action; 
it guides and monitors behavior; it coordinates one’s activities, including one’s 
interaction with others; and it can both prompt and suitably terminate practical 
reasoning”. 
 
However, it is important to note that Mele has a difference from Bratman.  When 
Bratman (1987, p.29) refers to plans, he assumes a “commitment to action: I have a 
plan to A only if it is true of me that I plan to A”.  In contrast, when Mele (1992) uses 
plans he uses them as the representational aspect of intentions.  I can have in my hand 
a plan (set of instructions) to change a component of my computer.  It does not follow 
that I am committed to carrying out the plan. 
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4.2.3.3 Courses of Action 
Scheer (2004) starts questioning the long tradition of understanding intentions as 
mental states.  As it was shown earlier, the belief-desire model and the planning 
approach, despite their differences, both consider intentions as mental states.  For 
Scheer (2004, p.121), “an intention is not a distinct thing, e.g., not a mental state nor a 
combination of desires and beliefs nor anything else”.  Intention is regarded by Sheer 
as “a course of action which one has adopted”. 
 
Part of Sheer’s argumentation is based on Wittgenstein: 
 
‘It was the intention that this should work as a brake.’ Whose intention? Here intention as a 
state of mind entirely disappears from view (Wittgenstein, 2001, §48) 
 
‘For a moment I meant to ….’ That is I had a particular feeling, an inner experience; and I 
remember it. – And now remember quite precisely! Then the ‘inner experience’ of intending 
seems to vanish again.  Instead one remembers thoughts, feelings, movements, and also 
connexions with earlier situations.     
It is as if one had altered the adjustments of a microscope.  One did not see before what is now 
in focus. (Wittgenstein, 2001, §645) 
 
In line with these paragraphs, Scheer (2004, p.124) suggests that what is usually 
regarded as definitions of intention are better understood as “characterizations of the 
preparedness, the eagerness, or the determination or desire, to carry out an intention”. 
Intention, more that a mental internal state, is a way to talk; it has pragmatic 
implications for action and coordination but nothing beyond this point (McHoul & 
Rapley, 2003). According, to this, Scheer does not think that the role of intentions is 
to motivate and sustain action or that they have some kind of causal power. 
 
However, understanding intention as a course of action is still useful in matters of 
coordination and practical reasoning using Mele’s (1992) language.  Crucially Sheer 
argues, that intention as course of action is more appropriate to understand the 
continuity of intentions.  Mental states come and go, and it is relatively easy to pin 
point when they start and finish.  However, courses of action can be abandoned and 
retaken, can be interrupted, and, nevertheless, it is possible to talk about their 
persistence over time.  An example of this situation includes, in Sheer’s view our, 
intentions to pay the bills every month (Scheer, 2004).   I do not have to think about 
paying my bills at every instant to be committed to this course of action. 
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Sheer also argues that his approach is better at explaining absent-minded people.  If 
somebody is asked not to walk over the wet floor he can nod in agreement and make a 
mental note about his intention of not walking over the wet floor.  However, later he 
can forget, so he will step on the wet floor.  If he is asked if he intended to step on the 
wet floor, on remembering he will say no.  “My belief is that this kind of context 
dependency is characteristic of intentions which the defender of the ‘mental states’ 
theory of intentions would have no way of explaining” (Scheer, 2004, p.129). 
 
4.2.3.4 A Complex Adaptive System 
Juarrero (1999) agrees with Scheer (2004) on both the idea of intention as a course of 
action and with the idea that there is a problem with the causal powers of intention.  
However, she does not deny the idea of a mental state.  The problem for her is how 
cause has been understood in western thinking. 
 
Her argument starts by describing how Aristotle explains causes.  This approach 
involves denying the possibility of self cause and postulating four different kinds of 
cause to explain phenomena: 
 Final: purpose. 
 Formal: organization or ‘shape’ that makes possible a function. 
 Material: the substance that constitutes and suffers change. 
 Efficient: The source of change. 
 
Next she explains how in the rise of western science the modern understanding of 
cause is reduced to mechanical causes.  Accordingly, to Juarrero the modern 
understanding discredited most of the Aristotelian framework of cause and only two 
aspects remain: the rejection of self causes and the efficient cause now in terms of 
collision-like Newtonian causes. 
 
Juarrero contends that if causes are understood in this way, there is no way in which 
they can control and guide an action.  For example, under the Aristotelian framework 
is possible to have a purpose (final cause) that can guide the process.  Without this 
 121 
kind of help explanations of intentions fall into the trap of defining very complex sets 
of requirements in order to explain intentionality (just remember some of the 
definitions earlier in this chapter). 
 
Juarrero’s proposal is to conceptualise in a different way the causes in philosophy of 
action.  To that aim, she uses information theory and complexity theory.  Information 
theory let her conceptualise intention as a trajectory.  “Thinking of actions as 
unbroken trajectories – calculated in terms of information flow, noise and 
equivocation – allow us to avoid many of the traditional objections to which causal 
theories of action are vulnerable” (Juarrero, 1999, p.5). 
 
The idea is that thanks to information theory, actions can be conceptualised as an 
information flow from an origin to a destination.  If there are problems in the 
trajectory (side effects, deviance, luck), those problems can be managed using 
concepts such as noise.  The other problem is how meaning is fed into the trajectory.  
Information theory is not adequate because of the way in which the concept of 
information is managed.  Here meaning is managed as bits in a computer, so it is not 
really meaning.  Consequently, Juarrero turns to complexity theory. 
 
Complexity leads us to reconsider how to understand causes. Traditional mechanical 
causes are called linear.  In complexity and systems causes can be circular.  In linear 
causes, causes and effects are separated.  In circular causes the effects of a cause 
ultimately affect the cause itself.  When a loop of causes is formed the complete loop 
that sustains itself emerges as a self cause. 
 
In a chain of causes, it is important to differentiate between the first and second level 
contextual constraints.  Constraints of the first level mean that after an action some 
options are open for the next action but not others.  So what it comes in continuation 
is dependent on the previous history.  Constrains of the second level appear when a 
loop is formed.  When a loop is formed the whole system is constraining the workings 
of the chain.  Meaning arises at this level.  Second order constraints provide a context 
in which the actions are framed.  This also makes possible control and guidance. 
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Based on this, “Intentional action should be conceptualized as a trajectory whereby 
emergent, second-order contextual constraints of dynamical brain organization 
selectively constrain lower-dimensional motor and speech processes” (Juarrero, 1999, 
p.192). 
 
Now not only intentional action can be understood in these terms.  Basically, the same 
idea extends to intention.  In this case, the trajectories are extended beyond the body 
and make part of larger control loops. 
 
It is nonsense to claim that we end at the contours of our body, or that our individual concepts 
and intentions exist independently of our experience and surroundings.  We have evolved the 
ability to construct antennae that both extend us into the world and internalize portions of that 
world.  And we carry our history on our backs.  In the light of our own past and in response to 
interactions with the world, we continuously restructure our internal dynamics. (Juarrero, 
1999, p.212) 
 
So our internal dynamics can affect my surroundings and my surroundings can affect 
my internal dynamics.  Interacting with others can affect my intentions but my 
trajectories of actions can also affect others.  I can affect my trajectories using my 
surroundings, for instance, a string around my finger can help to direct my actions to a 
previously committed course of action.  Juarrero also suggests that the way in which 
we human beings can make sense of that is through stories of our action.  At the end, 
understanding human agency is an interpretative process. 
 
It is important to note that those are important differences between Sheer and 
Juarrero.  Notice, for example, that the courses of action in Sheer are ‘adopted’ that 
seems to mean prefigured.  In contrast course of action in Juarrero is emergent, so 
they are “continuously restructure”. 
 
The other important difference is that for Juarrero intentions have causal powers 
despite the fact that they can be thought of in part as mental states. 
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4.3 Intentions in Language and Intentions in Philosophy of 
Action: How can they fit together? 
Garfinkel remarks that is usual to find different theories claiming to explain the same 
objects. However, their relationships are far from clear. 
 
They [theories] seem to be different sorts of things.  Some of the theories may address 
different phenomena or different realms of phenomena.  Some are genuinely competing, 
others can be reconciled with one another, while still others pass one another by, answering 
different questions.  They fit together only in a very complicated and overlapping geometry.  
(Garfinkel, 1981, p.1) 
 
In Garfinkel’s terms, Relevance Theory and Philosophy of Action are two “sort of 
things” concerned on intentions. This section proposes an approximation to their 
“overlapping geometry”. 
 
In order to discuss the relationship, I will explore two questions: First, can 
communicative intentions be understood as one of the faces of intentions proposed by 
Bratman (1984)? Second, it has been suggested by Philosophy of Action that 
intentions fulfil some roles in human action. Which of these roles can be fulfilled by 
communicative intentions? 
 
4.3.1 Communicative Intentions as Intentional Action 
As has been already mentioned on this chapter, intention is a two-faced phenomenon 
(Bratman, 1984). These two faces are commonly known as intentional action and 
intention. Based on this distinction, I propose to conceptualise communicative 
intentions as a subset of intentional actions. 
 
The initial premise of my argument uses the notion of language games. As was 
already mentioned, according to Wittgenstein (2001) in a language game, language 
and actions are weaved. To use language is to act. Now, the process of conveying a 
communicative intention involves actors producing stimulus by speaking up or by 
making gestures. Therefore, communicative intentions necessarily require action. 
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Having argued the action component, let us deal with the intentional component. This 
argument runs parallel to one in philosophy of action, comparing acting for a reason 
with intentional action. According to Audi (1997, p.105) “acting for a reason 
constitutes at least a partial account of intentional action”. The account is partial 
because although acting for a reason can be seen as an intentional action, not every 
intentional action is done for a reason. Even so, “certainly intentional actions that are 
not intrinsically motivated, that is, are performed in order to realise a further end, are 
actions for a reason” (Audi, 1997, p.102). 
 
On Relevance Theory's side, a communicative intention will be carried out in order to 
realise a further end.  This end accordingly to the theory is informing about our 
informative intention.  The possibility to convey the intention is based on our abilities 
for inferential communication, possibility that hints to additional ends: conveying 
more information than the one possible through a code and modifying and expanding 
mutual cognitive environments.  Consequently, and just like reasons, communicative 
intentions can be seen as well as means to realise further ends. 
 
Additionally, Audi (1997) explains that the realization of a further end requires 
connecting reasons one to each other in a process of reasoning. “Reasoning is a 
process of modifying antecedent beliefs and intentions, perhaps by adding some new 
ones, perhaps by deleting some of the original ones— normally by adding some and 
deleting others” (Harman, 1997, p.149). 
 
This process resonates with the inferential process of communication proposed by 
Sperber and Wilson (1995). Communications from this perspective aim to modify and 
extend mutual cognitive environments. They accomplish this by modifying the 
strength of assumptions and introducing new ones in a process that mirrors the 
process of reasoning. 
 
Hence, at the core of acting for a reason and communicating communicative 
intentions, there are similar processes and both are steps for further ends. Combining 
this with the idea that communicating is acting gives me enough confidence to think 
that there is a strong link between acting for a reason and communicative intentions.  
Therefore, just as in the case of acting for a reason, communicative intentions can also 
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be conceived as a subset of intentional action.  Not every intentional action is a 
communicative intention, but every communicative intention is an intentional action. 
 
4.3.2 Roles for Communicative Intentions from the Point of View of 
Philosophy of Action 
This chapter shows how authors such as Baldwin and Baird (2001), Enç (2003), and 
Mele (1992) suggest that intentions are important for a number of reasons. They 
enable us to make sense, explain and rationalize our actions and those of others. They 
are fundamental in helping to coordinate the interactions between groups of agents. 
They can cause, sustain and guide action. The question is how communicative 
intentions match against these roles. 
 
Relevance theory really does not go in depth to explore what is intention. It is more 
concerned about how these intentions are communicated and their effects. Still, it 
shows how intentions have a role in communication and inter-subjective 
understanding. As a consequence this approach to intention is useful to explain how 
we make sense, explain, and rationalize our actions and those of others. It is also 
useful to explain how interactions can be coordinated through the expansion and 
changes of their mutual cognitive environment. 
 
However, because the focus of relevance is on communication and interaction it does 
not explain how intentions can cause, sustain, and guide an actor's action. Therefore, 
to foster a way in which philosophy of action can complement the already defined 
framework, it will be necessary to find a way to cover these three aspects. 
 
4.4 Conclusions 
This chapter presented the philosophical/theoretical approaches to the understanding 
of the concept of intention.  The chapter shows five approaches to intention. One of 
them relies on language pragmatics. The other four come from Philosophy of Action. 
This confronts us the problem of multiple explanations competing for a problem 
(Garfinkel, 1981). 
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The proposed way out of this problem is to use Bratman’s (1984) idea of intention as 
a dual-face phenomenon. On one side, there is the present-directed intentional action. 
On the other side, there is the future-directed intention.   
 
It is argued then that intentional action can be understood by being approached 
through the communicative intentions in Relevance Theory.  Because this approach is 
based on inferential communication, it is useful to deal with roles of intention such as 
explaining, rationalizing and making sense of our actions and those of others. It can 
also help to understand the coordination of the interactions between agents. 
 
However, it is also argued that this approach is not covering the roles of guiding, 
producing and sustaining action.  These are associated with intention, the future-
directed face. Yet, from the remaining four Philosophy of Action approaches none is 
selected.  The idea is that they will serve as a pool of alternatives to contrast against 
the experiences in the field. 
 
The approaches provided here are developed in Chapters Six (present-directed 
intentions) and Seven (future-directed intention). The next chapter shows the process 
of learning on intention in the field, the empirical part of the research. Part of this 
work involved using the ideas in this chapter. 
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PART TWO: EMPIRICAL WORK 
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Chapter 5 Overview of the Empirical Work 
One learns the game by watching how others play.  But we say that it is played according to 
such-and-such rules because an observer can read these rules off from the practice of the 
game. (Wittgenstein, 2001, §54) 
 
to build dense, well developed, integrated, and comprehensive theory, a researcher should 
make use of any and every method at his or her disposal, keeping in mind that a true interplay 
of methods is necessary. (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p.33) 
 
So far, this text has been laying conceptual foundations for researching intention. 
These foundations encompass the disciplinary MS/ST (Chapter Two), the 
methodological drawing, mainly from Action Research (Chapter Three) and the 
philosophical/theoretical relying on ideas of Relevance Theory and Philosophy of 
Action (Chapter Four).  
 
This chapter now presents an overview of the empirical exploration. It is the essential 
juncture between the theoretical and the discussion of the findings in later chapters of 
the thesis. It shows the research process carried out in the field (see Figure 1.1) to 
learn the game in Wittgenstein terms.  However, here the learning was not limited to 
watching how others were playing the game. It also implied involving me with the 
game of intervening, and trying to read off the rules from all the research activities 
that I witnessed, or that I conducted. 
 
This chapter deals with a lot of detailed descriptions of the work. The purpose of it is 
dual. First, the detail appears as proof of the rigour, quality and reflection behind the 
work on this research. Second, it helps to show the micro-reflections contrasting 
different angles, and the co-construction with my participants in the process of   
striving for an ethical practice.  In essence, this chapter shows what was actually done 
on the field in contrast with Chapter Three where the methodology was a plan before 
engagement. 
 
The chapter starts by presenting background information about the group, and the 
project that I was following for the empirical part of research. It is aimed to provide 
the context of the case to the reader. Afterwards, it gives a general background of my 
research process, and the relationship that I established with my participants. Next it 
 129 
focuses more in detail on some of the research methods and its use in the field, 
interviews and the intervention component. The last content section deals with aspects 
about transcription and analysis of the data and how the themes to develop in later 
chapters of this text were defined after the actual involvement on the field was done. 
The chapter ends with some reflections and implications for later chapters. 
 
5.1 Background Information on the Case Study Site 
This section is divided in two descriptive accounts.  The first introduces the Team Of 
Practitioners (TOP) along with its origin and the context in which they were  
operating. The second part focuses on the Project For Analysis (PFA), the project in 
which my research focused.  It shows its objectives, case studies involved as well as 
the way in which TOP organised for working on it.   
 
5.1.1 Case Context 
To get a sense of TOP activities is important first to describe some elements about 
their context. TOP is a team of researchers working for a Crown Research Institute 
(CRI) in New Zealand. The CRIs are owned by the New Zealand government. They 
were created in the early 1990s from research bodies that existed inside government 
departments and ministries. Studies at the time showed that the level of investment in 
research in New Zealand was poor. The plan to improve this situation involved 
reorganising the whole sector. 
 
With that aim, the governmental research systems in New Zealand were organised in 
three components: 
* The Ministry of Research, Science and Technology (MoRST) that provides science policy 
advice.     
* The Foundation for Research, Science and Technology (FRST) that is primarily responsible 
for funding science outputs.     
* The Crown Research Institutes (CRIs) that perform actual scientific research. 
(Crown Ownership Monitoring Unit n.d.) 
 
Ten CRIs were created from different branches of the government: Department of 
Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR), the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
(MAF), Ministry of Forestry, Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Health. One 
 130 
of them, devoted to social science, was not viable and subsequently, closed. The other 
nine had developed a market focus and had proven profitable. This fact is ironic 
because both TOP and PFA, on which my study is focused, were conceived as ways 
to revitalize the idea of New Zealand’s viable social science. 
 
Although not in its own right, social science in the CRI where I conducted my 
research continued to have a role. It was seen as a component of more scientific and 
technical projects. Mainly, the role for social research in these projects was social 
marketing. The hard science was achieving the concrete outcomes and the role for 
social research was to find a way to communicate and assure the appropriation of the 
outcomes by the community. Consequently, the projects and research groups have 
some social researchers to support their activity. 
 
TOP and the PFA’s history can be traced back to 2003. At this point in time, two 
research groups from the CRI were bidding to FRST for two research projects. These 
projects were based on biophysical sciences in relation to environmental matters in 
water management. Their main objectives were directed toward contributions to their 
specific sciences. However, both had subordinate objectives of a social nature. 
 
Having social objectives in relation to the environment originates in big extent from 
the Resource Management Act (RMA) and from government efforts to get the 
involvement of Māori communities in decision making. The RMA is the “main piece 
of environmental legislation and provides a framework for managing the effects of 
activities on the environment” (Ministry for the Environment, 2006, p.24). This 
framework points out the importance of sustainability and community participation 
when deciding how to manage environmental issues. 
 
Regarding Māori people in New Zealand, it is important to note that this is a country 
founded on a bicultural treaty, the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi. In it the Māori indigenous 
people of New Zealand became part of the British Empire but keeping their rights to 
land and water. However, Māori claim that the treaty was not respected. This led to 
big protests on the 1970s and eventually to negotiated settlements for the breaches of 
the treaty. 
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Because of their right to land and water and because the current importance of the 
Treaty in New Zealand, Māori consultation is an important element when considering 
communities. This entails cultural difficulties. For instance, from a western 
perspective, rights over land are linked to ownership. From a Māori culture 
perspective the rights need to be seen in consideration to whakapapa, the genealogic 
principle that links people to ancestry and places. From this point of view land makes 
part of ancestry; for a Māori, land is part of the family. Consequently, the Māori 
world view includes the possibility of having a stake in a situation regardless of 
ownership. 
 
The RMA and Māori consultation are factors that set in some way the next step for 
this story, FRST’s entrance to the scene. After FRST received the bidding for the two 
mentioned projects they made a counter proposal to the CRI. They suggested the 
creation of a third research project incorporating the social research objectives from 
the other two. The idea was to have a social research project on its own right. 
 
The CRI took this opportunity to assemble not only a project (PFA) but a team of 
researchers (TOP) incorporating people from inside and outside of the organisation. 
All of them despite the dissimilar backgrounds were experienced in social research. 
The insiders came from the bidding groups of water and bio-solids with an 
unbalanced composition. Three people belonged to water: Frederick Jones 
(background in industrial engineering, systems thinking, and computer simulation), 
Wanda Allen (nursing and sociology) and Hannah Morgan (Education, Te Reo Māori, 
bicultural research). 
 
Barbara Jenkins (sociology, political science in education, New Zealand history) 
belonged to bio-solids. Mark Gould (psychology, systems thinking) and Grace 
Watson (systems science, management), two outsiders, were specifically hired for 
TOP social science group. Gillian Jackson (chemistry, water science) was officially 
part of the PFA, but her involvement on this project was superficial and it was not 
directly allocated to any specific part of the project. 
 
Three more people were the last to join the group.  Dianne Adams (psychology, Māori 
research, and health) was hired a pair of months before my first contact with the group 
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in 2005. William Donovan (geology, operation research) was hired a month 
afterwards. Laura Miller (geography, environmental policy) was hired at the begging 
of 2006, coinciding with my arrival in the research setting. 
 
Dianne was involved directly with the PFA. William was involved with the PFA at 
the beginning but his role diminished with time and he was moved to different 
projects. At Laura's arrival TOP was managing different projects and she was not 
involved with the PFA, but the possibility of her participation in PFA was always 
open. Although some of the people mentioned here did not have a big involvement 
with the project, all of them accepted to be participants in my research and our 
conversations also influenced my ideas. 
 
From my point of view, the more promising people to understand how they were 
managing methodologies were Frederick, Mark, Grace and William. They, in one way 
or another, studied and applied different methodologies. It does not matter here if they 
were calling them systems thinking, management science or operational research. 
They were nearer to my own way of making sense of interventions. 
 
The next section describes part of the history and structure of the PFA before my 
arrival in the setting. 
 
5.1.2 Project PFA Overview 
During my involvement with TOP, they were carrying out many projects at once. 
However, as I already explained my research was bound to the PFA. At my arrival, 
the project was already in its third year. I am not pretending here to give a complete 
account of the happenings in those three years. My purpose is to give a sense of what 
the project implied and the roles of the different actors in the project. 
 
The last section described how FRST asked the CRI to create a research project out of 
some biophysical science projects in water and bio-solids. The original projects were 
focused on improving scientific knowledge and giving this knowledge to communities 
to help them reach better informed decisions. As science projects they focused on 
studying samples of water and bio-solids. Social science was there to deliver the 
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outcomes and implications of the analysis to the communities. They were acting on 
the assumption of being experts and giving the expert view to the communities. The 
new project was based on the assumption that knowledge needs to be created with the 
communities for the communities, an aim in line with Action Research ideas. 
 
Three case studies were chosen. They involved different communities across the 
country. Two of them were “water” projects, the other a “bio-solids” project. All of 
them were aiming to involve communities around their respective issues. 
 
The first case study was concerned with water allocation. A local council was 
studying the feasibility of building a dam in their area. The work carried out by TOP 
was supporting this effort from a sustainability perspective. The communities were 
sharing the same sources of water for a variety of uses such as industrial, agricultural, 
drinking and for recreational purposes. In the process, they were stressing their water 
resources. TOP's aims were first to explore the different values held by the 
community around the water uses in the area. The second aim was to see how these 
values were related to different strategies for managing the resource. I will refer to 
this case as Values in Water Management (VWM). 
 
The second case was involving a regional council. One of the programmes of this 
council encourages different community groups to take care of the water resources 
such as rivers and streams in their local areas. The regional council in question was 
wondering about the achievements of the programme and was looking for a way to 
evaluate it. TOP proposed to work with some of the groups affiliated to the 
programme and help them to develop ways to assess themselves. I will refer to this 
project as Groups for Water Caring (GWC). This case is especially important for my 
research because it was the only one at hand in the setting. 
 
The third case, the bio-solids case study involved again a local council. Bio-solids are 
an end-product of sewage treatment (the other is relatively clean water). Once they are 
obtained, the options are using them or throw them away. The purpose of the project 
was to explore the community's perspectives around the use of these bio-solids. The 
project was in line with guidelines produced by the Ministry for the Environment 
(MfE) in 2002 to reach 95 percent of bio-solids use in New Zealand by 2007. 
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The topic can be a very sensible one because it can be thought of as the use of human 
waste for agricultural purposes, hence the need to construct approaches to the issue 
with the community.  I will refer to this one as Bio-solids. 
 
After this brief look at the different case studies one difficulty seems apparent. All of 
them are different enough to make difficult the idea of a coherent research project. 
This situation was stressed by the previous “allegiance” of the case studies to their 
previous biophysical projects. The team approached the problem defining new 
objectives detached from the case studies, and using the case studies as data for these 
consolidated objectives. 
 
Two objectives were defined. The first focused on how to improve dialogue between 
the different actors and sectors involved in the decision-making process. This 
involved understanding the institutional infrastructure and the modes of dialogue 
between land users, policy makers, scientists, and communities.  The second focused 
on the methods and tools that were going to be used or designed for enabling 
participation in decision making in the case studies. The purpose was to evaluate how 
well they were suited for enabling the participation. 
 
The research project was then organised around three case studies and two research 
objectives. There were three case study leaders and two objectives leaders. A team 
was assembled to manage each case study. The objective leaders were interacting with 
these teams to monitor and guide the compliance with the general objectives of the 
research. Finally there was general leader of the project. At the time of my arrival in 
the setting (February 2006) the leadership roles were as shown in Figure 5.1. It is 
important to note that in this arrangement even the leaders were part of the pool of 
resources available to the others. 
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Figure 5.1. Project Organisation. 
 
The aim with the structure was to have everybody working towards the objectives of 
the programme while having some people devoted to specific projects.  However, 
conditional to the phase or the amount of work in the case studies, other people could 
be called in support of some activities.  This was necessary considering that the work 
in the case studies experienced peaks of activity. 
 
At the CRI, they were organising the amount of work of the project by percentages of 
time devoted to the project. The range of percentages devoted to the project in the 
group varied from as low as 5 percent up to 30 percent of the time. Instead of taking 
5% of work each week for the project, the custom was to employ the percentage on 
the activity peaks. The valleys of activity referred to activities such as building 
relationships (usually at the beginning of the case study) and following up the setting 
after the interventions. The peaks of activity carried out activities such as preparing 
and executing the workshops. 
 
One activity that can be seen also as a peak of activity was reporting to an Advisory 
group. This group was a resource for the PFA. The group was composed by people of 
relevant sectors to the PFA but were outsiders to the CRI. Their role was to give TOP 
“guidance about how research can be useful” (Mark, session #1.3). This implied 
learning from the Advisory experiences in the New Zealand context, getting help to 
develop contacts to spread or “export” the findings of the research and in overall 
getting help to make the research relevant to New Zealand context. 
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TOP was meeting the Advisory group every six months. In those meetings, they were 
presenting advances on the research and receiving feedback about the work. This 
usually involved planning the session, designing presentations, rehearsing such 
presentations, and preparing different documents for Advisory information and 
revision. 
 
5.2 Research Activities 
After giving some general background about the project, now I will proceed to give a 
general background on the work that I performed on the field. The process of research 
comprised many concurrent activities. The Table 5.1 presents an overview of the 
process facilitating its visualization. There are two axes. One refers to the actual 
months of 2006 in which I was in the field gathering the data. The second axis shows 
the different activities that I was carrying out in the setting (from diary up to 
interviews).  It provides a complementary view of the fieldwork shown on figure 1.1. 
 
The representation of when a particular research activity was used through time uses 
different conventions. There are methods continually in use such as Diary, Readings 
(Pragmatics and Philosophy of Action), and working with the Network Files / 
documents concerning the project. A line's thickness represents the emphasis given to 
the activity at a certain point. An additional convention is the rectangle half empty-
half full on organising the network files. In this case, the empty half shows a period of 
time in which I was organising files to clarify my understanding of the PFA. In the 
full half, I continued the process aiming to help TOP to improve on the organization 
of their data. 
 
There is another set of methods applied in a discrete way through time. They deal 
with discontinuous and easily pinpointed events such as the feedback sessions. In the 
case of the meetings two conventions of points are use to mark the difference between 
the meetings, clear for the PFA and dark for the GWC. In the case of the interviews, 
ovals are grouping interviews with similar purposes. The first group points out the 
interviews with the whole team. The second group shows interviews just with the 
people involved directly with the GWC case study.  A complete enumeration of the 
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feedback sessions, interviews and meeting in which I was allowed to take notes and 
audio recordings is presented in Appendix 6. 
 
 
 
Table 5.1. Overview of the Activities on the Field. 
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Let us now comment in more detail the elements listed on the rows of the table. 
 
Diary: I started it before arriving at the setting.  At that time, it focused on the 
methods to be used, ways to be ethical, and speculations about what could I do once 
in the field.  After my arrival, these reflections stopped.  They were replaced by my 
observations of what people were doing in the field.  I was writing down things that 
people were saying, their behaviour, and general details that I felt were potentially 
clarifying for the understanding of the setting. The number of annotations on 
observations decreased with time, perhaps as the result of being more familiar with 
the context. 
 
While observations decreased, reflections started to regain importance. Now the 
emphasis of these reflections was on seeing how the overall fieldwork (and its 
activities) could fit with the theoretical reflections.  At the end, most of my reflections 
were seeking to make sense of Philosophy of Action in the light of the empirical data.  
 
Overall my diary encompassed empirical (observations about me and others), 
methodological, theoretical and philosophical entries. With the diary, I aimed to leave 
a trail of the whole process as Bloor (2006) proposes. 
 
I also produced separate files with reflections to prepare my interviews and feedback 
sessions. All of them were fundamental because I was tracing my intentions regarding 
my intervention opportunities. 
 
Readings: Before arriving at the setting, I was clear on the use of language philosophy 
and pragmatics for my research.  However, once in the field I realized that it was a 
limited way to understand intention.  By serendipity I discovered Philosophy of 
Action (walking around the library shelves). Consequently, my readings on 
pragmatics diminished while my readings on Philosophy of Action increased. This 
later field of knowledge was so vast that my reading of it continued after I left the 
field. 
 
The meetings: I attended all the available meetings for me.  They comprise work on 
the PFA and one of its case studies, the GWC.  The work on the other two case 
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studies was already done (VWM) or in a different city (Bio-solids).  It is important to 
note that most of the PFA was dedicated to report. This situation made me very 
nervous about how relevant could be the case for my research.  The situation 
improved once the GWC case study took momentum in August.   
 
Network files: During the first months of my fieldwork, it was very difficult for me to 
understand what people were talking about.  One of my strategies was to read past 
documents of the project in the shared files allocated at the CRI computer network. 
This helped me to improve my understanding of the situation.  Additionally, I used to  
search on the system for new documents or modifications of the existing ones.  This 
made me aware of the development of the project, meetings, problems, plans that in 
many occasions were not mentioned to me.  Once I started to feel more part of the 
team, and, consequently, I gained more access, the need for this “monitoring” 
diminished. 
 
The files included agendas for the meetings, minutes of the meetings, plans, reports 
for FRST, reports for the CRI higher management, reports for the stakeholders in the 
case studies, reflections on the case studies, annotations on those reflections, power 
point presentations, combinations of these materials for workshop preparation and 
conference papers. 
 
The other work that I carried out in relation to the network files was to propose to 
TOP ways to improve its organisation.  In part I decided to tackle this problem 
because I wanted to be useful in return for them allowing me to do my research in 
their space. Furthermore, it was a way to gain more access. It is important to note that 
thinking about this organization was an activity that I was already carrying out for the 
benefit of the research. 
 
Feedback: I performed three.  The first one was not related to intention, but it served 
as material to reflect on intention later.  The second one was inspired by my readings 
on pragmatics and corresponds in a big degree with the developments explained in 
Chapter Six.  The third one was based on my readings on Philosophy of Action, and it 
was the base for the work in Chapter Seven, although my understanding of this topic 
changed greatly between my feedback and later reflections after I left the field. 
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Interviews: I started my interviews after gaining confidence from the first feedback.  
The first group of interviews was intended to get a general knowledge of the people 
and the work that they were carrying out. The second was focused on the problem of 
understanding intention from the perspective of Philosophy of Action. 
  
5.3 Relationship with the Participants 
As was presented before, my research methodology was drawing from Action 
Research.  Consequently, an important component of the validity in such a 
methodology is the relationship between the group and the researcher.  Here I 
characterize this relationship in two parts.  In the first one I show how we were 
supporting and learning from each other.  In the second part I show how I went from 
observer to participant. 
 
5.3.1 Mutual Learning 
Since my first contact with TOP, I started to develop some empathy for the kind of 
questions that they were confronting. In some way I saw the reflection of my 
concerns. Their vocabulary tended to emphasize the idea of method while I focused 
on methodology, but the questions and problems could be applied to either case. One 
of their main research questions focused on “Evaluating Methods and Tools for 
Participative and Systemic Decision-making” (TOP internal document, 2007). In 
relation to this question, they frequently discussed topics such as how to evaluate, 
how people use methods, how to know if the participants made a shift, the possibility 
of neutral facilitation or how the identity of the facilitator was having an effect on the 
dynamics. 
 
For instance, in this comment from session #13, Mark is explaining an element to be 
considered for evaluating the methods in objective two of the PFA: 
 
we want to look whether the methods that we are testing achieve their intended purposes…but 
also whether they if they are perceived as useful by other participants and users regardless 
whether they achieve their intended purposes…that is important because something may not 
do exactly what is intended, but it has some useful byproduct…Its method and facilitation 
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because you have to be able to tease apart to the extent to which is the method or the extent to 
which is the way that you apply that method that makes the difference. 
 
These concerns are basically the same as mine, except that I am talking about the 
overall process of intervention. Gillian in informal conversations also explained me 
her way of conceiving facilitation. She draws extensively from her experience as a 
coach in different sports. Consequently, she was using the metaphor of the training, 
preparation and the match to decide strategies when planning workshops. That always 
resonated with my idea of using language games to understand the use of 
methodologies. 
 
The resonance of the questions was not the only point drawing me to them. They were 
researchers and, consequently, I found many discussions that for me were almost a 
parallel PhD. They discussed among other topics about methods, management of the 
group, presentation of research proposals, the future direction of the group, leadership, 
and interaction with the communities.  Because my future aims at the end of the PhD 
include having a research group back in Colombia, I found it all quite useful and 
interesting. 
 
Additionally, in some way they were supervising and teaching me about how to 
improve my fieldwork. Frederick used to give me advice about the stages of the 
research. Hannah suggested the need to involve different aspects and people in the 
research. Wanda talked with me a lot and was critical of my paradigm (systems). 
Mark was a support regarding systems thinking. 
 
Grace and Dianne were concerned about ethics. For instance, at the beginning I just 
assumed that if the meeting was starting, due to our previous arrangement, it was 
acceptable to start to record. However, Grace in session #2 advised me that “Normally 
if you are going to record somebody it will be good if you could just check with the 
people if it is ok”. I was very careful the rest of my involvement to ask permission 
before recording.  It is just normal politeness to do so, but I think now that it is an 
important ethical demand. 
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In the same line of ethics, Dianne was always questioning me about the boundaries of 
my observation. She saw my observation as problematic because there were no clear 
boundaries for it. TOP’s office interactions included discussions about other projects 
and sometimes even personal matters. However, on many of those occasions I was 
present, and they did not have clarity about my role or the boundary of observation 
there. Eventually, I dropped the observations on the office space. 
 
The relationship was both ways. Since my arrival, I also looked forward to making a 
contribution to the team. It was a way to thank the team for their support for my 
research, and also a way to show that I was not a handicap. My contribution was 
presented mainly through the feedbacks, as it will be explained later in this chapter. 
 
Additionally to my feedback I helped devising a structure of folders to organise their 
files on the network, I taught the basics of the software Endnote, and proposed the use 
of Wikis (as in Wikipedia) for documenting the research. Finally, the idea of 
organising some files using hyperlinks that I was using with the data of my research 
was mimicked. These were not big contributions but represented my struggle to find 
ways to engage and contribute with TOP’s work. 
 
On the other side, I felt interest in my research from TOP’s side.  They encouraged 
me, and helped me with some papers that I presented in conferences while I was there 
and even afterwards.  They also supported me checking the drafts of my thesis, 
helping me to gain confidence on the ideas presented. This works as an important way 
to improve the validity of my work. 
 
5.3.2 From Observer to Participant 
Arriving at the setting was not easy.  I was an outsider person studying the problem of 
intention in an empirical case. Two caveats come to mind. Firstly, this problem was 
mine, this research problem was not TOP’s concern. From this point of view, the 
research situation can be characterised as a research “on” people (Herr & Anderson, 
2005, p.40).  Secondly, studying intention is a sensitive issue. It was at best disturbing 
for the team. 
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To further complicate my situation, part of my agreement with TOP was not to 
interrupt their work with my questions. Therefore, while any other member of the 
team could clarify on the run ideas, data or concepts with their co-workers, this 
possibility was not open to me. Consequently, my progress at the beginning was really 
slow. I was having problems to grasp the extent of the project, its parts, the way in 
which they were working, and it was difficult for me to differentiate when TOP was 
referring to the PFA.  On many occasions, I took notes of what people were 
mentioning just to get a warning that the issue just mentioned was outside of my 
research space. This was emphasising my condition of an outsider (Herr & Anderson, 
2005). 
 
As an outsider I was pushed to find alternative ways to approach my work. Therefore, 
I turned to examine the Folders Files on the Network. These files were rich in 
information such as: research agreements with the funding bodies, log of all the 
activities carried out by the group, general plans of the research program, and plans 
for the workshops, surveys, interviews transcriptions, papers, data analysis, 
reflections, presentations, and reports. All this information was very useful to improve 
my understanding of the setting. 
 
Besides, thanks to these files, on some occasions I found out about meetings to which 
I was not invited (I was not on their minds when they set the agenda). Under the 
circumstances, I used the information to inquire about those meetings and make 
people aware of the needs of my research and get invited. Hence, I also started to use 
the information to keep track of the developments of the project.   
 
Slowly, I started to be more comfortable with my understanding of the meetings. It 
was not only the fact of attending a good number of them, but also the readings on 
documents produced by TOP as well as information about New Zealand and my 
observations of some of the interactions in the office space. Crucially for my research 
I perceived a team able to discuss very openly difficult issues about their work, world 
views, and relationships. This facilitated my work because I was not concerned with 
deception behind their intentions. On these grounds, I gained confidence for my first 
feedback in May. 
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As was stipulated in our agreement, my feedback was delivered in a reflective 
practice meeting. There were many topics on the agenda. They were prepared for a 
whole-day meeting. One of the topics was my feedback. I asked for 40 minutes, the 
amount of time that was approved without difficulty. My time slice was allocated at 
the beginning of the day. Because this was not a meeting concerning the PFA, the 
contents of the meeting (except my feedback) were outside of my research 
boundaries. In fact, it was decided at the start of the meeting that I would not be 
allowed to stay after my feedback.   
 
Although I always tried to be clear that this was not the case, some people were 
concerned about my analysing their intentions from a psychological point of view. I 
emphasised that my background could not possibly allow me to do this kind of 
exploration. I explained how I was planning to understand intention through 
linguistics. At the end, the group “enjoyed” my feedback (session #16). They 
considered it useful and not threatening.    All this allowed me to get permission to 
stay for the rest of the meeting.  This was my first tangible advance in the process of 
leaving the outsider observer status. Afterwards it was easier for me to ask questions 
(out of the meetings), and I felt a little more comfortable in office situations. 
 
A very important situation in relation to our relationship developed after the first 
feedback.  The reflective practice meetings disappeared. It seems that people did not 
have the time to pursue this activity. Without these meetings, my space for feedback 
was also gone.  I knew of the importance of having that space for the Action Research 
part of my methodology.  However, due to the good result of my first feedback, and 
my own confusion about how to manage the concept of intention and consequently 
what to do next, I felt safer not pushing for a second feedback. 
 
Curiously, this situation mixed with the ambivalence of TOP about the way of my 
participation in their meetings for the GWC. Part of the team wanted me to have a 
more direct involvement with the case study. However, I also felt that part of the team 
opposed the idea.  Consequently, my behaviour on the GWC became a function of the 
people present.  Accordingly, I contributed or not to the group.  This was a constant 
source of anxiety for me.   
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In session #38, without any plan from my part I suddenly found myself manifesting 
the tension that I was experiencing with the GWC meetings. In turn they manifested 
that they did not know what I was doing, therefore, the situation for them was also 
uncomfortable. In fact, they also expressed how they felt at my arrival to the field. 
Some felt that my research was imposed on them and complained about the lack of 
clear boundaries of my work. However, they did not blame me for it. (The context of 
this case is expanded in Section 7.1.3). 
 
After mutually clarifying situations and feelings, the group agreed to allow me more 
direct participation, and I agreed on giving feedback in any kind of space possible for 
the group.  Here I also felt an important space for getting the group’s acceptance. 
After my second feedback in session #41, the research was not so much “on” them, 
but now it was frequently “with” them (Herr & Anderson, 2005).  
 
I was helping them with their own problems, but on the other hand, they were also 
helping me more directly with my research problem. There was more trust. Now, they 
were seeing how my research could relate with their own situations.  Consequently, 
they were giving me useful feedback to improve the ideas. They were also 
participating in the elaboration of ideas on my research. The boundaries of the 
research setting shifted in relation to my stance as a researcher (Section 3.4). 
 
5.4 Interviews 
I decided to conduct the interviews in a very open way. I was trying to “provide an 
environment conducive to the production of the range and complexity of meanings 
that address relevant issues, and not be confined by predetermined agendas” 
(Gubrium & Holstein, 2003, p.75). Therefore, in a similar way to my feedback I was 
looking at how to “ activate the respondent's stock of knowledge…and bring it to bear 
on the discussion at hand in ways that are appropriate to the research agenda” 
(Gubrium & Holstein, 2003, p.75). 
 
Moreover, I was not trying to stay detached from my interlocutor on the interview. 
After all, “Interactive interviews offer opportunities for self-conscious reflection by 
researchers as well as respondents. Some interviewers now discuss how they feel 
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during interviews… and how they use their feelings, experiences, and self-analysis to 
understand and interpret the experiences of others” (Ellis & Berger, 2003, p.160). 
This was mirroring some of the behaviours in TOP meetings. I was also trying to be 
aware of my feelings there. My behaviour was relaxed and I did not find it 
inconvenient to laugh if something funny was said, although in the meetings I tried to 
conceal my bad feelings about something, and of course I was not allowed to talk.   
 
I always planned interviews, and wrote on paper the topics and questions. The paper 
was always presented from the onset to the other person (Farías & Montero, 2005). I 
was checking with them the development of the interview based on the points 
presented. If they asked my views, I gave them. However, I avoided taking sides on 
problematic issues that I felt had the potential to fuel conflict among them. I always 
started by explaining the purpose of the interview, and I always asked at the end if 
they thought that something was missing from the points covered. Usually this 
produced other 15–20 minutes of extra time, where people often talked about their 
specific interest.   
 
In my first round of interviews (Appendix 3), I decided not to be too technical on the 
issues. I asked people mainly about their “cognitive environment”, their studies, skills, 
aptitudes, ethics, aesthetics in relation to intervention and methodologies. 
Additionally, I was inquiring on their views about the purposes and plans in relation 
to the project PFA. 
 
From my researcher's perspective, the second round of interviews (Appendix 4) was 
much more complex. The difficulty was that the interview ranged from trying to 
understand intentions as something clearly conscious up to something emergent but 
not necessarily conscious. Consequently, I was moving forward and backwards asking 
on the different meetings on the subproject. In each one I was looking out for the 
effect of different concepts on philosophy of action, but also trying to understand 
together with my interviewee whether the intention emerged at some point of the 
process.     
 
Because of my Philosophy of Language background I assumed that my interviews 
were a way of intervening. From my point of view they were useful to make people 
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reflect about their work. I discovered later in the interviews that Wanda and Frederick 
in TOP also conceived interviews useful as intervention tools. They saw them as a 
tool for generating rapport and a way to encourage participation.  
 
5.5 Intervention 
A fundamental part of my research was my intervention component. It is fundamental 
because I used first and second person Action Research in order to reflect on my 
intention and other’s people intentions. Typically, because I am aiming to contribute 
to MS/ST, it will be expected to use some systems thinking methodology and use it in 
turn to reflect about my intentions on it. However, I encountered difficulties using the 
system’s ideas in the field.  Consequently, I had to turn elsewhere to think about 
feedback.   
 
What follows is an explanation of the difficulties that I found, why I turned to 
language games and how, from this perspective, I could draw guidelines.  Finally, I 
present an overview of what were the content and my purposes with each of the three 
feedback sessions delivered to TOP.   
 
5.5.1 Difficulties Using Systems Ideas for Intervention 
Before my first feedback, I became aware of some differences inside the group that 
affected greatly my way to intervene.  These differences were in some way 
interrelated and rooted in the history of the group. As it was already mentioned, 
before TOP came into existence there were different scientific projects with social 
objectives. Therefore, at this CRI social science work was already in place. Then 
Grace and Mark, non New Zealanders, with a strong background in systems thinking 
were brought in to strengthen the programme. Mark was given the leadership of the 
new project PFA and the old social sciences' objectives became part of the new 
project. 
 
There were some strong reactions. Someone in the group referred to this as a “take 
over”. Somebody else manifested that s/he did not want to be “brainwashed” by 
systems thinking, someone else stated that systems was too dominant. I was first 
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exposed to these comments and differences at the time of my first contact with TOP 
back in 2005. Mark argued against this.  His argument was that he pushed in the latest 
group enrolment for Dianne, a person not in systems thinking. Actually, Dianne was a 
Māori researcher and that represented the aim for having a diversity of disciplines in 
the group. However, I witnessed how the tension systems vs. other disciplines 
subsisted at least as long as my involvement until December 2006. 
 
In my opinion, one of the symptoms of this tension was the avoidance of systems 
methodologies for guiding the work of the group. On one side, they were using 
methods and methodologies, although not necessarily from the systems thinking 
paradigm, when engaging the target communities of their research. On the other side, 
they did not use methodologies or methods or techniques to clarify their own courses 
of action. Before my first feedback, the idea of using methods was proposed 
sometimes but there was never real support to the initiative. 
 
The time to give my first feedback arrived after two months of having started the 
fieldwork. By that time, I already had 15 recordings. I read intensively about the 
project, and I familiarised myself with the setting. However, there were many things 
that I did not understand, and I did not have the time to think about intention. In fact, I 
only cared about “surviving” and not embarrassing myself at the session (just as 
Frederick used to say). The question was: how to do it? 
 
5.5.2 Turning to Language Games 
Before starting my fieldwork, I considered the possibility of using some 
methodologies for my feedback sessions. However, using systems thinking and 
methodologies was risky considering the audience. On one side as I already explained 
there were a group of people looking the idea of systems as a kind of imperialism or 
brainwashing technique. I could not see myself as an imperialist (or colonized) 
researcher, and, I did not want to take the risk of being labelled as one. 
 
On the other side, in TOP, there was a group of people well versed in the use of these 
methodologies. Nevertheless, this was not making things easier. There was a big 
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possibility of this group disagreeing with my use of these ideas. Therefore, I felt the 
need of a kind of advantage in order to gain credibility as a researcher. 
 
Additionally, although the group never gave me some guidelines of what they were 
expecting, perhaps the idea of a formal evaluation was strong. According to our 
agreement my project was a formative evaluation. Perhaps, then, the image is of 
somebody looking at your work and pointing out the failures. This was not how I 
pictured myself here, nor did I think of myself as an expert evaluator. Additionally, 
some people in the group were also uncomfortable with this idea. 
 
My knowledge of the situation at the time was superficial. Furthermore, it was 
difficult to express my ideas due to the language. Therefore, I thought that presenting 
me in the guise of an evaluator was too much. I did not want to present my feedback 
as certainties. I wanted to present my feedback as ideas useful to reflect on the group. 
I wanted to avoid remarks that could lead to conflict. Consequently, I was planning to 
talk about topics concerning the whole group. I did not want to pin point anybody. 
One of my problems was to choose the content for the feedback.  The other problem, 
more methodological in nature, was how to give that content. With this last problem 
in mind I turned to Wittgenstein's language games. 
 
5.5.3 Drawing Guidelines 
The idea of using language games was not new to me. I was toying with the idea of 
intervening through interviewing, taking the opportunity to make people reflect about 
their activities. This was, even without knowing that later they were going to require 
from me some feedback, back in June 2005. This was partly because of my belief that 
it was impossible not to intervene on a situation, so it was best to have an intention 
with that intervention. Later I discovered in my engagement with TOP that they in 
general held the same belief. In fact, they were evaluating interviews as ways to foster 
participation (session #14, #21).   
 
In my case, I based the belief on the notion of language games.  From this perspective 
language is a tool. We do things with language. Methodologies and methods are 
language games, and consistently with this, they are ways to do things with language 
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as I argued in Chapter Three. Yet, the same argument implies that in order to 
intervene and do things, methods and methodologies are not the only way. 
 
For instance, Whitaker (1996) drawing from Wittgenstein argues that the 
representation of ethnographic accounts can be use to affect and change a situation. 
By this means what he is doing is introducing topics, themes, concepts in the language 
game in place. This is not far from my own point of view. 
 
After negotiating my agreement in October 2005 the idea of having my feedback was 
introduced. This reinforced my initial intention. At that time perhaps I was not very 
sure of the idea of interviews as a way to intervene, and perhaps I was timid to call my 
involvement an intervention. After the introduction of my feedbacks, I was less 
concerned about using the label intervention. I imaged myself using the opportunities 
available to “push boundaries”. The question now that my feedback was on the 
horizon was how in the absence of systems methodologies, I was going to apply 
language games ideas and define some guiding principles in the process. 
 
One starting point was to look at my strengths. My salient point in relation to TOP's 
multidisciplinary knowledge was my linguistic background. Hence, I set to use it, 
linking linguistic concepts to my observations. The process that I envisaged was 
following something like this: 
 
But do you really explain to the other person what you yourself understand? Don’t you get 
him to guess the essential thing? You give him examples, —but he has to guess their drift, to 
guess your intention.” — Any explanation which I can give myself I give to him too. — “he 
guesses what I intend” would mean: various interpretations of my explanation come to his 
mind, and he lights on one of them.  So in this case he could ask; and I could and should 
answer him.  (Wittgenstein, 2001, §210) 
 
Due to my language limitations, I did not really hope to be absolutely clear in my 
speech. Even so, I could look to be clear on my intention. Again, intention is what I 
needed to reflect on, an idea also found on Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 
1995). I was also aware of language as a “labyrinth of paths. You approach from one 
side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no 
longer know your way about” (Wittgenstein, 2001, §203). How can be known if we 
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are talking about the same thing when different people can approach the matter from 
different sides? 
 
My idea was to let people explore and play with the issues from different directions. 
Perhaps in this way with some wandering around the issues, we as a group, could 
understand the different directions involved. This was not so difficult. They usually 
did that in their meetings. They used to bounce ideas each other all the time. My role 
was more to be there and do some occasional steering of the course and keep them 
interested. 
 
When I am proposing language games inside the language already in place I am 
aiming to some kind of following in Wittgenstein terms.  How can we know if the rule 
was followed? In my case, I was taking advantage of the people of the group being 
used to playing with concepts, so I gave them concepts to play with, and I was of 
course seeing what was happening and trying to influence the game, like a feedback 
mechanism. If they did not get the game, I tried to push the ideas again. The problem 
with a following is that it is very difficult to know if people got it. They can get a 
fortunate following. Therefore, it was important to see how they played with the 
concept, explored different avenues, and if they exhausted the concept without finding 
any relevance my role was to find ways to reintroduce the concept and allow them 
further explorations until a point in which I felt that the understanding was good 
enough. 
 
However, it is important to note that all this explanation from the language games 
perspective does not mean that I was not using systems thinking at all. For instance, I 
found useful the CATWOE mnemonics (Client, Actor, Transformation, 
Weltanshauung, Owner, Environmental constraints) (Checkland & Sholes, 1990). 
Particularly, Transformation and the Weltanshauung were important to reflect about 
my purposes. I conceived the transformation of the process as one taking the language 
game in place and transforming that with the introduction of my language games or 
ideas. The Weltanshauung was in line with avoiding judgements, imperialism and 
conflict. 
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It can be said that I used these concepts to orientate my thinking. However, my 
“methodology” for the actual feedback was in a certain way similar to SSM. Both 
were relying in a construct to interrogate a situation and reach some kind of 
accommodation or recognisance on the issues. In SSM the construct is a model of a 
purposeful situation built following some conventions. In my case, the constructs 
were theoretical and philosophical concepts in language. 
 
The good outcome of the meeting and the parallels drawn gave confidence on the 
strategy. Consequently, I used the same basic ideas to guide my next feedbacks. The 
difference was that contrary to this one, which was aiming to cement my position in 
front of the group, in the others I focused on developing ideas on intention. However, 
as in the first one, I took and adapted those ideas, to make them relevant and useful as 
a feedback for TOP.   
 
5.5.4 Purpose and Content of the Feedback Sessions 
As it was said on Chapter One (also Figure 1.1), the feedback sessions were the 
convergence points for all the activities while on the field.  From the point of view of 
defining my approach to the feedback, the first was the most important one.  It was 
the only one in which I was not consciously thinking about my intention when I 
delivered.  For this reason, I frequently contrasted ideas of intention with the 
happenings in this session, which I considered less “contaminated” by theory and 
further reflections, allowing less biased reference for contrasting ideas about 
intention. 
 
From the point of view of intervention the session had two purposes. The first was 
making the team aware of how they were referring to one of the main objectives on 
the PFA and the implications of that interpretation.  In my view, their interpretation 
was problematic. I supported my arguments on philosophy of language and 
linguistics, particularly the problem of why names work to refer to people (McGinn, 
2002). One position is that names work as a shorthand of everything that describes the 
person.  The other argument is that they worked as a chain of uses.  We call somebody 
a name because we continue a socially established use. I show that the way in which 
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they were referring to the objective was following a social use that was now detached 
of the original ideas behind the objective. 
 
The second purpose made the case about the need to use more written media in their 
work. It relied on Ong’s (1982) ideas of how orality and literacy affect the way in 
which knowledge is constructed.  Accordingly, if knowledge relies on orality, it will 
lack complexity, and it will tend to repeat the same ideas.  Constructing knowledge in 
a written form allows for the development of more complex ideas. 
 
Notice that in both cases I proposed theoretical/philosophical themes to reflect on 
their practice.  This way to portray the feedback was not perceived as threatening. 
They found this very engaging and useful.  I saw that future sessions were using more 
visual aids to construct knowledge.  On the objective, they did not change the way to 
refer to it, but it seems that they were more aware of the limitation of their 
interpretation of it.  They added more caveats to the work related to this objective in 
future sessions. Using ideas about intentionality for the feedback was the role of my 
second and third feedback. 
 
The second feedback explored how intentions were communicated in their meetings. 
It relied on understanding intention from the perspective of Relevance Theory and the 
notion of boundary in MS/ST.  Based on these, I constructed the typology explained 
in Chapter Six. This typology was useful to describe some argumentation’s dynamics 
on their meetings. I use it to point out how, on many occasions, they lacked focus in 
their discussions, and, consequently, it was difficult to agree on a course of action.     
 
In that session, I explained a version of the typology that later was enhanced thanks to 
the feedback that I received from TOP. The team in turn found the typology useful 
and decided to use the ideas to reflect about their practice in a session in December 
that year. 
 
The third feedback was delivered just before leaving the setting. It used the 
Philosophy of Action and was exploring the concept of intention. This is explored in 
detail in Chapter Seven. My last feedback was not as coherent as the other ones. I was 
not yet set about how to understand intention from the perspective of Philosophy of 
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Action. Basically, I showed the team a wide range of approaches to intention and how 
difficult it was to defend under each one of them that our actions (TOP's intervention 
and my own ones) were intentional. 
 
What I tried to convey on the feedback was the hypothesis that an intervention 
process could benefit from having clarity on each one of the aspects that were 
mentioned on the approaches to intention. My aim was to make the team aware of the 
possibility of making their work more intentional. Some of them said that was a 
lesson that they will try to apply. 
 
5.6 Data Sense making 
The previous sections in this chapter show how the work of propitiating the research 
events and gathering data was done.  This section moves now to show how I started to 
make sense of the data gathered, approached the analysis and organised the findings 
explained in later chapters.  First I will show some considerations about the 
transcriptions and how they were enriched through the development of the findings.  
Next, I will show issues that affected on how I decided the themes. 
 
5.6.1 Transcribing and Sieving the Data 
Originally, I aimed to transcribe every research event in the field: interviews, 
feedbacks and meetings. However, I started to lag behind with the process of 
transcription even after the first session. On one hand, there was the problem of the 
massive amount of data generated in a meeting (which I discovered exceeded by a lot 
the one in an interview). On the other hand, I had problems understanding the 
recordings (and the meetings). I lacked the background about the context and 
sometimes even the pronunciation of the English was proving difficult for me. 
Although my understanding of the meetings greatly improved in few months, I was 
deeply troubled by my delay with the transcriptions.   
 
However, I found authors in the literature questioning the nature and need of full 
transcripts (Farías & Montero, 2005; Halcomb & Davidson, 2006; Holliday, 2007; 
Oliver, Serovich, & Mason, 2005). The arguments were the cost/benefit relationship 
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of the activity, and the supposed objectivity of the transcriptions. Consequently, as an 
overall guideline, I decided to transcribe what I saw as critical segments for my work. 
They are mainly related to ideas of purpose in the case studies, and references to 
methodologies.   
 
These segments provide the raw material or “illuminating instances” (Holliday, 2007, 
p.84) that makes possible later analysis. It is usual that these instances are small fairly 
independent paragraphs that are connected by the narrative of the researcher.  In my 
case, the length of these instances varied from very detailed transcriptions to meetings 
that I did not consider important so that there was barely an abstract on them. 
 
However, in meetings that I perceived as crucial for my work, especially feedback 
sessions, I was not just transcribing. I also complemented, enriched the information on 
the meeting. I documented my reactions to what was being said, and what was going 
on behind my actions. Because I was looking forward to understand my intentions, I 
was trying to disentangle every small detail of my action in line with first person 
Action Research (Chandler & Torbert, 2003).   
 
My transcriptions were using blocks of text on two different colour backgrounds. One 
was used to refer to descriptions of the observable happenings and actions in the 
setting. The other was used for explanations of the actions and reflections. In these 
explanations, I drew from internal documents, past observations, notes taken in the 
meeting and inside information of my own perceptions produced immediately after 
the session. In some cases, I was not very sure of my actions, so I gave some tentative 
explanations to these situations. 
 
These kinds of descriptions about my actions were not technical in the sense that they 
were not using concepts of philosophy of language or philosophy of action at this 
stage. Once I was more settled in the field and the first concerns about how to 
intervene were behind, I started to focus on more technical descriptions of intention. 
 
The first of these technical descriptions was based on Relevance Theory and 
boundaries (explained on Chapter Six). I started the process of developing categories 
for Boundary Games as I named them to analyse meetings. It was a process of 
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applying the categories, see if they were making sense and if not, rethinking them to 
develop new categories. They were based on reflections in many segments of 
interaction belonging to very different sessions. However, I just felt satisfied when 
applied to a whole session they were making sense. 
 
I also complemented the information on the transcriptions with reflections using 
Philosophy of Action. For this aim, I constructed a checklist of categories derived 
from this literature. They covered different aspects that the literature pointed out as 
important to understand intention. It comprised core elements for explaining 
intentions such as belief, desire, and plans. It also included elements used for 
explaining an intentional action such as intention, ends, reasons (normative, 
impersonal, motivational, promise, belief). Besides, it included elements that posed 
difficulties for intention-based explanations such as trying, wayward chains, and luck.   
 
My purpose, in the spirit of a deductive logic, was to look for those elements that 
were not useful to reflect on intention. In other words, the idea was to falsify to keep 
the useful ones. I used the checklist's categories to reflect on my overall intention, 
intentions in specific planned tasks such as interviews and feedbacks (although this 
did not cover my first feedback), also I was using it to reflect after some of my 
unexpected actions. This work led to the developments in Chapter Seven.   
 
5.6.2 Organising my Learning Process in Reflexive Cycles 
At the end of my involvement in the field I got a huge amount of information.  There 
were all the philosophical and theoretical reading, my reflexions on the field, plus all 
the information gathered through interviews, meetings, feedbacks.  The question was 
how to deal with it, how to organize my process and make it clear to myself and the 
reader. Action Research literature proposes organising the research process in cyclical 
stages such as intent, act, review phases posed by Dick (1993). When you organise 
cycles you can show how a given cycle is supported by past ones and is in turn 
supporting future ones. Sarah et al. (2002) suggest that it is useful to adjust the 
process to organisational cycles. 
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Consequently, when I approached the fieldwork, I tried to adjust my cycles to the 
delivery of my feedback, namely three cycles. However, I found very difficult to 
adjust the way in which I was learning to these stages.  This was not really mirroring 
my process.  
 
For instance, I established a way to intervene thanks to the first feedback.  The 
approach changed very little for the next two.  Additionally, the content, the ideas that 
I was trying about intention in the remaining two feedback sessions were basically 
different. One was relying on Language Pragmatics (feedback two), the other on 
Philosophy of Action (feedback three).  So even on the specific topic of intention, 
knowledge was not constructed supported by the previous feedback session.  Another 
problem with this interpretation is that when the topics were presented to TOP, they 
were at an incipient stage of development.  The maturation of the ideas was produced 
long after the end of my involvement in the field, through more reflections. 
 
Consequently, it made more sense to make a distinction between a stage of the work 
on the field (learning cycles) and after my involvement on the field, a stage better 
portrayed as reflection cycles.  In the first stage, I was acting and adjusting my actions 
for future interactions.  The second, involved reflecting about all the gathered 
experiences and the philosophical and theoretical readings that were still on the go.  
With this aim, I organised cycles around the process of developing the themes 
presented on feedback sessions two and three.  For most of the time, they were not 
crossing each other. The first cycle originated mainly by feedback two was developed 
as intentional action deriving from Language Pragmatics.  The second cycle 
originated from feedback three and developed as intention deriving from Philosophy 
of Action.  These cycles have their own characteristics. They will be explained with 
more detail in Section 6.3 and the introduction to Chapter Seven.  At the end, I saw 
ways in which both reflections cycles, both lines of thought could be entwined, as will 
be explained on Chapter Eight.   
 
Under this view, feedback sessions were an initial opportunity to test the ideas on 
intention, later they were the seed for reflection cycles.  The feedback then is better 
considered in the light of initial reflections about intention, not really on actions to 
improve TOP’s circumstances. As with some characteristics mentioned in Chapter 
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Three, this one also made me differentiate from an Action Research process.  It is for 
this reason that in Figure 1.1, the idea of Action Research does not show so 
prominently. 
 
5.6.3 Deciding the Main Themes 
When I first approached the problem of writing the thesis I had a very different plan 
from what ultimately was presented.  My starting assumption was that it does not 
matter what intention is, it is necessary to act in some way in order to achieve some 
effect with that intention.  Consequently I look for ways to “visualize” the intention or 
understand their effects. Wittgenstein’s philosophy and Language Pragmatics were up 
to this role.  
 
My first approach was only focused in language. After a while I discovered 
Philosophy of Action. I became aware of the different approaches here to understand 
intention.  In the light of this branch of philosophy I started to consider that while here 
they were dealing with the “true” nature of intention, Language Pragmatics was not. I 
saw Language Pragmatics as the façade of intentions. This was so because it was 
possible to witness language but intentions were hidden inside the actor.  These 
hidden intentions were manifesting through language. 
 
My plan was to use the evidence provided by Language Pragmatics to uncover which 
of the different approaches to intention on Philosophy of Action was behind the 
superficial appearances.  Language Pragmatics was the way to look behind the façade. 
However, I discovered that there were ways in which the approaches in Philosophy of 
Action were showing and manifesting their effects. The role that I planned for 
Language Pragmatics was not what I expected. 
 
Additionally, I also saw that it was possible from the Philosophy of Action to 
conceive a role for the way in which intention was understood in Language 
Pragmatics.  This is basically the idea of the dual face of intentions.  This realisation 
was perhaps one of my last findings, almost at the end of my writing.  This forced me 
to reorganise my writing.  At the start of the writing process I was planning to show 
how Language Pragmatics was the way to uncover Intention in Philosophy of Action. 
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At the end, Philosophy of Action was helping me to give a place to Language 
Pragmatics to explain one of the faces of the two-faced phenomenon of intention. 
 
5.7 Some Lessons 
This chapter was mainly descriptive of the research process. It serves as the ethical 
and quality guarantor of the research through the detailed explanation of the research 
procedures.  It provides background information about the context and projects of my 
research participants. It describes the development of my relationship with TOP. It 
shows my intervention component and how this was informed by my philosophical 
assumptions of language games. It shows how the data was gathered and how it the 
approach to its analysis emerged. Besides it shows how the research methodology 
planned in Chapter Three was adapted according to the events in the field. 
 
Additionally, this Chapter is providing background information for the reader to 
understand the context of the research and the work leading to the findings. Those 
findings corresponding to both faces of intention and their relationship will be now 
presented on the following three chapters. 
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PART THREE: DISCUSSION 
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Chapter 6 Doing Things Intentionally 
The early chapters of this thesis present the area of contribution (Chapter Two), the 
way in which I methodologically approach the research (Chapter Three), the initial 
philosophical and theoretical explorations of intention (Chapter Four), and an 
overview of the empirical exploration on the field (Chapter Five). This chapter starts 
the process of contributing to the role of intention in interventions combining 
philosophy, theory and empirical work. 
 
This chapter specifically goes deeper into the exploration of the present directed 
intentional action. It understands an intentional action as action in language. 
Consequently, it helps to explain the communicative role of intentions. Namely, 
helping to make sense of actions (our and others) and, as a result, helping in 
coordinating actions among actors as was proposed in Chapter Four. Towards 
explaining this face of intention, I devised an analytical framework drawing from my 
observations of TOP’s interactions, in the way of a second person Action 
Research/practice, and from theoretical sources such as Boundary Critique Theory in 
MS/ST and Relevance Theory in Language Pragmatics. 
 
The framework was constructed based on my observations and interactions with TOP, 
through a deductive strategy. I was observing the interaction, conjecturing possible 
effects of actors’ communicative actions on the boundary of what is considered 
relevant and reflecting about their coherence in order to refine the conjectures. An 
early prototype of this framework was in turn presented to TOP. Their comments and 
critique helped to improve and develop the arguments in later reflections (see Figure 
1.1). Here, I will be using some of these interactions to illustrate the framework and 
how it can be used to analyse interactions. 
 
The effects of the boundary are mainly interpreted using the Theory of Relevance. As 
Chapter Four presented, this theory provides a mechanism to assess the effect of 
communications on the process of reaching inferences.  Basically, Relevance Theory 
assumes that communication is about expressing and recognising intentions.  The 
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audience judges the intention and relevance of what is said, for the cognitive effects            
produced.  If we can connect what is being said, and additionally we do not have 
problems understanding it, we can then consider it relevant.  Otherwise if we cannot 
connect the information with our background, or it is too difficult to process the 
information, then what is said does not affect our cognitive environment.  It is not 
relevant. 
 
The chapter starts by explaining different takes on the concept of boundary and stating 
which one will be used here. Particular emphasis is placed on what is taken to be 
relevant in a situation, and on how language pragmatics and the theory of relevance 
can help in understanding effects on the boundary. Based on this, I propose a 
framework of six operations or intentions and the ways in which they affect a 
boundary.   
 
After the explanation of the different operations, some of the witnessed interactions in 
the field are described using the proposed operations. Next, guidelines for intervention 
are derived from the framework. Finally, some implications for Boundary Critique 
Theory are presented. 
 
6.1 Boundary 
The concept of boundary introduced in Section 2.2.3 suffers from a kind of paradox in 
systems thinking. On the one hand, it has been accepted as a central concept in the 
field; on the other “it is one of the least discussed, especially in the seminal literature” 
(Mingers, 2006, p.65). 
 
To some extent discussions on the concept of boundary resemble the disciplines and 
ideas that had fed systems thinking. Mingers (2006) manages to trace contributions to 
the concept of boundary from perspectives as diverse as physical sciences, 
mathematics, conceptual boundaries, social systems, and boundaries as observer’s 
constructions. 
 
Drawing from these perspectives, Mingers highlights some issues: 
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 Some boundaries, especially in physical systems do exist. Yet, observers 
always have a purpose with them. Due to this they choose how to perceive 
them and in the process, they also conceive them. 
 “boundaries are of different types —edges and surfaces, enclosures and 
membranes, and demarcations; and they have particular effects— separation, 
containment and constraints” (Mingers, 2006, p.99).   
 Some of the strategies used to conceptualise boundaries such as mathematics, 
geometry, and language seem to assume perfect distinctions of the boundary. 
For instance, geometrically, the usual representation for a boundary is by a 
circle on a paper that distinguishes perfectly what lies inside and outside of it. 
However, in practice “this does not hold with distinctions and difference being 
both imprecise and inevitable judgemental in their application. But, as with 
physical boundaries, distinctions do not have to be perfect to work and allow 
us to communicate and interact” (Mingers, 2006, p.100).  Similarly, 
Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein, 2001, §71) said: “Frege compares a concept to an 
area and says that an area with vague boundaries cannot be called an area at 
all. This presumably means that we cannot do anything with it. —But is it 
senseless to say: "Stand roughly there"?”. 
 
Regarding social boundaries, Mingers relies on autopoiesis theory. He explains how 
the operations inside the system generate the boundary. However, there are 
disagreements about the nature of these operations and the nature of the boundary 
generated. For instance, on one side of the discussion, systems operations are 
biological (Maturana, 1988), on the other side systems operations are communications 
(Luhmann, 1998).   On the biological side, the boundaries are physical, e.g., the skin 
of the organism. On the communicational side, the boundary divides communication 
from living beings, but it is difficult to specify its nature. 
 
Finally, he discusses “a central cleavage within systems thinking— whether 
boundaries could be said to exist at all, ontologically, or whether they were in fact 
always simply constructs of the observer” (Mingers, 2006, p.100).  Mingers’ approach 
on this takes a critical realist perspective (Mingers, 2000). In this way, he looks for a 
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“powerful argument for the independent existence of both systems and their 
boundaries” (Mingers, 2006, p.100).   
 
However, from the Wittgensteinian point of view that I am taking, the construction of 
such boundaries will be just another language game. As just another Language Game 
it can be constructed and affected by actors according to the given use. Consequently, 
here I depart from Mingers to look for other systems-thinking authors closer to my 
position. 
 
Wittgenstein’s position looks more compatible with a line of work introduced on 
Chapter Two: Boundary Critique Theory.  Authors such as Churchman, Ulrich and 
Midgley are relevant for the argument here.  Churchman’s ideas on ethics and values 
were already introduced in Chapter Two. It was also shown that for him, intentions 
affect the boundaries of the problem to be tackled. His work does not hold boundaries 
as something real but something that can be constructed. 
 
From the point of view of ideal-planning, the question of the proper boundaries has no 
plausible, common sense answer.  It’s like all the other questions, about clients, purposes, 
measure of performance, etc.  The idea is not to find an answer but to foster the process of 
unfolding. (Churchman, 1979, p.91) 
 
Ulrich's position reinforces this idea. “The boundaries, structures and goal states of 
social systems are not defined physically, as in the case with organisms, but rather by 
contexts of meaning” (Ulrich, 1983, p.330).  Because the boundary depends on these 
contexts of meaning, they depend on our judgments.   
 
Whenever we apply the systems concept to some section of the “real world”, we must make 
very strong a priori assumptions about what is to belong to the system in question and what is 
to belong to its “environment”. We call such judgements boundary judgements. (Ulrich, 1983, 
pp.225–226) 
 
 
Ulrich also states that we cannot really engage with the system, and, consequently, 
with intervening in it, without making prior boundary judgements: 
 
Because such a judgment is constitutive of the empirical and the normative content of the 
systems concept in a given situation, it must be made before the systems concept can 
meaningfully be applied to describe the situation. Hence, both the boundary judgement and the 
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systems concept it defines must be regarded as being relatively a priori to any empirical 
statement about the system in question. (Ulrich, 1983, p.191) 
 
Midgley´s work makes it possible to establish connections between boundaries and 
methodologies. He suggests that boundaries can be understood as “social and personal 
constructs that define the limits of the knowledge that is taken as pertinent in an 
analysis” (Midgley, 2000, p.35). 
 
Boundaries have an effect on how we tackle issues. Where exactly those boundaries 
“are constructed, and what the values are that guide the construction, will determine 
how issues are seen and what actions will be taken” (Midgley, 2000, p.36). Moreover, 
Midgley also states that different boundaries will give rise to different methodological 
choices. I would add that different boundaries imply also different uses in those 
methodologies and by extension any other tool. Surely, if we were intending to use 
different boundaries in the knowledge considered relevant for issues such as the 
involved people, or the values, different ways to use a tool must rise. 
 
6.2 Using Boundary to Pragmatically Understand Intention 
Under the assumption that different boundaries imply different ways to consider a 
situation, one way to understand how intentions intrude on intervention is to look for 
how intention affects boundaries and how they affect what knowledge is considered 
pertinent/relevant in the situation. Using effects to understand something bears 
pragmatist underpinnings that are not strange to MS/ST (Ormerod, 2006). For 
instance, Churchman’s work is based on pragmatism and this line has also been 
explored by Ulrich (2001) who cites the pragmatist philosopher Peirce: 
 
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the 
object of our conception to have.  Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our 
conception of the object. (Peirce, 1969, para.402) 
 
Peirce's phrase is proposing an approach to understand an “object of our conception”. 
That approach is based on effects. Hence one approach to inquire about intention is 
through its effects. This pragmatic dimension also resonates with Wittgenstein ideas. 
Actually, the notion of understanding the meaning of a word based on use has given 
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rise to many pragmatic interpretations, not only in pragmatic philosophy but in 
language pragmatics as well (Crary, 2003). 
 
In Wittgenstein’s terms what I set out to find is some operations or language games 
that in an intervention can affect what is being considered relevant in a situation. For 
this purpose, I will look for some “games” that will represent different ways to 
construct and act on the boundary. According, to Wittgenstein the uses that we can 
give to a boundary are not objective, they are not set at all. 
 
When one draws a boundary it may be for various kinds of reason. If I surround an area with a 
fence or a line or otherwise, the purpose may be to prevent someone from getting in or out; but 
it may be also part of a game and the players be supposed, say, to jump over the boundary; or 
it may shew where the property of a man ends and that of another begins; and so on.  So if I 
draw a boundary line that is not yet to say what I am drawing it for. (Wittgenstein, 2001, 
§499) 
 
Consequently, it is not really possible to say that Wittgenstein presupposes some uses 
for the boundary. What can be said is that again Wittgenstein is giving conceptual 
space to finding some uses on our own. It is here where Relevance Theory (introduced 
in Section 4.1.3) comes into play. I can conjecture possible uses, boundary games and 
then use Relevance to evaluate if they make sense. 
 
6.3 Boundary Games 
it’s to do with your intention when you are doing whatever is the communication that you are 
doing.  (Grace, Session #41) 
 
In developing the classification of possible ways to affect the boundary, I followed a 
deductive strategy. As such I started with a framework encompassing ideas from 
Language Games in philosophy and theories such as Boundary Critique and 
Relevance. The basic intuition is that intentions can trigger some dynamics of 
language and actions in relation to the boundary. I started the process conjecturing 
three intentions or operations on the boundary. 
 
One is the operation of enclosing something inside the boundary, designating the area 
relevant to tackle the issue. The second came inspired by Wittgenstein and is the idea 
that we can follow a rule, so we can “move” inside the area previously enclosed. 
 167 
Finally, sometimes we reject something because now it does not seem relevant 
anymore, so we erase the boundary. 
 
Based on this initial hypothesis, I started my empirical work, which included 
observing other people’ actions as well as reflecting about mine. I was following the 
idea of first and second person Action Research (Reason & Bradbury, 2006b). On the 
first I was looking forward to acting with awareness. On the second, I was exploring 
intent through “content and conduct” (Torbert, 2006, p.211). 
 
I was continuously comparing my observations, reflections and fragments of 
interactions with my initial conjectures. In the process, I tuned the ideas, created new 
“games” and in some cases I also disposed of them when the concepts did not fit with 
the observed interactions. It was a deductive process of formulating games and trying 
to falsify them. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Tuning games cycle. 
 
Although the language to describe these games is based on relevance theory as 
introduced in Chapter Four, there was a pair of guiding ideas for the process. One was 
to find by “convenience” a set of games (Wittgenstein, 2001, §569) to describe 
intention in relation to the boundary. The second was to find games, intentions useful 
from the point of view of intervention. This means finding “purposeful action[s] by … 
human agent[s] to create change (Midgley, 2000, p.113). In this case, the intentions 
that I am looking for were aiming to create changes on the boundary. 
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What kind of boundary is implied here? This question resonates with one that Wanda 
posed in my second feedback. She inquired if the boundaries that I was conceiving 
belonged to a group or an individual. Relevance let us consider both cases. In the case 
of an individual, the boundary of what is considered relevant in a situation (Midgley 
terminology) can be conceptualized as a private “cognitive environment” (Relevance 
terminology). In the case of a group of actors, the boundary can be seen as a social 
construct that encompasses the “mutual cognitive environment” shared with one 
another. In this light Midgley's intervention concept in the social realm can be 
paraphrased as purposeful action to modify and extend mutual cognitive environments. 
 
The fragments that were used to infer the games belonged to many different sessions. 
Here for convenience in this section the games are just defined. The order followed 
responds to didactic reasons. I consider the first the easiest to explain and the last the 
hardest. 
 
6.3.1 Following  
To act in agreement or compliance with; obey: follow the rules. (Following, n.d.) 
 
do you mean [they] are not following in terms of they do not understand, or they are not 
following because actually they do not agree? (Dianne, Session #41) 
 
The answer to Dianne’s question is that Following refers to the idea of understanding 
what has been said. When you understand you can produce a statement that is in 
agreement and compliance with the rules. However, this does not mean that people 
agree on what has been said. It is possible to explain what has been said, show other 
people that you “follow” the whole thing and afterwards explain why you do not 
agree on that. 
 
Following was one of my original games and perhaps the one that fewer 
transformations suffered in the research process. It was inspired by Wittgenstein’s 
idea of following the rules of a game.  Following presupposes that the rules are 
already present and, consequently, the boundary “around” them.     
 
As in any game the rules do not specify all the possible moves, but they make it 
possible to decide if a move is consistent with the rules. In terms of relevance, the 
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already present assumptions do not describe all the possible inferences. However, we 
can see if it is possible to infer the “move” from the mutual cognitive context. 
Following encompasses all the possible inferences on a given context. To be mutually 
manifest is what it is important in following. To be manifest “is to be perceptible or 
inferable” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p.39). For instance, it is unlikely that we had 
thought about the fact that Noam Chomsky and Julius Caesar never had breakfast 
together. However, is easily inferable and consequently, manifest (Sperber & Wilson, 
1995). 
 
Although this kind of action occurs inside the established boundary it still has some 
effects on the boundary as a whole. Following does not really have the aim of 
producing big cognitive effects. There is not new information that enables this. 
However, “the more a representation is processed, the more accessible it becomes. 
Hence, the greater the amount of processing involved in the formation of an 
assumption, and the more often it is accessed thereafter, the greater its accessibility” 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p.77). 
 
Greater accessibility implies a reduction in the cognitive effort applied. With less 
effort, there is an increase in the relevance of the rules. More relevant rules make a 
clearer stronger boundary. For the people involved it becomes easier to play the game. 
Following it also helps to make new connections and inferences between the already 
present information. 
 
The situation is shown in Figure 6.2. At the beginning, there is a boundary, next the 
Following of a movement inside the boundary is enacted, and finally as a 
consequence the boundary is clearer and stronger. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Following. 
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6.3.2 Enhancing 
To make greater, as in value, beauty, or effectiveness; augment. (Enhancing, n.d.) 
 
The intention behind Enhancing is, in principle, very similar to Following. Both 
games act in agreement with the established boundary. However, while in Following 
what is said is inferable from the mutual cognitive context, here new information is 
introduced. The new information is not inferable from what is already inside. 
Nevertheless, the new information let you infer new things, it helps to produce new 
and different Followings, without changing the core of the already established 
boundary. The idea of the game is to expand the boundary.   
 
The difference is also explainable in terms of relevance. While in Following the idea 
is to ease the effort required, here is about producing greater positive cognitive 
effects. The situation is shown in Figure 6.3. It starts with an already present 
boundary. Next, some new information is presented expanding the boundaries of what 
is seeming relevant. The final boundary covers more “ground” and because there are 
more cognitive effects, the boundary is more relevant hence the boundary is stronger. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3. Enhancing. 
 
Enhancing is similar to what Jackson (1991) calls an imperialist strategy. Here an 
idea is to have a problem-solving strategy as dominant. Next if some ideas from other 
strategies are seen as useful, they are subsumed inside the dominant strategy.  The 
strategy is Enhanced, its focus does not change, it only receives the help of new 
information producing more cognitive effects. 
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6.3.3 Wandering 
To go by an indirect route. (Wandering, n.d.) 
 
It is related to following (Frederick, Session #41)  
 
If it is identified as a negative then it reinforces the boundary and makes it more positive. 
(Administrative Assistant, Session #41) 
 
 
Wandering is related also to Following in a strange way. Again as in Following, the 
idea is to act in agreement with the established boundary. As in Enhancing it 
introduces new information. However, in Enhancing the new information becomes 
part of what is seen pertinent in the analysis. In Wandering the new information stays 
outside and is not relevant for the analysis. At the end the outcome is that the 
boundary becomes clearer in the same way as following. 
 
The reason that the boundary gets clearer is because Wandering is showing and 
making other people aware that the thing that is just said is in direct contrast with the 
boundary. On one side what has been said is not pertinent in the analysis. On the other 
side, it emphasises what is pertinent, hence the idea of indirect route, hence the idea of 
a negative element that reinforces the boundary. 
 
As in Following, Wandering works by reducing the cognitive effort required to 
produce the inferences.  This is shown in Figure 6.4.  First, it starts with an already 
present boundary.  Next, some new information is presented, but this information can 
be understood as a movement outside the boundary. The final boundary is more 
clearly defined because it becomes easier to identify where it lies. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4. Wandering. 
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6.3.4 Challenging 
call in question. (Challenging, n.d.) 
 
Up to this point, the role of the different boundary games has been to reinforce the 
boundary.  Challenging’s role is the contrary.  Challenging is to say that what it is 
inside the boundary is not pertinent for the issue at hand.   
 
Along with Following, Challenging was also present in my original hypothesis. Even 
so, my understanding of how it works changed greatly in the reflection process. I 
started with the hypothesis that this operation could erase the affected boundary. 
However: 
 
What the names signify must be indestructible; for it must be possible to describe the state of 
affairs in which everything destructible is destroyed.  And this description will contain words; 
and what corresponds to these cannot then be destroyed, for otherwise the words would have 
no meaning. (Wittgenstein, 2001, §55) 
 
Boundaries as names have meaning even when everybody accepts the Challenge and 
the previous boundary seems forgotten.  There is always the chance of “resurrecting” 
the boundary later.  
 
In order to Challenge both inside and outside boundary information can be used. The 
inside information is used to look for contradictions. Outside information looks to 
show that from a different perspective the selected boundary is problematic. 
Consequently, if the Challenge is from the outside a second external boundary is 
implied, if the Challenge is from the inside no other boundary is implied. 
 
From the point of view of relevance, Challenging reduces the positive cognitive 
implications or increases the processing effort required to operate inside the boundary.  
It shows that some previously accepted implications lack grounding, or new 
information shows that is not so easy to obtain the inferences.  
 
The situation is shown in Figure 6.5. It starts with the already present boundary, next, 
the boundary is called into question, fractured from the inside or/and outside, finally 
as a consequence the boundary gets weakened.   
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Figure 6.5. Challenging. 
 
6.3.5 Probing  
The act of exploring or searching with or as if with a device or instrument…An investigation 
into unfamiliar matters. (Probing, n.d.) 
 
Probing differs from all the games up to this point in relation to its inputs and effects.  
In all the others, it is easier to understand if the information comes from inside or 
outside of the boundary.  In all the others is easier to know if the boundary has been 
weakened or strengthened. Here none of these is clear.  Probing involves exploration 
and, consequently, it is very difficult to know what is going to be found. 
 
Probing can be executed when the boundary between the participants (the mutual 
cognitive environment) is not clear. “The boundaries of cognitive environments 
cannot be precisely determined, if only because the threshold between weakly 
manifest assumptions and inaccessible ones is unmarked” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, 
p.45).  If the threshold is fuzzy it is normal that someone will call attention to it in 
order to clarify it. 
 
However, there is another situation that deserves attention. This is when you probe 
and try to understand the patterns that underlie what is given. (Johnson, 2005). In both 
situations, the intention on the boundary can be understood as focusing on some 
aspect or “segment” to understand the potential of it. In both situations actors are 
looking forward to find “where” the boundary is. 
 
Because of the fuzziness of the situation, it is difficult to know if the area probed is 
inside or outside of the boundary. It is also difficult to understand the effect on the 
boundary. Sometimes the way the situation is probed can produce effects that mimic 
effects of all the other games. 
 174 
 
Consequently, the distinctive characteristic of Probing is the focusing on some area. 
One of the speakers calls attention to the problematic area. In some way it makes 
more relevant the area of the probing. The intention is to trigger a response to clarify 
the boundary. There is not an intention to change the boundary or the rules of the 
proposed boundary. The boundary is stable. You are just focusing in one “segment” of 
it. 
 
In Figure 6.6,  first there is an already defined boundary, next you are crossing the 
boundary, moving inside and/or outside, testing where it lies and next this part of the 
boundary gains relevance. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6. Probing. 
 
An easy way to show a Probing is when somebody has doubts about the relevance of 
something and asks about it. We do not have a way to know beforehand if what s/he 
asks is inside or outside of the boundary. Independently of the answer, what the 
question does is to focus the audience to consider the issue, and if it is very complex, 
a discussion can arise around this boundary “fragment”.   
 
6.3.6 Setting 
to establish for others to follow…to present as a model; place before others as a standard. 
(Setting, n.d.) 
 
As the word suggests, the idea is to establish some kind of rules or space and over it 
the other games and operations can be applied. Setting was also one of my original 
hypotheses and perhaps the one that is the most difficulty to characterize. Part of the 
difficulty is that I could not find criteria using relevance theory. 
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My first take on it was to think about an operation generating big contextual effects 
and easy to follow, almost like a combination of Following plus Enhancing. 
However, what Setting does is to say which rules or cognitive environment are going 
to be used to make the inferences. In this scenario, one can propose something new 
just to find that nobody understands or can follow what has been said. Consequently, 
what identifies setting a new boundary is not the amount of cognitive effects or 
easiness, although, taking these as guidelines it will be easier for others to see the 
relevance of the new game. 
 
The proposal here is to identify a new boundary by the kind of answers that are 
considered pertinent to the problem at hand. This space of answers carries implicit 
questions that make possible the identification of the boundary. As Garfinkel states: 
 
Attending to the questions rather than the answers and looking for the implicit question hiding 
behind the answer are a useful device for analyzing explanations and understanding historical 
shifts.  In general, epochs in history, the history of science or any other history, are marked as 
much by the questions they ask as by the answers that they give. (Garfinkel, 1981, p.8) 
 
Accordingly, the history of an intervention process can be considered as a succession 
of ideas or games responding to central questions. These questions change over times 
and correspond to the different boundaries settled. What marks the difference among 
the different questions in the process is “their practical point of view: they are 
oriented toward different purposes” (Garfinkel, 1981, p.11). 
 
If we follow the process and there is a change in the purpose pursued by the boundary 
presented, if the answers that are expected change at some point, this will mean that 
we are in front of a new boundary and a Setting game. 
 
Graphically (Figure 6.7), people do not trace boundaries from emptiness. There are 
always other boundaries from which to draw. Some of them are shared. They make 
part of mutual cognitive environments. Others are private cognitive environments. 
Private here does not necessarily mean that you are the only one with that knowledge. 
It only means that this knowledge is not shared with the other people in the specific 
interaction. 
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Next a boundary is traced taking elements from different boundaries effectively 
synthesising them under one boundary (similar to Midgley (1997) as explained in 
Section 2.5.2.3), and responding to a central question. Finally, the new created 
boundary is part of the mutual cognitive environment. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7. Setting. 
 
6.4 Using the Games to Describe Intervention’s Interactions 
6.4.1 Some Caveats 
One important idea in Relevance Theory is that “by producing an ostensive stimulus, 
the communicator therefore encourages her audience to presume that it is relevant 
enough to be worth processing.” (Wilson & Sperber, 2002a, p.256). This idea triggers 
two considerations for the understanding of the dynamics of interaction. One is that 
ostensive stimuli can include from words and phrases to body language and speaking 
tones. Therefore, these possibilities can be seen as worthy of processing by the 
audience. 
 
The other consideration is that everything in a conversation has the potential to cause 
effects. In a process of interaction the different parties have their intentions to change 
the cognitive environment of the others, and each party has their own set of 
assumptions that help them to make sense of what is being said. Then “as a discourse 
proceeds, the hearer retrieves or constructs and then processes a number of 
assumptions. These form a gradually changing background against which new 
information is processed. Interpreting an utterance involves more than merely 
identifying the assumption explicitly expressed: it crucially involves working out the 
consequences of adding this assumption to a set of assumptions that have themselves 
already been processed” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p.118). 
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Against all the changing backgrounds, I am proposing to organise and make sense of 
the movements in terms of the successive direction of intentions.  This direction can 
be seen by the way in which the games affect the boundary of what is relevant. At the 
heart of the approach is Sperber and Wilson’s (1995, p.254) idea of reflecting “a 
rather abstract property of the speaker’s informative intention: the direction in which 
the relevance of the utterance is to be sought”. 
 
From this it can be inferred that the possibility to produce effects on a boundary in an 
intervention does not depend on the actors following a methodology or any formalised 
tool. Effects can be achieved through using gestures, words, metaphors, phrases or 
methodologies, in short, engaging in language games. This shows that apart from 
methodologies, interventions can be told differently (Keys, 1997).  
 
6.4.2 An Illustration 
The following interaction segment is extracted from my first feedback. In it, I am 
mixing transcriptions and descriptions of the action. Wherever possible I prefer to use 
the transcription because it is not hiding elements used in the interpretation. However, 
sometimes the segments of interaction are too long to be presented here. 
Consequently, I opted for summarizing the actions in the interaction. 
 
I explicitly started my session in my first feedback explaining that the feedback was 
not only for TOP but also for me. The idea of doing the feedback could be understood 
as a first attempt to deliver on my agreement with TOP in 2005. However, I think that 
is better to understand this introduction as a Setting. 
 
There are two reasons for this. One is that the agreement was too distant in the past, 
increasing the effort required to process the information, so it does not have the 
condition of a Following. Second, I also introduced the idea of a feedback for me. 
This idea was new, so I was effectively drawing from an old shared boundary 
(feedback for them) and a personal boundary (feedback for me) and joining both ideas 
under a new boundary. 
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Next I stated that my presentation was covering three points, the first of which was 
the research protocol. With this statement, I was introducing new information relevant 
to a boundary. However, this boundary moved slightly. Before the concern was the 
tension feedback for them, feedback for me. Now the kind of expected answers are 
around three points. The boundary is still partly relying on the idea of the feedback. 
Consequently, the idea here is a Setting taking part of the old boundary and bringing 
new elements again. 
 
I also moved the boundary for a new Setting operation when I talked about the 
difficulties that I experienced due to language, culture and the lack of general 
background in understanding their activities.  The same operation on the boundary 
continued when I gave special importance to my efforts to avoid obstructing or 
disrupting TOP’s work with my questions.     
 
When I described how I restrained my questions and how lucky I felt when somebody 
asked the question that was in my mind, a new operation appeared: Enhancing. The 
central question still was to avoid disrupting their activities. However, I was giving 
new elements to expand and strengthen the boundary that I was establishing. 
 
The group reacted to my descriptions laughing, something that I interpret as a 
Following and in a lesser degree an Enhancing. They were acknowledging the 
information, signalling that they understood the context that I was presenting and in 
turn making such a boundary more relevant. It is also Enhancing because previously 
the information that they were understanding and with a good disposition towards my 
intervention was not present. Knowing the good reception enables possibilities of 
interaction that differ from the possibilities in a bad reception. 
 
Next I talked about interviews. I explained that the space of the office that I was 
sharing with them was not appropriate for conducting the interviews, so that when I 
was interviewing someone other people were stepping into the conversation. I 
suggested that as a matter of protocol it was better to have those interviews in a closed 
space with a well-defined and rigid timeframe. Again I emphasised that I did not want 
to disrupt. 
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Although the topic here is about interviews, I classify this move not as a Setting but 
an Enhancing. The reason: the topic was introduced to support the idea of looking for 
ways to avoid possible disruptions to TOP's work. Consequently, the “answers” are 
still focused to the same “question”. 
 
Next this conversation took place:   
 
(1:) Jorge: “Do you think it is sensible this measure?”   
(2:) Frederick: “Probably we will talk over the limit anyway”.   
(3:) Dianne:  “About the other day, that is all right with me, because we went over the 10 
minutes!! Laughs”   
(4:) Jorge: “I have notice that with everybody, I go for just a moment and people keep talking 
and talking.  At some point I get stressed because the conversation is taking too long” 
(5:) Dianne: “Ohh, nooo”   
(6:) Jorge: “On the other hand, I got excited because I was telling myself what nice 
information I am getting”   
 
Asking in (1) about my approach was a way to Probe the boundary, a way to call into 
attention the information that I gave and trying to see if we were understanding each 
other. Frederick in (2) Settled a new boundary. My boundary was focused in 
exploring how to minimize disruption. Frederick's boundary acknowledged the 
possibility of disruption but minimized the importance of it. It is interesting to notice 
that Frederick also accomplished weakening my boundary by creating a new one 
without troubling himself with Challenging. 
 
Dianne in (3) introduced new information but supported the point made by Frederick. 
Consequently, she was Enhancing the boundary. 
 
In (4), I was introducing more information inside the boundary concerned with 
avoiding disruption, Enhancing the possibilities from this point of view. At the same 
time, I was using this boundary to test the boundary distinguished by Frederick. I 
wanted to be sure that there were no concerns about these long conversations. 
Therefore, I was also Probing. 
 
In (5), although “ohh, nooo” is a very short utterance, it can be seen as accomplishing 
two operations. On one side, it was Challenging my boundary, weakening the idea of 
my concerns were founded. On the other side, it was agreeing with Frederick's 
boundary reinforcing it through a Following, making easier to consider this boundary. 
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In (6) I am relaxed about how they are seeing the issue, so I Enhanced Frederick's 
boundary explaining why it was good for me. 
 
Notice that this behaviour where the same spoken token have multiple effects is 
expected if these games behave as Leech's (1983) pragmatic principles as presented in 
Chapter Three. Consequently, the different games can potentially reinforce and even 
conflict among themselves. They also can be contravened, and, nevertheless, they are 
in some way guiding the dynamic. 
 
Through this illustration, it had been shown so far Setting, Following, Enhancing, 
Probing and Challenging. There is one operation that is missing from this interaction 
segment: Wandering. Wandering seems to appear frequently in the way of jokes. For 
instance, after the last illustration we continued discussing matters of participant 
observation in the setting and how my observations of the natural dynamics were 
unsettling for some people. 
 
In this context: 
 
(7:) Mark: “I did not tell anyone but the title of Jorge’s thesis will be The Office” 
(Laughs) 
 
When Mark referred to “The Office”, he meant the British TV social satire comedy 
about the day-to-day lives of office employees. The comments didn’t stop there.  They 
elaborated on the joke by matching some of the characters of this comedy series with 
some of TOP’s members and the situations.  After the series of jokes, the tension 
about my observations eased.  From the perspective of the boundary games that I am 
proposing, the situation can be characterised in the following way: 
 
In (7) there is new information, but that information is outside of what is relevant to 
the boundary that is being discussed. However, the new information does not pretend 
to displace the old information inside the boundary. The boundary that was being 
discussed gets strengthened and appears more relevant to deal with the situation by 
contrast with what was said in (7). 
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One additional and interesting issue here is that although the new information is not 
used to overthrow the old one, a new boundary is created. In this case Mark's 
comments were the base to make other people Follow and Enhance the information 
on this new boundary. At the end this new boundary stood just as a contrast of what is 
not being pursued. 
 
6.5 Drawing Guidelines for Intervention  
As happened with language games in the last chapter, from Relevance it is also 
possible to derive some guidelines in order to intervene.  Some guidelines derive 
directly from the concept of relevance. First, if we want to have an effect the 
communication needs to be relevant: possible to connect to the audience's background 
and requiring small processing effort.  Without this intention’s roles of helping, 
making sense of the situations and coordinating the actions of the different actors are 
hindered. 
 
Additional guidelines derive from the Boundary Games framework just presented. 
The idea is that in a language game, it is possible, in principle, to affect the boundary 
in at least the six ways proposed here. Frederick in feedback 2 asked me if those six 
were families of strategies that they were using, or if they were language games. It can 
be argued that they work as both. The main idea is that they can be used as a way to 
read a situation and reflect on the intentions and the effects that actors want to achieve 
on the boundary. 
 
I have derived two other guidelines which reflect on a situation from which TOP 
wanted some feedback: the problem of passing each other. It was already explained 
that TOP was a multidisciplinary team. Their backgrounds involved many fields of 
knowledge. Consequently, it was common for them to explain to each other some 
issues, and to feel that they reached agreements on the topics just to discover later that 
everybody had a different “agreement” in mind. 
 
From the relevance perspective, there is an explanation to this phenomenon. People 
do not manage just one context to interpret new information.  Focusing on the 
receiver, the idea is that identifying which assumption is more relevant for her/him 
 182 
requires finding a context for interpretation. “People hope that the assumption being 
processed is relevant (or else they would not bother to process it at all), and they try to 
select a context which will justify that hope: a context which will maximise 
relevance” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p.142). The selected context will enable to get 
the maximum cognitive effects using a minimum effort. The context is not given; it is 
a variable. 
 
As a result, I can explain some idea, but it is my audience who chooses in which of 
their contexts it makes sense for them. For that reason, you can have a situation in 
which everybody said that everything is clear, that they are connecting what has been 
said to their background. The problem is that we do not know under which context the 
ideas are making sense. As Wanda posed in feedback 2, “there is a difference between 
connection and shared meanings”. 
 
Two guidelines can be proposed to manage the issue of passing each other. 
 
First: follow Midgley and Ochoa-Arias’s (2001, p.641) advice of surfacing “at least 
two contrasting interpretations of problematic phenomena”. “The surfacing process 
can and should be enhanced by exploring different possible boundary judgements”. 
Midgley and Ochoa-Arias are concerned with giving the opportunity to different 
stakeholders to present their views and address in this way the problem of power 
relations suppressing voices. It seems to assume that despite the presence of a conflict, 
the boundaries are clear and no confusion is possible. However, it can be argued 
another take on this approach from Relevance's perspective. 
 
As it has been explained, relevance is a comparative criterion. Accordingly, it is 
difficult to perceive the implication of something if there is only one boundary within 
which to operate. Having more than one allows for contrasting and for a better 
understanding of their respective implications. 
 
This is not restricted to a particular set of methods. For instance, on the field, Hannah 
in my first interview (session #22), showed that one of her strengths was to be 
bicultural.  She was western educated but later she studied Māori culture in depth.  
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She believes that thanks to this double exposure, she could mediate and understand 
different points of view in the workshops. 
 
Second: combine different boundary games in the intervention. Iteratively changing 
games make easier to test if everybody is on the same page. If cognitive environments 
of all those involved are tested when the assumption is explained, connected with 
others, debated, called into attention or with its emphasis shifted, it becomes easier to 
accept that they are on the same page when everybody accepts to be on the same page. 
It also helps to avoid lucky followings, those interactions in which it seems that 
people deliver the right behaviour without really understanding what it is behind the 
ideas. 
 
An additional benefit is that it also makes the process a healthier one. For instance, I 
witnessed meetings in which the amount of Settings was very high in relation to other 
kinds of games. The consequence was that there were no stable boundaries on which 
to build. Once something was built it was immediately blurred by new boundaries on 
top. 
 
However, there is a caveat. The idea is not to eradicate the variety of possible contexts 
useful to understand an assumption. The idea is to realise that those possible contexts 
are present and in this way improve understanding. The variety of possible contexts 
can be used then to enrich a dynamic. For instance, in my first feedback I was 
explaining the difference between constructing knowledge from a written form and in 
oral form from the literary perspective of Ong (1982). TOP did not stick to my use.  
They turned those ideas to talk about reporting, emailing, writing articles, articulating 
the work of the group, and talking about cultural archetypes. 
 
6.6  Boundary Games and Boundary Critique Theory 
At the beginning of this chapter it was argued that the most coherent way to 
understand boundaries with the aims of this research in MS/ST was the work of 
Churchman, Ulrich and Midgley. Now I will make some reflections on Boundary 
Games and its possible contribution to Boundary Critique Theory. 
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Ulrich (1983, p.325) shows that Churchman’s work presents a shift in how to 
conceptualise intervention. “The crucial task then is not one of providing analytic 
tools such as social indicators, simulation models, etc., but rather dialectic tools to 
help the planner reflect on his designs, and enter into reasonable discourse with the 
affected”.  It can be argued that Boundary Games is a dialectic tool that helps the 
planner not necessarily to reflect on his design, but with engaging a reasonable 
discourse with the affected. 
 
The dialectic tool proposed by Ulrich is the Boundary Critique.  It “aims to make 
visible the ways in which any specific claim is conditioned by boundary judgements 
and how the facts and values it asserts change when the boundary judgements are 
modified” (Ulrich, 2003, pp.333–334).  Boundary Games is not exactly an approach 
to Boundary Critique. However, it helps to make explicit the modes of actions used to 
present the claim. It helps to show also the action taken to modify the boundary. 
 
Boundary Games is a tool that potentially can enable the practitioner to have constant 
reflection on the intervention process. This is an important component of Boundary 
Critique.  Accordingly, to Ulrich (2003, p.337) “The only way to achieve this 
[reflective practice] is to make emancipatory boundary critique an intrinsic, non-
separable part of any use of methods and of any claims to knowledge or rationality”. 
Midgley’s (2000, p.129) Systemic Intervention also considers in his approach the 
need to put the reflection of boundaries at the core: “purposeful action by an agent to 
create change in relation to reflection on boundaries”. 
 
Boundary Games can be used to reflect on the intended effects on the boundary 
during the actual interaction with the participants in an intervention process. It is 
proposing new tools to evaluate the situation. To understand how it differs from 
Ulrich’s and Midgley’s work let us give a brief description of some of their ideas. 
 
Ulrich (1983) assesses the boundary of a system through twelve critical questions. 
The questions explore sources of motivation, control, expertise and legitimisation. 
Each of the questions is posed in is and ought mode, enabling contrast and critical 
evaluation of the current system. Ulrich (2003) sees these questions as fundamental 
before engaging in intervention with other methodologies. 
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Midgley (2000) focuses on the problem of marginalisation. He shows how in some 
situations, groups that make wider appreciations of a situation have the risk of being 
marginalised by groups with narrower views. In these situations, there is a primary 
boundary with valued elements while the elements marginalised are devalued (Figure 
6.8). In this situation conflict can arise from the clash of two groups of values. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8. Marginalisation from Midgley (2000, p.143). 
 
Although Ulrich and Midgley are advocates of reflecting about the boundaries 
throughout the whole intervention process, their approaches seem more appropriate 
for a diagnosis of the situation. It is performed at the onset of a situation and lets you 
understand where the boundaries of the situation are. The Boundary Games approach 
provides additional perspectives that are not committed to a certain point in time.  
Boundary games can show the dynamics of a situation and how, with every 
communication, the boundary is affected through the whole intervention process.  In 
this regard Ulrich’s and Midgley’s proposals seem more static. 
 
Another difference is that Ulrich and Midgley seem to “value” some kind of data 
(e.g., what is asked in the twelve questions) as more important to define the boundary. 
Boundary Games assume that any kind of data when put into use will affect the 
boundary.  The two mentioned differences give an advantage to Boundary Games to 
trace what happens in the process.  A possible weakness is that the potential amount 
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of data can be overwhelming.  After all it is possible to think about the implications of 
each word expressed in the context.   
 
Another issue useful to differentiate my approach is the problem of when to stop the 
expansion of the Boundary. As it was shown earlier in this chapter, according to 
Churchman, there is not really a final answer for the boundary of the system. For this 
reason, it is fundamental to question those boundaries in the planning process. 
Churchman’s assumption is that a narrow conception of the problem implies a small 
boundary. The small boundary is represented by considering a relatively small group 
of stakeholders and issues. In this scenario, many potentially important issues are left 
outside, and therefore it is difficult to make sound decisions. The answer to the 
problem from Churchman’s perspective is to “sweep in”, to explore and expand the 
boundary further in order to take into account more elements in the analysis. In this 
way, more informed and ethical decisions can be reached. 
 
However, from Ulrich’s (1983) point of view the way in which Churchman “sweeps 
in” is problematic because in theory the process of expanding the boundary never 
ends. Ulrich (1983, p.23) argues that “no theoretical solution to the problem of 
practical reason can be both critical and practicable. An approach to “rational” 
planning that is both critical and practicable is thereby necessarily a merely heuristic 
approach”.  It is therefore, necessary to stop the “sweep in” process at some point with 
the aim of practicality.   
 
The Theory of Relevance gives us heuristic criteria for stopping the process of 
“sweeping in”.  If the boundary stops being relevant, that is, if with the new “swept 
in” elements the actors cannot make connections or the processing effort become too 
big, it will be pointless to continue that route. 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has proposed a way to understand and look at one of the faces of 
intention stipulated in Chapter Four: doing things intentionally, the present-directed 
intentions. This way is based on looking at the effects of communication and as 
Relevance Theory proposes, it can be assumed then that these effects were intended, 
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because actors make efforts to make them relevant.  Since the effects are intended, 
they are important for making sense of what different actors are doing and as the 
conversations develop, fundamental to the coordination of actions. 
 
In order to establish a point of reference to describe the effects, it was proposed to mix 
the ideas of relevance with the concept of boundary in systems thinking. Boundary is 
fundamental here because is providing a point of contact with MS/ST and Boundary 
Critique Theory literature. In this literature, boundaries are connected with the way in 
which an intervention is conducted and what methodologies are chosen. 
 
Six intentions, operations, games, strategies or ways in which actors can affect a 
boundary were proposed: Setting, Challenging, Wandering, Following, Enhancing 
and Probing. It is proposed that they behave as pragmatic principles, so in general 
they work in different degrees and can be mixed. It is also proposed that they can be 
used as a way to describe a dynamic and also to reflect on intervention processes. 
 
Finally, it was shown how the ideas on Boundary Games can enrich Boundary 
Critique Theory. It provides an approach for constantly reflecting on the effects of 
each of our actions on the boundary. This approach, contrary to what has been 
previous in Boundary Critique Theory, shows how any piece of interaction or 
information can have effects on the boundary. Furthermore, it shows that possible 
criteria to stop boundary expansion need to take into account limits by the cognitive 
processing effort.   
 
After presenting one face of intention, the next chapter deals with the other face: 
future-directed intentions. 
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Chapter 7 Intending to Do Things 
The last chapter explored the first face of intention, “we do things intentionally”. I 
proposed a way to understand the present-directed side of intention based on 
Relevance theory and system boundaries.  This chapter focuses on the second face of 
intention, the future-directed part: “we intend to do things” (Bratman, 1984, p.375). 
Additionally, it discusses intention’s roles of guiding, sustaining and causing action, 
roles that were not explored in relation to the present-directed part.  As in the last 
chapter, this is part of the discussion of data and implications of what I found and also 
combines philosophy, theory and empirical work. 
 
Specifically this chapter is underpinned by two components.  The first one involves 
my experiences during my Action Research involvement with TOP.  The second 
comprises the different philosophical approaches to intention in philosophy of action 
introduced in Chapter Four: the belief-desire, the pro attitude toward plans, the 
trajectory of actions and the complex adaptive system. 
 
These two components are brought together through the use of first and second person 
inquiry (Reason & Bradbury, 2006b). These methodological tools from Action 
Research allow me to integrate reflections about my intention, other’s people 
intention and philosophy of action.  In other words, I was using the knowledge gained 
in my readings of the field of Philosophy of Action to reflect about my experiences in 
the field. 
 
This chapter is organised as a succession of reflection cycles.  Each builds on the 
preceding one, expanding the range of ideas comprised by the concept of intention 
(Figure 7.1). At each step of the process, the aim is to find an approach to understand 
intention in a way coherent with both, what I witnessed in TOP and about myself. The 
purpose is to find a notion of intention useful for understanding intervention, taking 
advantage of the two intervention contexts (me on TOP, TOP on their project). 
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Figure 7.1. Cycles building the understanding of intention. 
 
The first reflection cycle at the beginning of the chapter shows what I learnt about 
intention through my involvement with TOP.  Next, in a second cycle I contrast what 
I learnt in cycle one, with different approaches to intention in philosophy of action.  In 
the third and last cycle, I show how the different lessons of the preceding cycles can 
be integrated under the complexity theory approach to intention. Before the chapter’s 
conclusions, some methodological implications for practice and Boundary Critique 
Theory are presented. 
 
7.1 First Cycle: What I learnt About Intention in the Field 
The reflections presented in this section were produced during my involvement with 
TOP.  They represent three issues that I found important for my understanding of 
intentions: 1) it is difficult to name them, 2) how knowing what you do not want to 
do, helps to give you a direction and an intention of what you do want to do, and 3) 
how not acting can also be intentional. 
 
Although realising these issues involved using philosophy of action, I was not looking 
at the time to challenge the different approaches to intention in this philosophical 
branch.  It was more about learning the vocabulary of the field and using it to describe 
and reflect about different experiences regarding intention. 
 
Because I used first and second person inquiry during my fieldwork to reflect about 
intentions, the data comes from two sources.  On one side, I was the research object, I 
was experiencing situations and reflecting about the role of my own intention on them 
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through my involvement with TOP, especially on my feedback to them.  On the other 
side, I witnessed how TOP engaged with their project process. This allowed me to 
reflect about their intentions through their interactions in their meetings but also 
during my interviews, and in their reactions to my feedback. 
 
The issues presented in this first cycle are not resolving the issue of how to understand 
intention.  However, in the light of my experience, these issues need to be explained 
for meeting the purpose of finding an approach useful for MS/ST intervention. 
 
7.1.1 Sometimes is Difficult to Know What Do You Intend 
I started the inquiry of how my intention was shaping my actions in the field under the 
assumption that identifying a concrete intention for the actor performing the action in 
a situation was easy.  However, both my own reflections and TOP’s testimony point 
out that this is not always the case.  
 
Although this situation looks similar to that described in Section 4.2.1, there is a big 
difference. There, it was about how for an observer is difficult to define if an action 
was intentional. Here is the very same actor embedded in the situation, the one that is 
having the problem knowing what her/his intention is.  
 
How I arrived at this conclusion is shown in three parts. The first one shows the 
process of inquiring about my own intention.  The second looks to contrast this with 
TOP´s views.  The last one deals with the implications that the difficulty of identifing 
intentions has for the research. 
 
7.1.1.1 Looking to Figure out my intention 
As an aid to help me with the understanding and identification of intentions, I 
developed a checklist of categories derived from philosophy of action as mentioned in 
Section 5.6.1. The categories covered issues and factors that some authors saw as 
basic constituents of intention, or that they were helping to propel, define or hinder 
those intentions.     
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I applied the checklist to reflect about my intention, especially before and after my 
second and third feedback. One of the things that I was looking for through this 
process was to understand more clearly what my intention was.  I considered these 
research events ideal for the purpose of clarifying intention. I felt that I could be more 
focused on thinking about my intention. This was so, because by that time I was 
already settled in the field, and I felt that thanks to the experience gained in the first 
feedback, my awareness towards the concept of intention was more developed.     
 
I found two approaches to intention particularly attractive to help me define my 
intention: The belief-desire model and the pro attitude to plans.  Based on them I 
derived categories such as belief, desire and plans. 
 
Trying to clarify intention by the way of belief and desire is assuming, as this 
approach does, that intentions are reducible to these more basic concepts.  In myself, I 
identified some basic desires such as: working for my identity as a researcher, 
receiving feedback on the ideas presented, and looking to improve their practice.   
 
When trying to couple it with the accompanying belief I got into trouble.  The very 
question puzzled me, and I could not find how to articulate an answer. This is 
problematic because without an accompanying belief, desire is not much use.  It is the 
relationship between belief and desire that propels the intention (Davis, 1997). Belief 
offers a confidence condition, that your action will mark a difference (Mele, 1997a). 
In the absence of this condition, from Enç’s (2003) perspective I was not intending 
but merely trying.  
 
In addition, I considered that my desires were quite vague, not at all useful to guide 
action.  The problem of how to manage the feedback to TOP involved some complex 
situations, and I could not see how the vague desire and unknown belief could be 
sustaining or producing my actions through this.  This makes me accept Bratman's 
(1987) critique, stating how the interaction between belief and desire is insufficient to 
manage complex issues.   
 
When considering the concept of plans, the situation seemed on firmer ground. 
However, was I planning? With regard to plans, I can mention my research 
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methodology (Chapter Three) and more specifically the preparation of some 
guidelines for my feedbacks.  I saw them comparable to a plan. The guidelines were 
loosely indicating the points that I wanted to convey, some possible criticism that 
TOP could raise, as well as my counter arguments, and also a list of situations that 
were better to avoid. 
 
My guidelines were useful and not rigid. The fact that they were not rigid does not 
pose a problem according to Bratman (1987).  He understands that plans constantly 
change at both the micro and the macrolevel. This matched my experiences. For 
instance, regarding the microlevel, in the middle of the feedback, prefigured sections 
for the session were renamed, erased or created according to what I perceived as the 
needs of the session.  Furthermore, at the macrolevel, especially at the beginning of 
my involvement, I formulated overarching plans that changed or disappeared 
according to the demands of the context. 
 
However, having the plan in front of my eyes and asking myself about the intention in 
it was again not helping me to understand what could be my answer.  Later, in a more 
careful reading of Bratman, I realise that he was not really equating a plan with 
intention.  He was pointing out that intention is something that is compelling you to 
carry out your plan. This put me in despair about the possibility of finding out about 
my intention. 
 
Additionally, plans did not seem suitable to explain all my actions. For instance, on 
some occasions I acted impulsively without a plan. For example, when TOP was 
preparing workshops for the subproject on water caring, they were making 
contradictory demands about my participation.  I felt that some of the people in the 
group were asking me to participate actively giving ideas.  However, I also felt that 
some people were opposing this. I never consciously took a decision of what to do 
about this tension.  Yet, in one of the meetings without mediating a plan, I felt an 
opportunity to speak up on the topic, and I expressed my discomfort. 
 
There I just acted even to my surprise without visible connection to a plan. Under 
Bratman (1987), because I did not plan to follow a plan I was not acting intentionally. 
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Nevertheless, I felt that I was acting coherently with let us say in the absence of a 
better word with myself.   
 
Another issue that bothered me was that there were cases in which I defined a plan.  I 
believe on it, I wrote about the way in which I was going to follow it, I was convinced 
that I was going to follow it, but at the end nothing happened. I found later that this 
case was already mentioned by Mele (1992). However, it was still a puzzle not 
understanding why this could happen. 
 
I tried to make sense of all the aforementioned reflections to understand my intention.  
However, I went more confused. The situation was comparable to the story of a 
centipede trying to understand how to manage all its legs and getting so confuse that 
was unable to walk. Adding elements to think about intention seemed like extra legs 
to take care about. 
 
The problems understanding my own intention led me to think that perhaps I lacked 
the rigor or clarity of mind to really understand my intention and the concepts 
surrounding it.  As a way to cross check my feeling and doubts I turned to TOP’s take 
on intention. 
 
7.1.1.2 TOP’s take on Intention 
I focused on TOP’s preparation of workshops for the Evaluation Case Study.  The 
work that I saw was a very conscious one.  For instance, before starting their 
engagement, they devoted four meetings to plan their involvement.  These meetings 
covered a wide range of issues such as defining purposes, choosing the participants, 
the tools and conceptual underpinnings of the work. 
 
However, when asked on the interviews about beliefs, desires and plans, they also 
experienced difficulties identify them. A huge difference thought, is that while I was 
hoping to make sense of these concepts in relation to their work, they were sceptical 
about their impact or even presence. 
 
 194 
For instance, Frederick could not see his intentions affecting his actions. He 
questioned whether intentions were something at the level of the actor, or it was a 
social phenomenon. He joked in my second interview that perhaps his difficulty to 
identify his intentions was due to being a “sloppy thinker” (session #48). He even half 
joked saying that the only intention that he could identify was to avoid embarrassing 
himself.  
 
Dianne's stance went beyond that. At the end of my second feedback she suggested 
that the work that they were carrying out was not intentional but “ad hoc” (session 
#41). Furthermore, she complained frequently about the lack of rigor in their research.  
I understand this last comment not as a statement that they were not actually preparing 
for the workshops, but as a manifestation of her dissatisfaction with the difference 
between what was planned and what was actually performed.  The plan was not 
working. 
 
7.1.1.3 Implications 
I am not discarding the possibility that on some occasions you can be clear about your 
intention. However, overall, in my involvement neither I nor TOP was clear about 
intention after reflecting on the categories drawn from philosophy of action. How was 
I to make sense of this? I considered three possibilities. 
 
Perhaps it was a problem of sloppiness just as Frederick suggested about himself.  
Perhaps this was also applying to me.  However, I resisted that interpretation, 
especially for two reasons. First, because I saw how much effort TOP was applying to 
prepare the meetings. Second, because my own feedback to TOP was seen as useful 
by them and although the issues that I used for it were very likely to produce conflict, 
I was managing to avoid it. My actions were definitely not random. 
 
The other possibility was that, after all, naming or recognising an intention is not an 
indispensable characteristic of the phenomenon.  At the time in which I was 
contemplating the issue, I was not aware of literature supporting this idea.  However, 
much later I discover that Gibbs (2001, p.106) warns us that the notion of the content 
of intention as something that “must be mentally represented” is problematic. 
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However, if you cannot identify what intentions are, how can it be said that they are 
guiding, sustaining and causing action? How can you intend to do something? In fact, 
how actors can make a difference in an intervention process?  The next section starts 
to give hints about how that can be possible. 
 
7.1.2 You can Intend to do Something by Construing What You Do 
Not Intend 
The difficulties in realising what my intention as, described in the sections above, put 
me on the path of disbelief about my own research for a while. However, I started to 
see a different path for the research thanks to something that I observed in the 
changing relationship between TOP and its Advisory Group. 
 
In a nutshell, it was the issue of how they were avoiding certain paths of action.  
Although different from intending to do something, intending not to do it was in my 
perception definitely intentional.  I have divided the discussion of this, describing first 
the situation at TOP, next introducing an interpretation using Philosophy of Action, 
and finally exploring some implications.   
 
7.1.2.1 The situation 
In Chapter Five, the Advisory was presented as a group of people advising TOP about 
ways to make their research more useful and relevant for New Zealand. This was, in 
fact, how Mark saw its role previously to their formal interaction with them. 
However, the nature of the relationship changed after the first Advisory session at the 
end of 2005. Although I was not yet based at TOP's town, my second visit to TOP 
coincided with their preparations for the first meeting with the Advisory. 
 
Most of the preparation time was used on discussing the nature of their relationship 
with the Advisory, not on the actual preparation for the meeting. When they first 
confronted the Advisory they saw an Advisory conceiving its role as monitoring. 
Additionally they saw a group of people drive by strong interests.  TOP was not 
prepared for an engagement on those terms. What happened inside that meeting is not 
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clear for me, but I have the impression that TOP was questioned on some key points, 
and at the time they were not ready with answers. 
 
It felt as though after the meeting TOP’s standing weakened in the eyes of the 
Advisory, threatening in the worst-case scenario to make TOP lose control over their 
research. One of the consequences of this “failed” meeting is that since then, every 
encounter with the Advisory required several meetings to plan, rehearse and revise the 
session.   
 
It was even suggested changing the nature of their relationship with them. In March 
2006 (session #8), Frederick, for instance, suggested “I mean why we cannot consider 
working with the Advisory as an intervention?” The idea was accepted without 
problems.  However, when it was first suggested before the “infamous” meeting in 
2005, the very same idea was emphatically rejected. 
 
From the overall situation, I want to focus now on the preparation of presentations for 
their meetings with the Advisory. The dynamics were simple. Someone in TOP 
worked out a presentation, usually accompanied by some slides. Afterwards, this 
person rehearsed the presentation while the rest of the team commented on it. There 
were comments ranging from the merely aesthetic to the theoretical and philosophical. 
Some of the comments were concerned about the possible reactions of the Advisory to 
the content of the presentation. They even explored different reactions leading to 
positive and negative scenarios. 
 
In many cases, the protagonists in these scenarios were named. This allows them to 
consider the background of those persons in designing careful wording of the ideas 
presented. They were aware that some terms could guide people inferences in 
undesired directions and contexts. As a result, they were careful to shape their actions 
to direct the Advisory inferences in a favourable direction for TOP's research. 
 
As can be inferred from my last paragraph my first approach to this kind of event was 
through Relevance Theory. In fact, this kind of event reinforced my confidence in the 
approach that I took in Chapter Six. However, it also made me reflect on a concept in 
philosophy of action: wayward chains. 
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7.1.2.2 Avoiding Courses of Action Or Avoiding Wayward Chains 
Wayward chains, as already introduced in Section 4.2.1, is a concept in Philosophy of 
Action that refers to those sequences of actions or events that deviate from the 
prefigured course that the actor has in mind.  Regarding TOP presentations to the 
advisory, it is useful to consider the differences between Figure 4.1 (wayward chain) 
and Figure 7.2.  Here two important differences can be seen. The first one is the 
timeline. In traditional wayward chains (Figure 4.1) philosophers are discussing based 
on past events if the outcome was intentional. In Figure 7.2 TOP is engaged in the 
process of predicting reactions to the presentation. They are thinking about the future. 
 
The second difference is that in Figure 4.1, the outcome was the same for both chains 
of events. In Figure 7.2, there are different deviations (black and red), and people are 
concerned with those deviations pushing TOP's research to different undesirable 
grounds. In many cases, the action triggering the wayward chain was removed or 
adapted to avoid the problem. The process that they were carrying out is simplified in 
Figure 7.2.  The real process involved the exploration of many possible branches and 
sub branches. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2. Presentations and possible wayward chains. 
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7.1.2.3 Implications 
In relation to intention, two aspects of these wayward chains and deviations were 
important for the development of my understanding. First, although for the team it 
was difficult to understand what they were intending, they did not have problems 
recognising the risk involved in the deviations. Fiddling with their planned actions in 
order to avoid those undesirable chains was for me evidence of an intention. 
 
Second, when they were exploring the wayward chains, they seemed more able to 
guide and control the course of actions. Usually if they were not exploring those 
deviations, once in the field it was more difficult for them to know how to react to 
changing conditions. For instance, TOP’s first meeting with the Advisory is a good 
example of this. In later meetings, when a great effort was put on rehearsing and 
polishing the meetings, and exploring possible deviations, negative experiences were 
minimised. 
 
As was already explained guiding and controlling are aspects associated with the role 
of intentions. In a way actions in which different chains of actions were explored 
seemed more intentional.  They were not sure about where to guide events, but they 
constrained the situation avoiding undesired directions. 
 
I applied what I saw in TOP for my second and third feedbacks. In fact, the wayward 
chains of actions become part of my checklist of reflections before delivering the 
feedback. I was making myself aware of potential deviations and how they could 
jeopardize my deliveries. 
 
I think that this kind of preparation helped me to react fast when I saw problems in 
how people were interpreting the content of my presentations. Additionally it made 
me more aware of how certain group’s moods and how previous events in the 
meetings could be problematic for the content that I was looking forward to delivering 
in my presentations. In those occasions, I constrained myself and cut or adapted 
potentially problematic content on the move. 
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7.1.3 You Also Intend when You Decide Not to Act 
Intentions are a powerful explanatory device, and they are such because we attribute 
them causal power (Davidson, 1963; Enç, 2003; Risjord, 2005).  Consequently, an 
important body of work in Philosophy of Action centres on how intentions produce 
actions. Not much work is done on how intentions can be present on non acting. 
 
However, my reflections on events in the field led me to consider inaction as an 
important part of the intention puzzle. Two cases were particularly clear to me. The 
first case refers to the delivery of my first feedback. In it, partly because of my 
language games framework, partly because of my limitations of language and 
knowledge of the context, I was giving very short explanations on issues, and I was 
letting the participants elaborate on those explanations. 
 
I only intervened if the person elaborating at this point deviated from the ideas that I 
wanted to communicate. If their elaborations and inferences matched what I wanted to 
convey, I did not bother to interfere. I thought that it was even more convenient if 
they could  explain, follow, and elaborate the ideas among themselves. In a way I was 
intentionally not acting here. 
 
My second case, already introduced in Section 5.3.2, makes reference to the space 
allocated to my feedback.  According to my arrangement with TOP, my feedback was 
to be delivered in their reflective sessions.  However, after my first feedback, people 
were not allocating time for this activity so basically this kind of session disappeared. 
 
I did not mention to the group the fact that with the sessions the space for my 
feedbacks also disappeared. I decided not to act. I did this because I felt that the 
situation favoured me. I did not want to risk the success reached with my first 
feedback, and around that time I was struggling with many doubts about the concept 
of intention. My decision can be judged right or wrong but the important fact in this 
argument is that TOP seemed unaware of the fact, and although I was aware of it, I 
remained deliberately silent. It could be argued that deciding to remain silent is a kind 
of action.   
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However, it can also be argued that my intention was not producing or causing any 
movement. This is problematic because most of the Philosophy of Action is based on 
the idea that intentions have causal powers. However, Frankfurt argues that “Despite 
its popularity… the causal approach is inherently implausible and that it cannot 
provide a satisfactory analysis of the nature of action… From the fact that an event is 
an action, in my view, it does not follow even that it has a cause or causes at all, much 
less that it has causal antecedents of any specific type” (Frankfurt, 1997, p.42). 
 
To illustrate the idea, he proposes a case that resembles my experiences. “A driver 
whose automobile is coasting downhill in virtue of gravitational forces alone may be 
entirely satisfied with its speed and direction, and so he may never intervene to adjust 
its movement in any way”. (Frankfurt, 1997, p.48). 
 
This position raised another question for an approach to intention. Asking about the 
role of intention on intervention seems to imply that you need to perform some action 
in order to produce some effect.  How then can one describe an intention 
accomplishing something when we are not performing any action? 
 
7.2 Second Cycle: Enriching what I learnt about Intention 
through the Philosophical Approaches 
Having outlined some issues that I found important to understand intention, the set is 
ready for the second reflection cycle. In this cycle, I am questioning the explanatory 
power of some of the approaches to intention in philosophy of action, using the 
learning in the first cycle to test it. Additionally, I am looking for characteristics in 
these approaches that could enrich our understanding of the concept.   
 
The approaches to intention used here are the belief-desire, trajectories of action, and 
the pro attitude toward plans.  The issues used to test them are: why intention can 
work even when we cannot name it, why exploring possible deviations make our 
actions more intentional and why it is possible to have intentional inactions.  The 
section finishes showing how the need to find a way to integrate all the seemingly 
dissimilar observations arose. 
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7.2.1 The Belief-Desire 
In order to work under the belief-desire model, it seems that intentions need to be 
clearly defined. Its reductionist approach relies on defining belief and desire and 
explaining their interrelations. It requires a degree of awareness of what is the 
intention or at least their constitutive elements.   
 
Although the literature on belief-desire was useful to make me aware of the concept 
of wayward chains, the treatment of such a concept is aligned with the difficulties to 
explain intentional action. This opposes my approach to the concept as something 
useful to explain that intention can be present even when you are not clear about the 
direction of your actions. 
 
On the final issue, the biggest obstacle is how the belief-desire approach assumes 
intentions endowed with a Newtonian causal power.  Intention hits something to 
produce action.  Under this light, there is no way to consider inaction as something 
guided or produced by intention.  
 
However, although this approach does not fare well against the “test”, I could not rule 
out belief and desire as factors having a role in intention. Although I doubt that they 
are essential to it, if they are present I cannot see how to argue against the idea that 
they are helping to guide and sustain our actions.   
 
7.2.2 Courses of Action 
In the first instance what most attracted me from this approach was its claim of being 
based on Wittgenstein’s philosophy. It states that intentions are not really mental 
states. They are really a way in which we talk.  Intentions are statements on the 
“course[s] of action which one has adopted” (Scheer, 2004, p.121).  Additionally, 
Scheer argues that if they are a way to talk, they do not have causal power. 
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Now I will show how this particular way to conceive intention fares in the light of 
what was learnt in the first cycle. Because it is a way to talk it requires a way to name 
those courses of action. Consequently, they will not work if you cannot name them.   
 
You can develop the histories around them, but because there is no causal power on 
them, they cannot sustain an action. However, not having causal power curiously 
means that they will not have any problem handling inaction.  
 
Regarding to how actions can become more intentional when we know what we do 
not want to do, this approach seems indifferent.  Perhaps talking about what we do not 
want to do will make clearer the description of what we want to do.  However, 
because the direction of what we want to do is already there, the role is merely 
clarifying. 
 
My biggest difficulty with the approach is Scheer’s rejection of the notion of causal 
power. Without it, they cannot cause, or sustain the action. Consequently, from this 
perspective it is difficult to see how the actor can intervene in the intervention.  
 
What proves very compelling in this approach is the way to talk about courses of 
action. It is indeed a powerful image and its influence can be perceived in some of my 
arguments (e.g., in relation to wayward chains). 
 
7.2.3 Pro Attitude toward Plans 
Again, using what I learnt to discuss the approach I can start by saying that, in 
principle, intentions cannot be named because they are pro attitudes. They act as a 
compelling force to carry out a plan. However, the prominent role that plans take in 
this approach gave a way in which some clarity about what is pursued is needed. 
Although Bratman (1987) suggests that plans can be very vague, nevertheless, they 
have an aim that requires a certain level of awareness. 
 
The case of how deviation can make actions more intentional can be explained in 
terms of reasoning and practical reasoning (refer to Sections 4.2.3.1, 4.2.3.2 and 
4.3.1). This process is the one leading to the refinement of plans. So it just a matter of 
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considering possible chains and rejecting them, helping in this way to define better 
plans. Although this argument is not present in the surveyed literature about the topic, 
practical reasoning seems a way to construct one coherent with the approach. 
 
That sometimes actions are not needed and, nevertheless, the situation is still under 
“control” of an intentional process can be explained by the coherence of the events 
with the overall web of relations. If the events are coherent with it, there is no need for 
action.   
 
As a whole, this approach fares reasonably well against the issues found in cycle one. 
However, there are some problems regarding plans, as I explained before. One is that 
having a plan, believing that you will apply it is no guarantee that it will be used. 
Additionally, there are actions that do not seem connected to any plan. 
 
On the bright side, the approach has a very attractive characteristic, the idea of a web 
of relations interacting to give coherence to the plans.  This opens a way to consider 
that factors such as belief and desire among others could have a role to play with 
intentions, and, in fact, this idea led me to change my initial methodological approach 
to understand intention as the next discussion shows. 
 
7.2.4 From Discarding to Integrating 
Before and during the first months of my involvement with TOP, my idea was to 
falsify approaches.  It was to come out with some ideas based on the literature, look if 
they were matching what I was seeing in the field and then discard the ones not useful 
for my purposes.  This approach worked well in relation to the boundary games 
presented in Chapter Six, but confronted with the problem of this chapter the strategy 
changed. 
 
As the preceding discussion shows I could not fully discard any approach.  For 
instance, the categories that I developed to reflect on intention were proving not to be 
a way to falsify some of them, but a way to see that all of them could be applied in 
some degree. 
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Additionally, thinking about intention in relation to plans was introducing the concept 
of a web of relations, and how intention role was to reinforce the coherence between 
the elements of the web.  Consequently, I started to think that the issue was not how to 
get rid of the different characteristics that I was finding on my way but perhaps how 
to integrate all of them under a coherent approach. 
 
Obviously, my first candidate to integrate all the elements was Bratman’s approach. 
The aforementioned problems with the approach seemed workable. However, near the 
end of my involvement with TOP I went to discover the approach to intention 
involving complexity theory.  Potentially this approach could cover what I saw as the 
good characteristics in the planning approach. Interestedly, this approach, although 
drawing from Philosophy of Action was also drawing from systems concepts 
(complex adaptive systems), something closer to my field of contribution 
Management Science/Systems Thinking.   
 
Additionally, reflecting on Garfinkel's (1981) idea that different theories sharing an 
object at the end are dealing with different questions, led me to see a difficulty with 
using Bratman’s approach for my research.  One of the reasons for which I consider 
my research important is the possibility of being more creative and flexible when 
tackling an intervention. However, I arrived at the conclusion that Bratman was 
considering a problem not compatible with my search, the question of how intention 
enables us to carry out complex actions. 
 
Bratman’s approach shows how intentions help me to carry out a plan. For example, 
in the case of an intervention, a methodology can be conceived as a kind of plan. Then 
the pro attitude that is compelling action explains how practitioners can carry out the 
process of applying the methodology. It is ensuring the execution of the plan. It is not 
about being creative and flexible. This diverges from my purposes. 
 
For this reason I moved from Bratman.  In the next section I will explain how the 
complex adaptive system of intention deals with the issues so far introduced in this 
chapter in a more coherent way with my purposes. 
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7.3 Third Cycle: Integrating What I learnt from Theory and 
Practice under the Complex Adaptive Systems View of 
Intention  
This section deals with the different issues that arose from the previous two reflection 
cycles. It is about integrating what I learnt from the field, with what I learnt from 
contrasting this learning with the different approaches to intention.  It also deals with 
the issue of how to show in which way intention can affect an action and from there to 
have a way to show how methodologies can also be affected. 
 
The proposed way to answer these issues is by understanding intention as a complex 
adaptive system.  As introduced in Chapter Four, this approach relies on seeing 
intention as an emergent phenomenon based on circular causalities.  These circular 
causes work then as self-causes that constrain the possibilities of actions open to an 
actor. Guidance is provided by the emerging system constraining the trajectories. 
  
We as observers do not identify an intention directly. We identify the courses of 
action emerging from the web of relations. Making sense of this trajectory is what we 
use to give meaning and coordinate our actions with others. Here this approach is 
coherent with Scheer (2004) and his courses of action.  However, his courses are 
consciously taken, while here they are emergent. 
 
One interesting point is that based from the arguments, there are two ways to describe 
intention: emergent courses and emergent web of relations. Talking in terms of course 
as Sheer does make it easier to integrate intention inside of practical reasoning’s 
chains (e.g., when you elaborate towards a goal you give a direction). Talking in 
terms of web helps us to identify how different elements reinforce each other. 
 
This section first shows how characteristics from other approaches (cycle 2) can be 
integrated under the complexity approach. The way in which they are integrated adds 
ideas about the nature of intentions.  Next, the issues raised in cycle 1 are explained. 
Finally, it is shown how this approach explains how actions can be affected by 
intention. 
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7.3.1 Intentions as Emergent Webs of Relations: Taking Account 
of the Second Cycle 
Perhaps one of the big difficulties when we are thinking about intentions is the idea 
that we can pinpoint an exact cause that is producing action, just as when we use a 
reductionist approach to intention such as the belief-desire model. Juarrero (1999) 
blames this situation on our understanding of causality in linear terms.  She proposes 
moving our understanding from collision-like causes to multiple circular causes 
arranged as loops and acting as constraints. 
 
Using the idea of linear causality, the cause for action can be only one. Juarrero’s 
approach allows multiple causes. Circular causes can constitute a web, like the web of 
relations proposed by Bratman (1987). Inside the web multiple reinforcement loops 
can coexist. Consequently, it can be argued that multiple factors, derived from other 
(and even different) approaches to intention such as belief, desires, plans, or skill can 
be part of the web. 
 
These factors can then support each other enabling sustained action. Furthermore, 
their joint dynamic works as an attractor bringing inside new elements or factors. In 
fact the elements included reach out of our bodies (Juarrero, 1999) and include other 
people. In this way, the intention is propelled further. 
 
One consequence of understanding intention in this way is that intentions do not 
appear fully formed.  Webs can be very weak at the beginning and their interactions 
can be merely fortuitous.  It could take a while for them to gain strength and transform 
in second order contextual constrains, that is to say, it takes a while for them to be in a 
position to constrain and direct actions. 
 
This can help to explain something that puzzled me about my experiences in the field. 
Take, for instance, occasions in which I had a plan, I believed in my plan, and I had 
the desire to follow the plan.  However, nothing happened.  Furthermore, there were 
occasions in which I did not recognise important pieces of information in my 
interactions with TOP when I heard about them for the first time. It took me time to 
rediscover them.   
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I think now that the problem was that the elements of the web were not yet reinforcing 
each other, the web was weak. It took a while for the intention to take off, to stabilise, 
and to get a direction. Once there is a direction, things become to be recognisable. It 
becomes easier to fit elements into the web. While there is not a direction, behaviour 
will be pulled by many possible attractors or webs at once (Morgan, 1997).   
 
That intentions are not fully formed when they appear but go through a process of 
development seems to go against the other approaches in Philosophy of Action. Even 
Juarrero (1999, p.5), when she uses information theory to conceptualise “actions as 
unbroken trajectories” where information flows from intention to behaviour, seems to 
imply this idea. 
 
7.3.2 Dealing with What I learnt on the First Cycle   
How can intentions achieve something if we cannot name them? The key issue about 
intention in this perspective is not that they have some representation, but that they 
have the power to constrain trajectories of action. The constraints are self causes that 
arise from a web of relations. As such there is no factor that is essential for producing 
the self cause, not even the cognitive component of knowing how to name the 
intention.  
 
Obviously, this does not imply that it is useless to understand how to name the 
intention. As an additional factor in the web, surely it will help to propel intentions, 
constrain trajectories and attract other factors to the web. What it is implied is that 
having a name cannot be by itself an intention. 
 
How can the exploration and rejection of wayward chains make our actions more 
intentional? Rejecting wayward chains is showing that the web of relations has the 
power to constrain the trajectory. In fact, the process itself of rejecting a trajectory is 
included as part of the web of relations strengthening the intention. Rejecting a 
trajectory does not require us to rationally know exactly what we want instead. It can 
be just that it feels wrong (Damasio, 2000). However, later the feeling and the rejected 
chain can interact to give stronger reasons to reject similar chains. If there is no power 
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to constraint actions, the web will be so weak that it can be said then that there is no 
intention. 
 
How can inaction be intentional? Under the idea of linear cause, it is necessary to 
witness some movement in order to feel the presence of the cause. Consequently, if 
the cause is present it will produce an event. No cause: no event. However, the cause 
defended by Juarrero is a constraint. If there are external events, actions or courses of 
action that fall between the limits of the constraint, there is no need for action. It can 
be let loose. In fact, intervening can affect the pursued trajectory. As a result, in some 
occasions it is necessary to be intentionally inactive. 
 
7.3.3 How Intention Can Affect Action 
It is important for this research to show how an action can be affected according to the 
intention.  This is necessary to understand how different actors can express their 
individuality and intrude on the intervention process, despite using the same tools, or 
perform actions based on the same recommendations or “modes of action” and yet, 
arrive at different non-standard uses due to their intentions. 
 
Juarrero’s approach can explain this.  The argument considers how the constraints 
associate to an intention which becomes manifest through “sudden changes in the 
conditional probability distribution of component behaviour” (Juarrero, 1999, p.175). 
In other words, the alteration of the component behaviour is biasing which actions 
will be pursued. 
 
In the same way, the biasing of behaviour is causing a partition of the space of 
possible actions. Not every action in the space of actions is available once intention 
acts. Something is “grouping” the actions towards it. One of the reasons why this is 
important is because depending on how the space of actions is partitioned, the 
meaning of the action arises. Two actors can refer to the same action but meaning can 
mark the difference of their intentions and ultimately how their actions will be 
affected. 
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To explain the partitioning of the space and how meaning is obtained, Juarrero makes 
use of the concept of contrast space as put forward by Garfinkel (1981). This concept 
was originally conceived to highlight the differences between a set of explanations. 
Garfinkel explains the concept through the following case: A priest asks a bank robber 
why he robs banks.  The robber replies that the money is in banks. The idea is that 
here both the priest, and the robber are emphasising different aspects of the situation 
producing different explanations and contrast spaces. The priest focuses on the fact of 
the crime, so he is partitioning the space between rob and not rob and possibly ideas 
about the good and the bad. The robber emphasises banks, so he is partitioning the 
space considering different scenarios as attractive scenarios for the crime: banks, 
petrol stations, or houses. 
 
It can be noted that the meaning of “robbing banks” is not clear until the contrast 
space is considered. It could be a phrase to condemn the action (priest) or a 
confirmation of the kind of criminal activity in which somebody has chosen (the 
robber). What is giving the meaning is the contrast with the other elements of the 
space.  This is similar to the situation proposed in Section 2.4.3 where a methodology 
(SSM) is affected by two different contrast spaces (Total Systems Intervention and 
Critical Pluralism). 
 
Now, although the idea of contrast spaces seems static (the aforementioned example 
shows a snapshot of a situation), emergent second order contextual constraints are not. 
The use of the concept of an attractor and courses of actions shows the dynamic side 
of the process. Juarrero conceives that actions can be understood as sequences of act-
tokens. Consequently, they can be seen as a course of actions. In turn, courses emerge 
from the second order contextual constraints. Therefore, when actions are in the 
presence of an intention, they are attracted to certain patterns. Combining this idea 
with the contrast spaces it can be said then that meaning attracts actions to a certain 
pattern, web, or certain attractor, shaping actions in a certain trajectory or course of 
action. 
 
This is a familiar experience. If somebody is already set to a course of action, this 
person will tend to use any comment to support her/his course of action. The contrast 
space is “colouring” every stimulus in the preferred direction. For that reason, the 
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priest is thinking about his action in terms of saving a soul, and the same phrase is the 
consideration of a setting for the crime. The complex adaptive system of intention is 
then looking for ways to support the course of action. The element or stimulus is 
adapted despite its original intention (or lack of it). 
 
One final issue: it is important to note that there is a relationship between contrast 
spaces and the potential wayward chains. A chain of action in itself is not a contrast 
space. It is when the chain of action is judged as wayward that we are making a 
contrastive stress.   
 
The link between contrast spaces and wayward chains gives weight through meaning 
to the argument that exploring those chains adds intentionality to the actions. 
 
7.4 Drawing Guidelines for Intervention 
As happened with language games in Chapter Five and Relevance in Chapter Six, it is 
also possible to derive some guidelines to intervene from understanding intention as 
an emergent phenomenon arising from complex adaptive systems. 
 
As I already mentioned in this chapter, sometimes intentions are difficult to name. 
Consequently, a first guideline is that it pays to narrow the universe of possibilities. 
This can be done by finding what we do not want to happen. In other words, it is 
about narrowing the options making the wayward chains explicit. A second guideline 
derives from considering that intention relies on a web of relations.  Accordingly, the 
trick is how to build a web of relations capable of reinforcing among themselves. 
 
Additionally I see two guidelines deriving from the relationship between intention and 
meaning: The need to explore alternatives and the need to use guidelines in an 
intentional way.  If there is a lack of alternatives to configure a contrast space, the 
meaning of the actions will not be clear. Only against a contrast does an intention 
emerge and meaning can be decided. Here it will be very difficult to know if the 
participants really agree on the improvement actions to intervene. It is just like the 
case of the priest and the robber. It is difficult to define the meaning of “robbing 
banks” in the absence of contrast. 
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The need to be intentional about following a guideline derives also from meaning. If 
meaning is not clear, the actor applying methodological guidelines will have 
difficulties for effectively incorporating elements to the trajectory of actions. Only 
when there are trajectory and meaning, can intentions in the way of attractors help to 
sustain the guideline even against unexpected difficulties.  If the meaning pursued is 
not understood by the practitioner, he will not be able to give stability to the process. 
 
To obtain the benefit from a reason or guideline for doing something, the 
reason/guideline needs to be pursued in an intentional way. 
 
7.5 Contrast Spaces and Boundary Critique Theory 
Boundary Games, the approach explained in Chapter Six, helps to make explicit the 
modes of action used to arrive at a situation and are good at showing the dynamics 
and fluidity of boundaries. However, they do not seem so useful to “make visible the 
ways in which any specific claim is conditioned by boundary judgements and how the 
facts and values it asserts change when the boundary judgements are modified” 
(Ulrich, 2003, pp.333–334). Although, boundaries were not mentioned in this chapter, 
contrast spaces the aforementioned approach, provides a way to explain how the 
conditioning of claims works and it helps to show further ways to understand 
boundaries.  
 
Ulrich’s tool for examining how claims are conditioned by the boundary makes use of 
a contrast. His questions (as explained in Section 6.6) contrast an “is” with an 
“ought”. This can be expressed using the idea of contrast spaces in Garfinkel (1981), 
as was explained in relation to intention as a complex adaptive system.  However, as 
was shown in this chapter, the notion of contrast space is not limited to “is” and 
“ought”. It can encompass more types and not only dyadic comparisons (just 
remember the banks, shops, and petrol stations in the case of the robber). What is 
more, it could be possible to find that the people involved on a situation can agree on 
the “is”. Nevertheless, the “is” can be subjected to different contrast spaces 
effectively meaning that the “is” is different to all.  
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Analysis using contrast spaces can provide different insights in a situation. For 
example, let us see Midgley’s (2000) problem of marginalisation through the lenses of 
contrast spaces. First from Midgley’s diagram in the previous chapter (Figure 6.8), all 
that is considered in the primary boundary is included/seen by the group of people 
making the distinction of the secondary boundary. 
 
However, from a contrast spaces’ perspective (Figure 7.3), people make choices based 
to the contrast spaces involved.  This leads to thinking that if they set for a primary 
boundary it is because there is a contrast space that supports this decision. What is 
likely is that people on the secondary boundary also took the decision based on a 
contrast space.  Even so, what is on the contrast is excluded from the boundary.  It is 
there just to give the meaning, but they are not the elements seen as pertinent. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3. Marginalisation using contrast spaces. 
 
This kind of analysis has yet to be tried in practice, but it seems to illustrate 
possibilities for exploring conflict from a different angle. It has the potential to 
provide new methods to make visible the ways in which claims are conditioned. 
 
7.6 Conclusions 
This chapter builds the case that the future-directed face of intention, the one dealing 
with how we intend to do things, can be understood as a complex adaptive system. 
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Therefore, intention emerges from a web of relations reinforcing each other as circular 
causalities.  These circular causalities in turn constrain the possibilities for action, 
guiding and in a way causing action.  Instead of talking about intention as something 
sustaining action it can be said instead that if the web of relations cannot sustain itself, 
it cannot be called intention. These are fulfilling the roles of intention not covered by 
the present-directed intention as shown on Section 4.3.2. 
 
Because intention is underpinned by a web of relations, it can incorporate 
characteristics from other approaches.  Belief, desire, plans, skills and so forth can be 
attracted and accounted for by the web. In fact, the web can extend even beyond the 
body and include social circumstances. Because intentions are emergent and act as 
constraints, it can be explained how intention can work even when we do not know 
what we want, why choosing what not to do helps us to build what we intend, and 
why we can move towards our aims by not doing anything at all. 
 
Additionally, thanks to the notion of contrast spaces it is possible to see a way in 
which action and meaning are affected by intention, giving actors space to intrude on 
the intervention. Contrast spaces can also be a potentially useful notion for Boundary 
Critique Theory and help to understand how facts and values are conditioned by the 
intention/contrast associated to a boundary.  
 
After explaining the second face of intention, the next chapter looks for ways to 
integrate this face and the one explained in Chapter Six.  The idea is to provide an 
overall framework to explain intention on interventions. 
 
 214 
 
Chapter 8 Entwining Explanations of Intentions on 
Intervention 
An important form of justification is the uncovering of mutual reinforcements between 
paradigms, when the aims and goals of two different modes of operations appear to be in 
harmony, or sympathy, with each other’s philosophical and/or ideological aims. (2001, p.124) 
 
The past two chapters of this thesis explain two different ways to conceptualise 
intention, corresponding to the two faces of intention in Bratman (1987; 1997). In 
Chapter Six, the present-directed face, intentional action, is underpinned by Relevance 
theory. In Chapter Seven, the future-directed face of intention is underpinned by 
Complexity theory. These chapters also explore how intention affects actions and 
therefore offer ways to study them.   
 
The purpose of this chapter is to combine the aforementioned faces of intention. It 
uses the concept of interventions as language games as proposed in Chapter Two to 
underpin the combination.  Furthermore, this chapter also shows that it is possible to 
use Garfinkel’s (1981) ideas to consider the two paths of explanations as different 
levels of explanation. I argue that in this way it is possible to obtain a better 
understanding of the process of intervening. Part of this argumentation relies on an 
illustration in which I use both levels of explanation to follow part of TOP’s work in 
one of their projects. 
 
8.1 Two Threads/Faces of Intention 
This thesis has presented two threads of argumentation about intentions. They offer 
different answers to the support questions: what is intention? And, how those 
intentions can be studied in intervention?  Based on the idea that intentions are a two-
faced phenomenon, both questions have two answers.  From the four answers, two of 
them refer to the present-directed face of intention, and two refer to the future-
directed face of intention.   
 
Chapter Six deals with the present-directed side, using Relevance Theory and 
understanding the effects of intention in relation to how the boundary of what is 
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considered relevant in a situation is affected. Chapter Seven deals with the future side, 
approaching intention as a complex adaptive system where emergent courses of action 
are affected and constrained by contrast spaces and meanings.  
 
Although the answers presented in Chapters Six and Seven have different 
foundations, they share something in common: they deal with language and actions.  
Chapter Six deals with actions in language that affects boundaries of what is seen as 
relevant.  Chapter Seven shows how intentions affect the meaning, by the way in 
which the space of actions is partitioned. This process in turn constrains the emergent 
trajectories of actions. Both approaches deal with language and actions, and 
additionally they show how language can be used in different ways. With the use of 
language affected, meaning is affected too. These ideas and consequences connect the 
approaches to intention with the notion of Language Games in Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy presented in Chapter Two. 
 
Now, if the ways to consider intention can be applied to Language Games, they also 
apply to intervention and the tools used there.  It was already argued that the 
interactions in the intervention setting as the different tools used in an intervention can 
be conceived as Language Games.  From there it also follows that if the answer to the 
supporting question of how to study the effects of intention applies to Language 
Games, then it can be applied again to the intervention, and the tools used.  
 
Consequently, the questions about how actors’ intentions intrude interventions have 
two answers. In the first one, intentions as a communicative intention or intentional 
action look to cause specific effects on the boundary of what is seen as relevant in the 
intervention process. Setting, Probing, Wandering, Following, Challenging and 
Enhancing are the effects towards which the tools can be intended. 
 
In the second answer, intentions are complex adaptive systems.  Here the meaning or 
use (following Wittgenstein) of the methodology is constrained and attracted by the 
meanings derived from the contrast spaces and the emergent courses of actions.  Both 
answers are illustrated in the next section through an empirical case. 
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8.2 Intention on Intervention: An Illustration 
To illustrate how to study intention according to the concepts presented, I will focus 
on one of TOP´s case studies, the one about Evaluation. As was introduced in Chapter 
Five, the purpose in this case was to help evaluate the achievements of the groups that 
the regional council supported to take care of water resources, the Groups for Water 
Caring (GWC). 
 
TOP´s subgroup responsible for this case used Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) to 
assist with the purpose of evaluation.  What follows is an account of the process of 
deciding for its use, and the process of deciding how to use it, from the point of view 
of both faces of intention. 
 
Consequently, I am arranging this illustration in two parts.  The first shows how 
methodology and other elements were used intentionally as tools to affect the 
boundary.  This is important because this was not shown in the previous illustration in 
Chapter Six.  Here, I am following actions in session #38 in which the group 
discussed how to conduct a workshop using Soft Systems Methodology (although this 
label was not used at this time). 
 
The second part of the illustration looks at the analysis of intentions through the 
concepts of contrast spaces and courses of action. It is shown that this kind of analysis 
helps to clarify what kind of use (in Wittgenstein’s sense) is given to SSM.  This 
requires going back to previous meetings and tracking elements of the trajectory of 
actions looking for the contrast spaces made by TOP’s participants.   
 
8.2.1 Intentionally Affecting the Boundary 
TOP referred to session #38 as “nitty gritty”.  This was the third and last of a series of 
meetings for planning the second workshop with the GWC. In it, TOP was working 
based on purposes defined in previous meetings. They were looking at how to 
translate those purposes into concrete actions to carry out in the workshop.  The 
illustration follows the meeting’s conversations in terms of their effects on the 
boundary, paying attention to methodological elements in it. 
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In this fragment, TOP’s members discuss how to approach the second workshop.  
This involved discussions on issues such as attendants, resources, programme, and 
methodology. The session was building on the success of the previous workshop 
where the GWC concluded that evaluation was necessary.  The purpose of this second 
meeting was to find ways to carry out the evaluation. 
 
Attending the meeting were Hannah (the person coordinating the project), Frederick 
(the expert on methodologies), and Dianne the Māori researcher. My role as always 
was to discretely observe. What follows is the analysis of a piece of interaction where 
the methodological discussion gradually takes central place. The analysis is conducted 
on the same lines as that conducted in Section 6.4.2. 
 
At the start of the meeting, the group is not very clear about the way to proceed with 
the meeting, for instance: 
 
1) Hannah: “We want to go over the… creating the mental model, the card storming 
exercise, of desirable positive outcomes…how we are actually going to do that?”     
 
In fact, clarifying this was the whole purpose of the meeting.  Although this operation 
is Setting a boundary operation, the resultant boundary can be described as weak. It 
comprises very dissimilar elements and there are no linkages or rules of how to 
operate the relationships between them. 
 
2) Dianne: “we get some cards” 
 
Dianne responded in the way of a half joke.  In fact, she and Frederick laughed.  
There is a weak element of Following. She is not changing the focus of Hannah’s 
boundary; after all, the focus at this moment is very wide.  Additionally, she is also 
Probing if this path is a possibility. However, more important is the Setting of a rule 
about how to deal with the issue, namely focusing on the physical cards themselves. 
Hannah does not laugh and instead poses a series of questions about the kind of cards 
(e.g. Size and colour), and how they were going to manage the material (on the table, 
board, wall).  In this way, she Follows the rule introduced by Dianne and Probes 
 218 
asking for elaboration.  Dianne and Frederick in turn provide the details that 
effectively Enhance the boundary. 
 
The activity of defining the procedural aspects of the workshop continued discussing 
how to deal with some new attendants for the second workshop.  They were 
concerned about how to manage a group where original participants and newcomers 
were mixed. They discussed how to provide a role for the new people and how the 
Think Piece, a method use by TOP, could be used to that aim (the Think Piece is 
explained in Section 8.2.2.2).  All these operations involved defining procedural 
aspects for the meeting. They drew from the original boundary through Setting new 
rules, as well as performing Followings, Enhancings, and Probings. 
 
At some point, they deviated from considering the actual workshop and started to talk 
about possibilities for future research through the people that they were meeting in the 
workshops. This was effectively Setting a new boundary not related with the 
procedural aspects aforementioned nor with the original purpose of the meeting.  
 
After some minutes, Hannah makes a kind of motion of order.   
 
3) “Anyway that’s fine… So match pairs how we do that? No, no match pairs sorry, 
card storming”.     
 
Here she does a Following of the original boundary strengthening again the need to 
work on this.  This also has the effect of making the discussion about the future 
research boundary less relevant, Challenging in this way the deviant boundary. 
 
At this point, Frederick as the person responsible for the methodology comes in.  He 
pointed out that the notion of outcomes is important for the GWC and that this notion 
links with something that they would potentially evaluate. Here he Sets a rule 
bringing together outcomes with evaluation. It refers tangentially to the cards but the 
main focus now is the problem of how to generate the ideas about the outcomes and 
what to do with them. Dianne asks if they will choose these outcomes as individuals, 
Probing, but in a lesser degree leading, Setting a new direction.  Frederick Follows 
Dianne on it confirming an individual brainstorming.    
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In what follows, while Frederick explains his ideas about how to approach 
methodology, Dianne’s and Hannah’s interventions repetitively Probe, asking for 
clarification of the issues.  For the aim of brevity, I focus mainly on Frederick’s 
operations. 
 
4) Frederick: “Then you get people to group like outcomes with group like outcomes”.     
 
This Sets a new rule, shifting the last boundary. He mentions then how to move the 
Post-its® around the flat table Enhancing the tool box to engage with the GWC.  
Additionally he Enhanced the boundary taking elements from the initial discussion 
promoted by Dianne regarding the cards.  
 
5) Frederick: “When you are happy that all the post it notes are in the correct pile, you 
say well, how do you describe this big pile...”.   
 
Again the operation is shifting the boundary by Setting rules and changing the focus 
of the question implied by the boundary. With this scenario, he can now formally start 
to introduce the methodology. 
 
6) Frederick: “So they [big pile’s description] become important outcomes, or purposes, 
or evaluation potentially”   
 
He is again Setting a boundary that brings together all the previously dispersed ideas, 
especially when he introduces the term evaluation that was neglected up to this 
moment. He is introducing again rules to operate and team up all the issues.   
 
7) Hannah: “so that [the important outcomes] is what you call a mental model”   
 
Hannah was aiming to Follow. However, Frederick rejects this and in fact Challenges 
the unintentional boundary created by Hannah. He then uses the whiteboard to explain 
in more detail, and Sets a boundary of what he understands by mental model.  After 
the explanation… 
 
8) Hannah “So after you got the different outcomes, you try to work out what do you 
need to get that outcome…that need a new sub heading”.     
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Here Hannah Follows but also Enhances showing the need for specifying clearly this 
section to the participants.  Nevertheless, this did not change the focus question at this 
point of the interaction. 
 
9) Frederick: “my feeling is that we drop some jargon, and we called mental model”.     
 
This move is odd taking into account that Frederick is the one stating this.  Frederick 
is aware that the SSM calls this a Conceptual Model. Despite this he has been 
allowing Hannah to call this a mental model. What is more, he is now using 
reinforcing and validating the term.  He is performing a Following.     
 
Next in explaining how to proceed with the model he suggests to look for… 
 
10) Frederick:  “what are the things the GWC has control over which contribute to these 
outcomes”     
 
Again he is joining in one boundary different elements introducing new rules to 
operate the elements present on the boundary. 
  
Next, Frederick deviates from the topic speculating about the political possibilities of 
the actors in the GWC in relation to the regional council. After Hannah brings him 
back to the topic… 
 
11) Frederick: “what system is the GWC setting that produces that outcome”… “You can 
describe it in terms of what is known as the CATWOE”.     
 
It is interesting to see that from his point of view, he is Following the definition (he 
knows SSM).  From the point of view of the shared cognitive environment among the 
people attending the meeting, he is Enhancing the ways to describe the system. 
 
He explains how CATWOE can assist in a discussion of the issues, helping everybody 
in understanding where the other actors are coming from.  He proposes to use 
CATWOE as a tool to focus on systems producing a specific outcome.     
 
12) Frederick: “After you're done that, you do something call conceptual modelling, what 
are the activities that you need to do to bring about the transformation process” 
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Again he is Enhancing; the operation proposed is not changing the focus of the 
boundary, but is detailing how to proceed in relation to what has been said. 
 
Having explained the elements for thinking about a conceptual model, he tells the 
attendants that this is going to be his first time using conceptual modelling (he did not 
say SSM): he Sets a new boundary preparing the stage now for doing a rehearsing of 
the methodology. 
 
For the next part of the session, Hannah and Dianne took the role of the GWC.  They 
chose a system (likely to be chosen by the GWC) and Frederick assumed the role of 
facilitator. They were then defining outcomes, arranging outcomes in piles, naming a 
big pile (systems), specifying CATWOE, and working out the conceptual model.  
They later referred to the methodology as SSM.  This part of the meeting from a 
macro perspective served as a Following; it was reinforcing and enabling the group to 
gain confidence with the methodology. From a micro perspective, it comprised 
different games in which Dianne and Hannah were advancing and discussing several 
ideas under Frederick’s facilitation. 
 
Finally, what this section shows is that different methodological elements such as 
CATWOE, models, brainstorming can be used as different operations, games, or 
intentions on the boundary of what is considered relevant in the situation.  Sometimes 
these elements are used even for more than one operation, raising the issue that it is 
possible to choose how we want to use them to accomplish a boundary 
transformation.  It is also interesting to highlight that “methodological” remarks were 
not the only ones used to affect boundaries; common/normal language was affecting 
boundaries as well. This is coherent with Wittgenstein (2001) when he states that 
language is a tool. Consequently, the property of affecting the dynamics of the 
situation is not limited to methodology. 
 
8.2.2 Emergent Courses of Actions and Contrast Spaces 
In this section I continue with the aforementioned case.  This time instead of focusing 
on the actions and language of the “nitty gritty” session, I am looking to the history of 
some of the concepts used in terms of their contrast spaces and trajectories.  The aim 
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is to understand in a better way how emergent intentions were guiding, constraining, 
and attracting elements to the dynamic and trajectory of using Soft Systems 
Methodology (hereafter SSM). 
  
I found four themes having an effect on how SSM was planned to be used with the 
GWC: Evaluation, think piece, outcomes and model.  I track how the understanding 
of these topics developed in terms of contrast spaces. In the final part of this section I 
show how their meanings affected how SSM was intended. 
 
8.2.2.1 Evaluation 
As was already presented, the subproject used for these illustrations focused on 
evaluation.  The kind of evaluation to be performed was not clear from the onset. I 
witnessed a first contrast in session #14.  “Are we looking how [the regional council] 
can improve the [GWC] model? Or how the model can be improved?” They 
understood the dilemma as whether to evaluate them or to help them evaluate 
themselves. They decide for the second, perhaps in part due to the fact that the overall 
project was aimed towards improving participation (see Section 5.1.2).  Consequently, 
the project started to be framed as helping the GWC to develop tools to evaluate 
themselves. 
 
Next the team was considering the issue that perhaps the GWC did not want to be 
evaluated.  Additionally, the people responsible for the GWC were facilitators just 
like TOP. The team saw this as a possible barrier to gain legitimacy for their work.  
TOP considered that the possibility was that the GWC would accept the evaluation.  
Consequently, they focused on developing a strategy to overcome GWC´s resistance.  
 
The plan for the first meeting in session #28 was to find ways to engage the 
participant with a provocative question.  They explored obvious ones such as why 
evaluate, or the reasons for evaluation, but at the end they settled for “what evaluation 
can do for you”. The idea was to engage people at a personal level with evaluation to 
stimulate commitment.  In this respect, this question was superior to the other options 
in the contrast. 
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After their first meeting, they did not encounter the expected resistance.  This enabled 
TOP to focus on what the GWC saw as the ways in which evaluation was useful for 
them: legitimising their work for the regional council and improving the way in which 
they were carrying out their work. These became the principles for planning the 
evaluation. 
 
8.2.2.2 Think piece 
The think piece was a method used by TOP, and it is interesting to see how the 
contrast spaces produced different meanings for this tool.  The think piece relies on 
creating a text where all the different views of the participants were placed.  Their 
views were collected through interviews before the workshops.  Additionally, the 
views on the document were continually actualised with the progress and 
developments on the workshops of the case study. 
 
Here the story began when they were deciding how to make the questions to gather 
the views of the participants.  There was discussion between a direct approach and an 
indirect approach to the questions.  Here there were a couple of contrast spaces that 
produced a miscommunication.  One person was thinking about direct-indirect from 
the point of view of ethics.  Consequently, asking indirectly meant concealing 
something to the participant. It was not ethical.  The other person was thinking about 
how difficult is to construct an answer for a difficult topic. Asking directly was in the 
light of a complex issue, overpowering the cognitive abilities of the participant.  
Consequently, a process was needed of building the relevance to construct the 
approach to evaluation. After some debates clarifying the confusion, this second take 
on asking indirectly was the contrast finally accepted (session #14). 
 
What to do with the collected information was the next question. It was proposed to 
use a rich picture like the ones in SSM. However, they wanted to try the think piece as 
in a previous project.  They also mentioned difficulties in a past project with the rich 
picture in a project involving Māori community like this one.  It seems that the 
problem is that usually when using the rich picture during the workshop, the big group 
was divided in smaller groups.  Some Māori were concerned that they were not aware 
of what the other groups in the session were talking about. Over this contrast, the 
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think piece collecting all the views seemed a better alternative.  Additionally, the think 
piece was a way to work forward to the final report of the research.  
 
As well as rich pictures, they also contrasted the think piece with statistical measures.  
In this approach what is meaningful is the percentage of the population supporting an 
idea.  Here in the think piece, it does not matter how small is the group of people 
supporting an idea, the idea is treated as equal to others (session #28). 
 
Up to this point, there were several meanings put on the think piece without 
contradicting each other.  It was working as an indirect approach to facilitate the 
construction of answers of how to evaluate, a way to keep everybody informed of all 
the views, a way to keep the group together, a way to write the final report and a way 
to make the view of the minority meaningful for the process. 
 
Another more political use of the think piece was suggested in session #31. TOP was 
aware that there were things that were difficult to say in the context of the meeting.  It 
was easier to put a potentially controversial view in an anonymous written form. This 
enabled the group to raise difficult issues from a safe position.   
 
This more political use is pursued further in session #38. They were facing the 
problem of new participants joining the group of participants for the second 
workshop.  The think piece was seen then as a way to accelerate people and the 
possibility to assign the new participants a role, a mission to fulfil in the meeting.  
This was very interesting because they were also talking about the importance of 
having certain people on the workshops to stir things up.  So two additional 
strategies/contrast spaces were derived for the same tool. 
 
8.2.2.3 Outcomes 
Outcomes were mentioned in session #28, the first meeting related to the Evaluation 
case study that I witnessed.  Frederick referred to them as something which regional 
council was very keen about, so perhaps the outcome-based evaluation was preferable 
to stakeholder-based evaluation.  Outcomes started to gain more importance for the 
group when Frederick in session #36 explained a conceptual model involving 
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interconnected activities. Because each activity has an outcome, it was possible then 
to focus on the outcome and think the evaluation around them (Figure 8.1a). 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1. Ways in which TOP understood outcome. 
 
Wanda in the only session that she joined to work on this subproject, and just after 
Frederick's argument, proposed that it was possible to use a global outcome and then 
to think about all the things that were necessary to arrive at that outcome.  The 
outcome under this view is a kind of global sink (Figure 8.1b).  So there was a 
transition from evaluating intermediate stages to evaluating the whole set of activities 
by their shared outcome.  
 
In session #38, the “nitty gritty” meeting detailed in Section 8.2.1, outcomes suffered 
a series of transformations.  First it was a way to organise a brainstorming (remark 
#4).  The product of the brainstorming was considered as all the intermediate 
outcomes needed to arrive at the macro-outcomes.  Next, Frederick suggested 
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grouping the outcomes in piles and giving a name to the pile, a kind of outcome 
encompassing the others (remarks #5 and #6).  Finally, in remark #11 this outcome 
was seen as the product of a system that in turns required a description (Figure 8.1c).  
Now, making such a description was the focus. 
 
8.2.2.4 Model 
The concept of model used by TOP was affected according to the word used to 
describe it: mental and/or conceptual. When it was accompanied with mental, it 
referred to a cognitive representation of an individual.  When accompanied by 
conceptual, it referred more to the kind of model or representations used in MS/ST to 
illustrate the activities needed to carry the purposeful activity on focus (see Appendix 
5). 
 
The first take on model was in regard to the way in which the GWC was conducting 
intervention.  TOP was concerned about the facilitators disappearing in their own 
mental models of the situation (session #14), namely facilitators were not considering 
different views of the situation. 
 
After the first workshop with the GWC, in session #31, it was noticed that the GWC´s 
facilitators did not have a formal approach to their own facilitation of the meetings.  
This situation was treated by Frederick as the GWC’s lacking of a model or theory of 
intervention. Because of his background, it is sensible to infer that he is talking here 
about conceptual models as in SSM. The situation was reaffirmed in session #32, and 
it was suggested that TOP could help to provide tools to cope with the lack. 
 
In #36, as was discussed in relation with outcomes, mental models reappeared as a 
way to show different possibilities for evaluation.  They considered SSM and systems 
dynamics models.  Despite being called mental, these methodologies are more in line 
with the notion of a conceptual model. 
 
In session #37, Frederick suggested that people in the GWC were acting without a 
mental model.  However, Dianne contested this from a psychological point of view, 
emphasising that everybody has mental models.  Frederick made the mistake of 
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mixing here the ideas of mental and conceptual.  However, he was trying to force a 
similarity between conceptual modelling and mental models in order to approach 
Dianne and Hannah’s background. 
 
Finally, at the end of session #37, they agreed on making explicit the mental model of 
the participant to give them the opportunity of sharing and construct something 
collective.  So models were a way to share knowledge.  This paved the way to use 
SSM as the way to express, share and reach agreement. 
 
8.2.2.5 How SSM was affected? 
Although the selection of factors chosen for this section is limited (evaluation, think 
piece, outcome and model) they are suitable to show that the use of SSM (see 
Appendix 5) was immersed in a web.  Now, in order to show the intention, it is 
possible to show the methodology under the influence of the emergent trajectory 
arising from it.  
 
What the emergent courses of actions do to influence the methodology is to constrain 
the dynamic, the possibilities for action.  Additionally, it can be shown how once 
inside the web, the methodology can help the overall network to attract or subsume 
other elements inside it.  This means that the look is for how SSM was constrained by 
the web, and how once part of the web, the methodology helped to attract other 
elements. 
 
A first example of constraining the possibilities of action can be seen through the 
evaluation and the think piece elements. Their effects were coherent with what is 
normally understood as the benefits of using SSM.  The role of these elements, more 
than constraining SSM in itself was constraining the fact that the methodology chose 
for working with the GWC was SSM. 
 
When TOP decided how to evaluate, they did not choose an expert scientist kind of 
role.  That is to say, they did not choose criteria to conduct GWC’s evaluation in the 
way of the classic OR approach (Section 2.2.1). They went to find ways to help GWC 
to evaluate themselves. They went for a soft approach (Section 2.2.2).  
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The idea of working from this paradigm is in turn reinforced by some of the contrasts 
present in the selection of the think piece as a method in the process. Here, the ideas 
of allowing different views, and that it was necessary to construct an approach to 
evaluation, can also be seen as coherent with a soft approach.  
 
After considering the way to evaluate and the effect of using a method in the way in 
which TOP was using the think piece, make the conditions very difficult for a classic 
OR approach (in fact computational simulation was briefly considered).  They 
constrained the conditions to go for a soft approach. However, the effect on changing 
the methodology is small.  They are more on the side of reinforcing why SSM was 
useful for this situation. 
 
A more direct effect on the inner workings of the methodology is observed comparing 
TOP’s work with the second and fourth stage of the SSM: the problem situation 
expressed and making the conceptual models.  SSM tools for the second stage aim to 
answer the question “what are the names of the notational systems which from the 
analysis phase seem relevant to the problem?” (Checkland, 1981, p.166). SSM uses 
some tools to help the practitioner guide the description of the problematic situation to 
be improved. These tools basically refer to analyses of intervention (one), social 
characteristics (two), political aspects (three) and the elaboration of rich pictures. 
 
However, as shown in relation to the think piece, TOP rejected the idea of rich 
pictures. They were looking at how to make people aware of the whole discussions 
and in this context rich picture was considered problematic. However, later when 
SSM was legitimised as the methodology chosen for working with the GWC, the 
think piece was seen as a replacement of the activities of SSM at the second stage. In 
this later stage SSM was starting to subsume, attract elements to the new web of 
meaning. 
 
Yet, the think piece was not solving the issue of the names of the systems relevant for 
the analysis.  TOP approached this issue by outcomes.  As was shown TOP discussed 
outcomes in relation to activities, also as a kind of global goal, and as a global goal 
produced by a system. The outcome in this last contrast came to be the “name of the 
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system”. Under this name, they could proceed with the third phase of SSM looking 
for a CATWOE description of the system.  This step connects TOP’s work with the 
usual stages and tools of SSM. 
 
It is interesting to notice that outcome is not a word in SSM’s epistemology.  It can 
resemble the outputs of an activity. In SSM’s epistemology, although not present, 
output can be inferred. This makes this concept secondary in relation to activities. 
However, TOP’s emphasis makes it more meaningful, specially when contrasted with 
the notion that they were outcomes.   
 
It can be argued that the curious diversion to name the systems and the change of 
meaning of the words was due to TOP’s intention to make the process more relevant 
for the GWC. The regional council required an evaluation. It was easier to show that 
the work was geared toward this direction by talking about outcomes. 
 
Now, in the fourth stage, TOP’s work departs radically from what is accepted as SSM. 
In a superficial examination of the situation, it seems that everything is done 
according to what is expected from the root definitions and conceptual models.  What 
is more, it can be said that the epistemology, the set of concepts to describe what was 
done with the GWC was right. However, let us see the following SSM’s warnings-
guidelines: 
 
Once conceptual building starts there is a noticeable tendency for it to slide into becoming a 
description of actual activity systems known to exist in the real world.  This needs to be 
resisted because it negates the whole purpose of the approach…If descriptions of the real 
world slip into the model then in the comparison stage we shall be comparing like with like, 
and novel possibilities are unlike to emerge. (Checkland, 1981, p.170) 
 
However, constructing a model of what was the real world was exactly the kind of 
thing that TOP was doing with the GWC. As explained regarding model, TOP was 
oscillating between understanding model as a mental representation and as a 
conceptual model. The dominant interpretation at the end was the mental. This 
produced as a consequence that they were looking the way to make explicit the mental 
representations that people were having of the situation. This can also be seen as a 
consequence of the purpose of evaluating the GWC.  It seems logical to think that if 
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you are aiming to evaluate, you do it in relation to a reality, not regarding ‘novel 
possibilities’. 
 
8.3 Entwining Explanations 
I see the operation, but I am interested in how they combine to fulfil the intention. (Frederick, 
Session #41) 
 
Frederick’s phrase came just when I finished the presentation of my boundary games 
framework on the second feedback. It is interesting to see that although I frequently 
used the term intention during the session, at the end Frederick feels that we still do 
not have enough elements to “fulfil the intention”. His question was one of the 
elements that pushed me to find bridges between the intentions used by the Relevance 
Theory and those from the point of view of Philosophy of Action. 
 
Section 4.3 advanced some ideas about the relationship of the two approaches to 
intention presented in this thesis. It was proposed that based on the two faces of 
intention, intention and intentional action (Bratman, 1984), it was possible to establish 
a complementary relationship. Consequently, the approach developed in Chapter Six, 
the present-directed side of intention, deals with making sense of communication and 
actions and the coordination of behaviours.  The one developed in Chapter Seven, the 
future-directed side, deals with how intentions can produce, guide and sustain an 
action. 
 
However, reflecting more in depth on Garfinkel’s (1981) ideas, I saw another way to 
understand the relationship between both approaches to intention.  This way relies on 
understanding the explanations provided as cases of reductionist and holistic 
explanations. It is argued that understanding an intervention process using these two 
levels of explanation can give us a better understanding of the situation.   
 
8.3.1 Reductionist versus Holistic Explanations  
According, to Garfinkel (1981, p.14) :“The reductionist claims that one class of 
phenomena, more or less well explained by some body of theory, is really explainable 
by some other theory, which is thought of as deeper or more basic”.  The explanations 
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produced using this more basic or deeper body of theory is known as reductionist or 
microexplanations. 
 
Garfinkel goes on to show, for example, how with a macroexplanation such as the 
psychological ones, the aim is reduced them to explanations from the domain of 
physics and chemistry. The claim is that “In microreduction the upper level object is 
explainable by the (lower level) microtheory. Therefore, the upper-level explanations 
can, in principle, be eliminated in favour of the microexplanations” (Garfinkel, 1981, 
p.51).  This account mirrors work on MS/ST by Checkland (1981).  Introducing 
Checkland serves me a contrast to emphasize some differences in the next part of the 
argument. 
 
Both Checkland and Garfinkel question the reductionist’s claim that upper level is 
dismissible. Checkland’s argument relies on how the emergent levels of organization 
require different levels of description.  However, while Checkland argues for a 
scientific method comprising reductionism and systems thinking, recognising the 
value of both approaches, Garfinkel is highly critical of microexplanations. 
 
I am more inclined to Checkland’s idea of complementarism. However, Garfinkel’s 
critique is more useful in the sense that it enables us to see how these two kinds of 
explanations can complement each other. For this reason, I will continue to explain 
his argument but in Checkland's spirit. 
 
Garfinkel uses the case of a reckless driver who crashed against a truck to explain the 
advantage of macroexplanations in relation to microexplanations.  One possible 
macroexplanation is that the irresponsible way in which this person drove had been 
endangering him from a long time ago, so the crash does not take anybody by 
surprise.  A possible microexplanation that perhaps the driver can advance is that the 
crash was due to him/her having breakfast that morning. Without having breakfast he 
could have arrived earlier at the point of the crash, missing the truck and consequently 
avoiding the crash. 
 
In this case “The microlevel has an extremely specific object of explanation and 
consequently an extremely specific antecedent to explain it” (Garfinkel, 1981, p.56). 
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The explanation is only valid to explain the specific crash against this truck. However, 
the explanation is very unstable, that 15 seconds more or less having breakfast can 
change the outcome.  Ideally, “an explanation must have a certain amount of stability 
under perturbations of its conditions” (Garfinkel, 1981, p.57).  The macroexplanation 
focused on the recklessness is a more resilient explanation.  It can survive time 
differences, breakfasts, even crashing against a different car. 
 
This difference makes the macroobject superior to the microobject in several ways. The first is 
pragmatic. The microexplanation includes data that are irrelevant to the outcome and therefore 
bury the explanation unrecognizable. It delivers an embarrassment of riches and so is less 
useful. It also does not lend itself to a certain kind of practical reasoning, which the 
macroexplanation does. In many cases the point of asking for an explanation of something is 
that we are interested in eradicating or preventing it.  Microexplanations, by their nature, 
cannot lend themselves to this use. (Garfinkel, 1981, p.56) 
 
According, to this Garfinkel poses that microexplanations and macroexplanations are 
generally dealing with different objects of explanation.  Consequently, microlevel 
explanations for many purposes cannot replace the upper level. What is more, he 
suggests that criteria for a good explanation involve stability. This implies that upper 
level explanations are superior. 
 
He suggests that the stability of upper level explanations is due to the kind of 
causality. While microexplanations rely on specific causes, macroexplanations rely on 
redundant or multi causalities. Hence, for example, if an attitude “is relatively 
important to a society, the means of generating that attitude will not be left to chance; 
there will be multiplicity, a redundancy, of mechanisms to ensure that the child 
developed the ‘right’ attitude. So the causality with which the effect is produced has a 
strong resiliency” (Garfinkel, 1981, p.57). 
 
However, it is possible to see that both microexplanations and macroexplanations can 
have complementary roles to fulfil: 
 
The motivation of reductionism then becomes clearer. If some structural fact is responsible for 
a redundant causality producing Q, then, as I said, it will be misleading to cite the Pi which 
actually occurred as the explanation of Q. But some Pi did have to occur. The 
macroexplanation tell us that some realization or other will be the case to bring about Q but is 
indifferent to which. The microexplanation tell us the mechanism by which the 
macroexplanation operated. The structure gives the why, while the microexplanation gives the 
how. 
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We can see the force behind the reductionist’s claim. Without some mechanism or other, 
without some realization of the affectivity of some structure, it really would be mysterious to 
talk about the structure’s causing something. But merely citing the specific mechanism which 
brought about the effect does not tell us the important fact that had that particular mechanism 
not occurred, then some other would have, to accomplish the same end. The crucial point here 
is that the particular mechanism was not necessary for the effect, and therefore it is not a good 
explanation to cite it as the cause. (Garfinkel, 1981, p.58) 
 
Microexplanation shows the details of how something came to be. It shows the 
mechanism. Macroexplanation shows us the structure of the situation and with it, why 
the actual realization of something can withstand the use of different mechanisms. In 
a way macroexplanations are like the concept of equifinality on systems thinking, that 
it is possible to arrive at a steady state through different paths (Georgiou, 2007). 
 
Now the question is how this relates to the two kinds of explanations about intentions 
presented here.   
 
8.3.2 Two Levels of Intentions 
Having explained what Garfinkel considers microexplanations and 
macroexplanations, I can now link both kinds of explanations with the approaches to 
intention presented on Chapters Six and Seven.  Specifically, I will argue that 
Boundary Games can be linked to microexplanation while Juarrero’s approach can be 
linked to macroexplanation. 
 
Boundary Games are presented in Chapter Six and in the illustration in this chapter 
can be used to show the effects of communications on the shared cognitive 
environments of the participants in a situation.  It draws from Relevance Theory and 
the concept of boundary in Systems Thinking.  Because Systems Thinking is a kind of 
synonym to holism, it can be surprising to argue now that Boundary Games is a 
reductionist approach to explain intention.   
 
However, just consider the kind of explanations that can be constructed from this 
position. We can arrive at some shared cognitive environment because somebody just 
Set that boundary. Alternatively, we can arrive at that situation because a boundary 
was Challenged, and it was necessary to define a new consistent boundary or because 
there was an original boundary that suffered successive Enhancements. The point is 
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that in any case the antecedent to the desired situation is too specific to really explain 
why we arrived at that situation. If we understand intention as something that is 
guiding action, this explanation lacks the redundant causes that can guide the 
interaction to that specific point. It shows how we arrive at the situation, it answers a 
how question. 
 
How questions are important because they show examples of how things can be 
achieved in the field.  In fact, one of the problems that frequently I saw in TOP’s work 
was a certain amount of confusion about how to tackle some issue.  An important part 
of the confusion was dispelled once they found ways to act, ways of how (e.g., modes 
of action, methods and methodologies).  Over the skeleton of hows, it was easier for 
the team to fit more pieces and reflections and have a contrast to give desired 
meanings. In some way the hows are pointing to modes of action and methods. 
 
A second argument strengthening the case of Boundary Games as microexplanations 
is how the cause is conceived. It can be argued that they fit collision-like Newtonian, 
efficient causes. As Chapter Six shows, every communication affects the boundary.  It 
strengthens or weakens the boundary of what is seen relevant. Although the effect that 
they produce depends on the individual cognitive environments of the participants, the 
process is about communications “colliding” against the boundary.  
 
Now considering intentions as a Complex Adaptive System, it is possible to see a 
different kind of cause.  As it was mentioned in the last chapter, this approach to 
intentions considers the case in which events start to consolidate loops creating a web 
in which elements reinforce one another.  This was called second order contextual 
constraints, which additionally were linked to attractors and constraints. In different 
ways, these concepts are referring to a redundant cause or multicausality in 
Garfinkel’s terms. Understanding causes in this way can help to explain why a 
mixture of Boundary Games can be different but the trajectory of actions is driven by 
the same attractor to the same sink. 
 
Additionally, as it was explained, Juarrero shows how meaning derives from these 
processes.  Meaning is important here because it can be used to establish a plot. Many 
dissimilar elements can be integrated as part of a plot. So contrary to the Boundary 
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Games approach that explains the moves in a technical sense detached from what 
people are actually thinking, Juarrero’s approach using meaning gives the possibility 
of seeing how actors can construct a story integrating past actions.  The constructed 
plot can in turn be used by actors in practical reasoning processes to take decisions 
about their future actions. What is more, from the point of view of this argument the 
plot leads us to answer the why question, why we arrive to some situation. 
 
Understanding both approaches to intention as different levels of explanation lets us 
see that they deal with slightly different objects.  However, it is still necessary to show 
how they can interact with each other to have a really combined approach to 
understand the intention on methodologies.  I propose to use as the joint between both 
approaches the idea of trajectory of actions. 
 
Chapter Four mentioned Juarreros´s definition of intention.  This definition proposes 
how emergent trajectories of action are conditioned by the second order contextual 
constraints.  Juarrero’s treatment of trajectories of action is based on trajectories in 
information flows, using information theory.  What connects a trajectory is how 
information flows from a source to a destination despite noise and interruptions. 
 
I propose using Boundary Games as a way to show a trajectory.  This approach 
enables trajectories to be seen as the trail of actions on the boundary and the 
transformations that it experiences. Namely, it shows how a boundary is Set, Follow, 
Enhance, Probe, Wander and Challenge. Even when the boundary is abandoned it is 
not destroyed (as argued in Section 6.3.4) helping to see the continuity of 
discontinuous trajectories. Therefore, this works as an alternative explanation to 
information flows.   
 
Conceptually, there are some advantages in this approach. Because it relies on the 
concept of boundary it can be connected with previous existing approaches to 
systemic intervention.  Additionally it is based on a social way to look at intention.  
This expands the possibilities for understanding interventions, which are basically 
immersed in a social setting.  Furthermore, it attaches a kind of purpose to the 
individual moves according to their effect on the boundary. This facilitates analysing 
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sequences of actions as Sections 6.4.2 and 8.2.1 show.  So in a way is an explanation 
of higher order than information flows. 
 
Yet, it still maintains coherence with the notions of second order context sensitive 
constraints, and how the different levels interact and affect each other.  It will be 
possible to see how individual moves in the games in some cases start to reinforce 
each other.  If the boundary growing or strengthening becomes stable, it can be a sign 
of reinforcement loops from which contrast spaces start to emerge.  With contrast 
spaces, trajectories start to have meaning. With meanings, practical reasoning enters 
the scene and intentions as complex adaptive systems can start to guide the individual 
moves on the boundary games. 
 
8.3.3 A final Knot: Language Games 
The discussion about what intentions are and how they can be studied and the 
evidence from the case study can give us arguments to support and expand certain 
points presented in relation to language games as portrayed in Chapter Three.  
 
It was proposed that methodologies were not the only language games in a situation. 
Other language games can already be present or arise by or in interactions, activities 
and “forms of life” in the intervention context. This leads to the idea that 
methodologies are not the only ways to intervene or describe the happening in an 
intervention process. A methodology would be part of a network of language games. 
It is a game among others.  
 
This situation is shown, for instance, in Section 8.2.1. There it is shown how people 
were using very different strategies that in many cases were not related to a 
methodology to affect the boundaries of what was seen as relevant. Talks about cards, 
evaluations, invitations and methodologies were creating a picture of the task at hand.  
All these games contributed and intermingled in the construction of the understanding 
of the situation, and the construction of the intervention process. From Wittgenstein’s 
point of view, it could be argued that all the games eventually overlapped giving 
strength to the construction. This is similar to Mauws and Phillips (1995, p.327) idea 
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on section 2.9.3. They propose to approach managerial practice in terms of collections 
of diverse language games or “flexible networks of language games”. 
 
However, what I saw also let me contradict Wittgenstein when he argues that there is 
nothing common in all the family resemblances of language.  At least in this situation 
as is shown on section 8.2.2, several elements (evaluation, think piece, outcomes, and 
model) were converging in how the methodology was going to be understood. 
Although at the beginning they look and feel dissimilar, it is possible to see things 
tending to some logic to some contrast space. This enables to re-signify their 
meanings from a more unified perspective in which the elements reinforce each other. 
From this what is emerging as common is the intention. 
 
There is another idea already presented in Chapter Two that finds support on elements 
on this chapter.  The idea that introducing a Language Game embodied in a tools can 
affect the Language Games in place but in turn, those also affect the tools introduced. 
The easy way to see this is in terms of tools intentionally affecting the boundary and 
tools under the influence of emergent trajectories of action. 
 
In the first case, a language game (the tool) is used with the intention to affect the 
language game in place (the boundary of what is seen as pertinent) in some of the six 
proposed ways in Chapter Six. In the second case, the language games in place can be 
seen as the trajectories of actions and previously established contrast spaces. 
Consequently, when the tool arrives at the place is re-signified to the meanings in 
place. This is what happens in Section 8.2.2, when SSM is used in a non-standard 
way. 
 
8.4 Conclusions 
This chapter provides answers to the question of how practitioners’ intentions affect 
methodologies.  At one level intention changes the way in which a methodology 
affects the boundary of what is seen as relevant in a situation.  At a different level, the 
possibilities of a methodology are constrained and/or attracted by meanings and 
trajectories of actions emerging from second order contextual constraints. 
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Each level of analysis of intention lets us in turn answer different questions about the 
use of the methodology. At a microlevel, the boundary games show us the actions that 
were taken to arrive at some outcome. It answers how the process developed with the 
potential to make clearer the modes of action employed. At the macrolevel contrast 
spaces and meaning let us understand why, although problems can be found on the 
way, the dynamic of intention was gaining stability and direction. 
 
Now that the purpose of this thesis has been met, the next chapter presents an 
overview of the argument, limitations and possible future ways for development. 
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Chapter 9 Closure 
The central question in this research is: what is the relevance of intention in MS/ST 
intervention? What follows is an overview of the ways in which the exploration 
conducted shows the ways in which the concept of intention is relevant and 
contributes to the understanding and practice of interventions in MS/ST. Additionally, 
it proposes some future research and examines the limitations of the work.  
 
9.1 Contributions 
The contributions are divided into three sections.  The first one summarises what it 
has been said about both sides of intentions.  Next, it is shown contributions for 
practitioners/researchers.  The final subsection shows the contribution for Boundary 
Critique Theory. 
 
9.1.1 Intentions in Intervention 
In the preceding chapters, based on Philosophy of Action, I approached intention as a 
two faced-phenomenon. “We do things intentionally, and we intend to do things” 
(Bratman, 1984, p.375). I used two sets of different philosophical concepts and 
theories to underpin the understanding of each face (Table 9.1). Both approaches are 
complementary. Both describe different issues and answer different questions at 
different levels about how actors’ intentions appear in interventions. 
 
Despite these differences, both sides of intention share language and actions as the 
point of reference to show how an actor’s intentions cause effects. This allows 
studying the influence of intention in a big range of tools, in Wittgenstein´s sense, 
used to interact and intervene.  
 
This dual approach to intentions introduces a preliminary proposal of how to fill the 
gap of the underdeveloped concept of intention.  Additionally, it suggests ways in 
which actors can be flexible and creative in the use of tools. The following two 
subsections explain each one of the faces of intention in Table 9.1. 
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 Intentional Action “we do things 
intentionally” 
Intention “we intend to do 
things” 
Time Horizon Present. Future. 
Underpinning 
Philosophy 
Philosophy of Language. Philosophy of Action. 
Underpinning 
Theory 
Relevance, Boundary Critique. Complexity. 
Performed Roles  Making sense of our actions and those 
of others. Coordinating actor’s actions. 
Guiding, sustaining and causing 
action. 
Kind of Cause Collision-like, Linear. Redundant, Constraint. 
Way of study Effects on Boundary. Contrast Spaces – Meaning –
Reinforcing Webs of Relations. 
Intention is… Not explicit, yet they can be 
recognised through behaviour and 
effects. 
Course of actions produced by 
emergent second order contextual 
constrains. 
Level of 
Explanation 
Microexplanation. Macroexplanation. 
Question 
answered  
How the current state was reach. Why the current state was reach. 
Effect on tools Tools used to produce a mix of six 
effects: setting, following, 
challenging, enhancing, probing, 
wandering 
Tools attracted, and constrained by 
emergent courses of actions and 
meanings. 
 
Table 9.1. Two Faces of Intention Side By Side. 
 
9.1.1.1 We do things intentionally 
The face of intention developed in Chapter Six deals, with how “we do things 
intentionally”. I underpinned the understanding of this face in Grice’s (1991) 
philosophy and Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). Accordingly, 
communication works thanks to the process of conveying and recognising intentions. 
More importantly intentions can be recognised by their effects. For helping to 
recognise those effects I also draw from Midgley’s (2000) approach to Boundary 
Critique Theory. 
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Relevance Theory suggests that our human cognitive environments are affected by 
every communication.  New communications can strengthen or weaken the previous 
assumptions held by the actor (Sperber & Wilson, 1995).  Following Midgley (2000), 
I suggested the idea of considering the presence of a boundary around actors’ 
cognitive environment. This boundary in the specific case of intervention processes 
encloses all the assumptions of what is considered pertinent in a situation. 
 
When both theories are combined, intentions are recognised by the ways in which the 
ideas conveyed in the discussion affect the boundary of what is seen as relevant. They 
work as collision-like, Newtonian or effective causes. A communication is used to 
“hit” the boundary, and as a consequence the boundary experience changes.  
 
This way to conceive intention helps us to make sense of our actions, those of others, 
and the coordination between actors’ actions. I found six ways or six Boundary 
Games to make sense of how intentions affect and change the boundary: 
 
 Settle creates a new boundary out of previous boundaries. 
 Following represents a movement inside a boundary, reinforcing it. 
 Wandering depicts a movement outside the boundary reinforcing what is 
inside. 
 Probing shows a movement on the boundary. It focuses the attention on some 
issue and tries to establish where the limits are. 
 Enhancing introduces new information, making the boundary bigger. 
 Challenging weakens the boundary from the inside or the outside. 
 
It is argued then that any communication, including methodologies, can be used to 
achieve one or a combination of these effects. In this sense, they work as pragmatic 
principles (see Section 4.1.1). The rules (operations, intentions) can apply in different 
degrees, can conflict with each other and can even be contravened without losing its 
effect on the activity (Leech, 1983). Section 6.4.2 shows an illustration where this 
kind of behaviour is exemplified. 
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In Section 8.3.2 it is proposed that this approach show us at a microlevel how 
different actions or operations were used to arrive at some particular boundary.  It is 
useful because it allows us to reflect on the modes of action and, consequently, on the 
different ways in which the methodologies can be used and articulated to arrive at 
some end. 
 
However, this way to explain intentions works as a microexplanation. Consequently, 
it is not very stable (Garfinkel, 1981). This means that particular moves on a boundary 
are not a good explanation of why we arrived at some situation. For instance, knowing 
that we Set, Challenge and Follow a boundary does not tell us why the boundary was 
pursued. The approach can show us how we arrived. It shows the trail of actions that 
enable us to arrive there. 
 
9.1.1.2 We intend to do things 
The second face of intention, the one developed in Chapter Seven, deals with how 
“we intend to do things”. Here the underpinning is Philosophy of Action, although the 
particular branch that I am using takes as the starting point a critique on traditional 
ideas on this area. Juarrero (1999) bases her approach in complexity theory. 
Consequently, intention is seen as a complex adaptive system in which trajectories of 
actions emerge from the interactions of a web of relations (including Language 
Games). This web in turn constrains and guides the actions. The cause here is seen as 
redundant, namely, multiple factors reinforce each other to “guarantee” the outcome. 
 
The way in which this face of intention does its work is through the partition of the 
space of possibilities for action. This means that certain actions will resonate as 
coherent with the present web (are possible) and others not.  It is for this reason that 
intentions do not necessarily imply that they must be clear, explicitly defined or even 
conscious (only require to resonate). It is for this reason that knowing what we do not 
intend, being aware of the wayward chains of actions, help us in the process of finding 
out what we intend (it helps to partition the space). It is also for this reason that we 
can decide not to act, and still be intentional. If something is coherent with the 
constraints implied by the web of relations, action is not really necessary. The 
complete arguments for these implications are shown in Section 7.3.2. 
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The partition of the space of possibilities is also responsible for the presence of 
meaning. This is expressed by Juarrero using Garfinkel’s (1981) idea of contrast 
spaces. We cannot really get the meaning of a communication if we do not contrast 
what the actor wants inside the space of possibilities with what the actor is trying to 
leave outside. 
 
Tools are affected in this view because they take their meaning according to the 
contrast space to which they are subjected. The partition of the space acts as an 
attractor. Consequently, actions (including language) that in a first moment seem 
incoherent with the constraints in place, can be adapted and integrated to the course of 
actions imposing a new meaning.  
 
This approach deals with factors that reinforce each other as redundant causes (see 
Section 8.3.2). It can show us a macroexplanation of why we arrive at a certain 
situation. They allow us to build a plot. Its explanations are more stable that the ones 
of the first approach.  
 
9.1.2 For Practitioners and Researchers 
Depending on which explanation one chooses, the solution takes on different form. (Mason & 
Mitroff, 1981, p.11) 
 
Mason and Mitroff suggest that for certain kinds of problems, there are connections in 
the way in which they are explained and their solutions. I see the ideas proposed here 
resonating with this. There is a proposed way to understand interventions and there 
are some ways to learn about the process underpinned by those descriptions. 
 
The following contributions aim to provide practitioners/researchers and actors in 
general with guidelines and tools for a more nuanced and reflective approach to 
MS/ST interventions. It deals with a way to look at the process of interventions, some 
guidelines for intervention, guidelines for making accounts and learning about the use 
of tools, and in the final section there is the proposal of a conceptual model that looks 
to combine the previous sections. 
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9.1.2.1 Appreciating Interventions 
This section is an overview of the different concepts seen through this thesis and the y 
view interventions that these concepts allow.  The argument starts in Chapter Two 
where I proposed to understand the use of methodologies, methods, techniques, and 
also, theories or the simple use of words in an intervention context through the 
concept of Language Games in Wittgenstein’s (2001) philosophy. All of them share 
"family resemblances". All of them are possible tools that can be used to intervene. 
 
The Language Games’ framework let me treat all the aforementioned seemingly 
dissimilar elements under the same framework. This is so despite differences such as 
level of elaboration (consider a word and a methodology), or philosophical 
underpinnings (consider mathematical modelling and storytelling). When used all of 
them are threads of language and action. Consequently, the whole of the intervention 
process with all the possible tools that it can encompass can be framed as multiple 
overlapping Language Games. 
 
Every game has rules, and the Language Games (tools) used in intervention are not an 
exception. However, under Wittgenstein’s perspective these rules do not need to be 
fixed. They can be followed, but also bent, changed, adapted and used for many 
different purposes. The rules depend on the actors and their social interactions. The 
meanings behind the rules derive from the constant re-enactment, and use made of 
them. 
 
The Language Game understanding of intervention can be enriched by the theories 
first described in Chapter Four and used to underpin intention in Chapters Six and 
Seven: Relevance Theory and Complexity Theory. It was argued that because in 
relation to intention they are connected with language and action they can support and 
complement Language Games’ propositions. 
 
Relevance Theory advances the idea that individual actors have cognitive 
environments, namely sets of ideas that we use to make sense of situations. Every 
time that we receive a stimulus from another actor, we assume it is intentional. Then 
our brains aim to make sense of the situation and our cognitive environment changes. 
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This helps to explain why any kind of stimulus can be used to intervene, and why 
every action (including the use of tools in an intervention) somehow produces 
changes in the context. Thereby, when people interact there is the opportunity to 
change the context in a way that allows us to extend the mutual shared cognitive 
environments of the actors. These modifications change the way in which we perceive 
and use tools, changes the possibilities for future interaction and, hopefully, will 
provide a ground for more enriching interactions. 
 
Complexity Theory, the theory underpinning Juarrero’s (1999) approach to intention, 
is based on complex adaptive systems and autocatalytic networks. Namely, from the 
interactions of a set of elements emerge a web in which some of the elements 
reinforce each other and can sustain the existence of the web. In Chapter Eight, based 
on Wittgenstein, I argued that the strength of the intervention process depends not on  
a central thread but on the “overlapping of many fibres” (Wittgenstein, 1958, §67). 
From the point of view of autocatalytic networks, it can be said that the strength in an 
intervention process depends on how all the tools used by all the actors reinforce each 
other. 
 
From the aforementioned proposals, it does not make sense to centre the 
understanding of an intervention process on methodology. Methodology is just one 
among many possible fibres. What is more, methodology does not signify by itself. It 
is through social interaction where actors came about with the uses of methodologies 
and the language games in general.  These uses are the basis for the construction of 
meanings and potentially different ways to signify and be flexible with the tools 
involved. 
 
9.1.2.2 Guidelines for Intervention 
Through the thesis, I have been extracting recommendations about how to approach 
interventions. These recommendations derive from Language Games (Section 5.5.3), 
Boundary Games (Chapter Six), and Intentions as a Complex Adaptive System 
(Chapter Seven). Here I am presenting them in a condensed form. 
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From the idea of Language Games derives the possibility of using many different 
conceptual constructs to intervene. Tools, ideas, methodologies, and theories all can 
be used to interrogate the situation. In this interrogation, we can lead people to “guess 
the essential thing” (Wittgenstein, 2001, §210). We can let the participants play and 
explore the issues to recognise whether they came from similar or different paths. We 
can guess whether the participants have problems understanding the meaning if they 
cannot follow the implicit or explicit rules posed. In this scenario, we will need to find 
ways to reintroduce the concepts. 
 
Boundary Games imply relevant communications, namely the possibility of 
connecting with the background of the participants with a minimum effort. 
Communications can be use to affect a boundary in a mix of six different ways. It is a 
good idea to use mixtures to uncover different interpretations of the issues. This helps 
us to realise whether the participants are attaching the same meanings to the issues.  
 
It seems from my observations in the field that when there is a mix of games in the 
dynamics the process seems more robust. It also seems important to keep different 
boundaries “alive”. Their existence can potentially contribute more ideas. 
 
From the perspective of intention as a complex adaptive system, pays to focus on 
what we do not intend (what we want to avoid) to clarify what we do intend. It is 
important to build a web of relations reinforcing each other when intervening. When 
we have the web, that in itself helps to guide, cause and sustain the intervention.  
 
Meaning emerges against a contrast. Therefore, building contrasts will make it easier 
to drive the situation in a direction and really take advantage of all the tools applied to 
the process. They will be more easily assimilated to the web of relations, and they will 
support such a web. To obtain the benefit from a reason or guideline for doing 
something, the reason/guideline needs to be pursued in an intentional way. 
 
Because all these principles are supported by theories and philosophies, it can be 
argued that they cover the lower invisible part of the methodology iceberg described 
in Section 2.3.2. What all these guidelines or principles need now is to find ways to 
develop the categories on the upper, visible part of the iceberg.  
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Checkland (2000) argues that when guidelines are iteratively used in intervention 
processes they can, with time, develop modes of action. Consequently, it is reasonable 
to think that the guidelines presented here could be the base for methodological 
developments. However, it can be noticed that these ideas do not need to be a method 
or methodology on their own. They can be applied in conjunction with other 
methodologies or tools to intervention. 
 
9.1.2.3 Guidelines for Making Accounts and Learning about 
Methodology Use in Interventions  
Interventions and methodology use are understood here based on Language Games 
and intentions (Chapter Eight). The proposed approach can integrate the 
methodologies, methods, and other kind of actions (theory-led approach) with the 
social interactions, expressed in terms of intention (practice-led approach) in which 
they are embedded.  Hence, in achieving this combination, the work corresponds to 
what Keys (1997) identifies as the third way to learn about the OR process, as was 
introduced in Chapter Two.  
 
Chapter Eight shows how descriptions, accounts of an intervention, can take the form 
of Boundary Games, Contrast Spaces and the ways in which different factors and 
Language Games reinforce each other in the situation. The application of these ways 
of description can help us to understand different aspects. 
 
Boundary Games provides a way to describe modes of action. The idea is to describe 
language and actions in terms of their effect on the boundary of what is considered 
relevant. This can help to recognise meaningful actions in the process and help to 
identify mode of action as sequences of Boundary Games. As Kotarbiński (1966) 
remarks there are infinite ways to describe an action. The determinant factor to 
describe the action is the intention. This approach enables the practitioner to describe 
action in terms of the intentions/effects pursued. 
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Intention as a complex adaptive system offers us two ways to make descriptions: 
contrast spaces and the analysis in which different factors reinforce each other. 
Contrast spaces help us to clarify the meanings applied to the different actions and 
tools. Analysing the different factors/Language Games present in the situation, and 
whether they are reinforcing each other lets us reflect about the directions in which 
these tools are being driven by the situation.  
 
Now, the elements presented to make an account can also be applied to the problem of 
tuning/improving a method. Expressing a particular intervention process in terms of 
effects on the boundary can help to recognise the importance or not of some actions, 
or the possibility of changing some of the actions based on the achieved effects or the 
same dynamics of the situation. Additionally, the idea of contrast spaces can help to 
determine powerful contexts of meaning to be applied when using the method. 
 
The reflection on a sequence of action in terms of boundary games can also help to 
recognise certain sequences of events or actions and then develop recommendations 
about their proper order or application. This is a recommendation more in the order of 
the methodological. 
 
The overall purpose or potentiality of this approach is to intentionally enhance the 
way in which we can use methodologies and methods. 
 
9.1.2.4 A Conceptual Model for Intentionally Intervening 
The model on Figure 9.1 is inspired in the SSM model on Appendix Six by  
Checkland and Sholes (1990).  It uses the same kind of conventions such as activities 
nested and monitored at different levels.  In this case, the figure represents the two 
levels of intentions proposed here, and extra layer aimed to learn from the process and 
improve the way in which we intervene intentionally.  The purpose is to organise in 
the way of a model some of the implications of using intentions to reflect about an 
intervention.  For that reason I call it a model for Intentionally Intervening.  This can 
be thought of as an initial approximation to use the ideas presented here to intervene. 
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The inner part of the diagram deals with doing things intentionally.  It shows a 
possible way to use Boundary Games (Chapter Six).  Basically, the process is to 
appreciate how the boundaries are affected by actions of all the involved in the 
interaction.  Then on this basis the practitioner can reflect on what effects are relevant 
for the situation.  Finally, the practitioner can choose and adapt a tool for its use on 
the situation having into account a possible combination of the six games defined.   
The most inner part is then monitored in relation to the advances made towards 
building a relevant shared cognitive environment among the actors.  The criteria to 
judge such a cognitive environment takes into account the usefulness for making 
sense of our actions, those of others and the consequent implications for coordination, 
namely the roles for present-oriented intention. 
 
Having a shared cognitive environment is an important base for an intervention but is 
not enough.  We can share some ideas, but we can disagree on their interpretations or 
implications.  Consequently, on top of this layer came the intention to do things, the 
future-oriented side of intentions.  This level is concerned with the emerging meaning 
derived from the interaction between a web of relations and the established contrast 
spaces.  The idea is to direct the attention of the practitioner to build/organise such 
webs, and contrast this with what is not the web.  This layer of intention is then 
monitored in relation to the trajectory of actions and the second order contextual 
constraints.  The criteria to judge whether they are useful (or corrective action is 
needed) takes into consideration guiding, sustaining and causing the action, the roles 
of future-oriented intention. 
 
Finally, in the most external level, the idea is to learn from the process for improving 
it and improving the ways in which the tools are used.  This is done through the 
identification of modes of action and the understanding of how intentions guide the 
process.  Mixing this two parts is necessary for achieving the third way to learn about 
the intervention process (Keys, 1997). 
 
Looking at the whole diagram it is tempting to speculate that the whole system is 
working simultaneously.  When some tool is used to affect a boundary, at the same 
time some trajectory is implied.  When a trajectory is suggested some operation is 
done on the relevant boundaries.  Obviously, the middle levels are also affected.  
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Consequently, in every interaction, the web of relations changes, and with it, 
meanings and contrast spaces. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1. Conceptual model for Intentionally Intervening. 
 
This suggests that you can approach an intervention process from the top down but 
also bottom up.  In a top down there is the idea of a trajectory or second level 
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contextual constraints.  The problem is how to build webs and contrast spaces able to 
guide, sustain, cause (constrain) actions? and how to create a shared cognitive 
environment to sustain this? From the bottom up you start to create a shared cognitive 
environment.  The challenge is how eventually in these emergent process trajectories 
of actions and second level contextual constraints can be built. 
 
An unexpected consequence of this conceptual model is that I discovered that in a 
way helps me to understand my research process from a new perspective.  I started a 
research process building a shared cognitive environment with my participants.  From 
this I search for connections (redundant causes) and meanings.  If those were 
promising I embarked in some research direction.  If they proved dead ends, I tried to 
look for new connections, for new shared cognitive environments.  In some occasions, 
I also had insights about the nature of a situation.  This produced a trajectory of 
actions looking for meanings or contrast spaces favourable to that insight. 
 
9.1.3 Implications for Boundary Critique 
Boundary Critique Theory is discussed in Sections 2.2.3 and 6.6. This strand of 
Critical Systems Thinking aims to make visible the ways in which claims are 
conditioned in an intervention process.  For this reason, its approach is dialectic 
involving constant reflection.  The reflection is performed in relation to the 
participants’ perceived boundary. The boundary comprises what is pertinent in the 
situation.  Changes in the boundary mean that the elements seen as pertinent will 
change as well as the whole approach to action in the situation. 
 
It is argued in Section 6.6 that Boundary Critique Theory can benefit from Boundary 
Games, the approach developed in Chapter Six. Boundary Games provides an 
approach for constantly reflecting on the effects of each of our actions on the 
boundary. It helps to explain not the way in which claims are conditioned but the 
ways in which the claims are made.  
 
The approach, contrary to what has been previous in Boundary Critique Theory, 
provides the tools to shows how any piece of interaction or information can have 
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effects on the boundary. Furthermore, it shows that possible criteria to stop boundary 
expansion need to take into account limits by the cognitive processing effort.   
 
Boundary Critique Theory can also benefit from the notion of contrast spaces, as 
argued in Section 7.5. Contrast spaces can be an additional tool to help to understand 
how facts and values are conditioned by the intention/contrast associated with a 
boundary. 
 
Overall, to the discourses and theories already informing Boundary Critique Theory 
(Section 2.2.3), this thesis contributes ideas from Languages Games, Language 
Pragmatics, Philosophy of Action and Complexity Theory. 
 
9.2 Future Research 
There are areas that I have not visited in my process. For some of them this was 
because I saw them as inconvenient at the time, or they could have made my task 
harder. Others were not the focus of my research, or they were outside of my area of 
knowledge. However, I consider all of them very attractive for further research.  
 
9.2.1 Further Explorations on Intention 
When I was deciding how to understand intentions, I took decisions to simplify the 
task at hand in relation to Philosophy of Action. Consequently, I ignored a complete 
branch dealing with Collective Intention, and I simplified the problem of Intentional 
Action. 
 
Bratman (1999) criticizes Philosophy of Action for paying too much attention to the 
intention as an individual phenomenon. In my case, because I was dealing with the 
intention of the practitioner I decided on taking this route. However, as Gibbs Jr. 
(2001) points out intentions can emerge as the product of social interactions. This 
points to the important field of how intentions are generated. Notice that my work 
does not deal with this topic directly.  It is more interested in their effects. 
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Additionally, it could be of interest for MS/ST to understand how collectively we can 
intend to change a situation. Some of the authors that I found but yet remain to be 
studied are (Bratman, 1993; Gold & Sugden, 2007; Kutz, 2000; Petersson, 2007; 
Saaristo, 2006; Tollefsen, 2002; Tuomela, 1991, 2005) 
 
Another aspect requiring more research is my treatment of Intentional Action. I 
showed on Chapter Four that the use of communicative intentions let me deal with 
some aspects of Intentional Action. I can say that any manifestation of a 
Communicative Intention is an Intentional Action.  However, not every Intentional 
Action is a Communicative Intention. It remains unclear to me the elements missed 
from my interpretation.  
 
Finally, one interesting area of exploration with implications for Philosophy of Action 
is the debate simple view vs. single phenomenon view presented in Section 4.2.2.  
The problem is if always that we do X intentionally we were intending to do X.  Here 
is a problem in which researching MS/ST interventions can potentially throw lights.  
A preliminary reflection base on the argument presented seems to suggest no, namely 
the single phenomenon. 
 
9.2.2 Analysing Social Interaction and Intervening in Other Fields  
There are two broad topics in which the developments in this thesis can be transferred 
to other fields of knowledge: analysis of social interactions and intervention.  They 
can be transferred because they are based on intention and language. Intention is a 
general concern in social science used to make sense of situations (Prasad, 2005; 
Schwandt, 2000). Language possesses the versatility of being a problem with its own 
field of study or a perspective crossing multiple domains (Verschueren, 1995).  
 
In the research, I focused on a specific kind of social interaction, that of interventions. 
However, it is likely that the utility of the tools that I used can be extended to other 
kinds of interactions.  In those perhaps they can help to answer questions regarding 
whose intention, what intention, and which actions were performed in the process of 
achieving something. I consider that this research is presenting ways to analyse 
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interactions that can find a place in broad areas such as discourse analysis and 
conversation analysis  (Silverman, 2000). 
 
On intervention, I am focused on MS/ST. However, this is not the only branch in 
management concerned with intervention. It will be worth exploring whether there are 
possibilities for cross learning with other pro intervention areas such as 
Organizational Development, or Strategy. Additionally, interventions are not 
circumscribed to management. Consequently, it would be interesting to explore as 
well connections with disciplines such as family therapy and education. 
 
9.2.3 Ethics 
Part of the motivation for embarking on this research was to consider the importance 
of actors in determining the shape of an intervention. This work shows this 
importance in explaining how practitioners’ intentions affect intervention. If the 
practitioners are more aware of the kind of effect that can be produced by the use of a 
methodology, the door opens for more creative and flexible uses and, consequently, to 
more deviations from the standard. This brings a responsibility that, as Brocklesby 
(2009, p.1075) suggests, “certainly cannot be left to others”. The actors need to 
consider their ethical stand on interventions (Romm, 1996). 
 
Ethics is not a question of only codes of practice.  Simple prescriptions “are doomed 
to failure” (Taket, 1994, p.131).  In fact, from the perspective argued here, codes of 
practice, as any other language game when used, can be affected by intention. 
Potentially, they can even be used for unethical purposes. For instance, codes can be 
used to identify and exploit possible flaws; an example of how a pragmatic principle 
can be violated, but in some way it continues to guide the activity. If the approach to 
ethics by codes is flawed, a different approach is needed. It is from this background 
that “self-reflection on ethics has been put forward as an alternative to devolve ethical 
responsibility from these [frameworks and codes of ethics] to practitioners 
themselves” (Córdoba, 2006, p.1033).  
 
Depending on the authors, self-reflection involves examining “every micro-decision” 
(Brydon-Miller et al., 2006, p.129), “not just to look at things from different angles, 
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but to do so in a way that will be considered right or useful” Midgley (1995, p.547), 
and “reflection about how people deal with ethical dilemmas and their own 
judgements. In other words, self-reflection on ethics needs a critical review of its 
emergence and purpose(s)” (Córdoba, 2006, p.1033).  
 
The ideas that I present in this thesis cannot turn a practitioner ethical.  However, they 
can be used to reflect on the effects of our actions. They provide tools that can be used 
for supporting self-reflection.  
 
For example, Boundary Games enables us to show how every action and 
communication have effects on others’ cognitive environments. Consequently, they 
can work at the level of micro-decisions. Thinking about different angles can be 
pursued through Contrast Spaces. The emergence and purpose of ethics can be traced 
in terms of how intention is emerging from a web of reinforcing relations. 
 
An intervention using this approach has yet to be tried.  In this regard, Brocklesby 
(2009) makes a point to consider: social circumstances, constraints, power relations, 
and interpersonal dynamics, conspire to make real time ethic reflection difficult if not 
impossible. 
 
9.3 Limitations  
I will divide the issues on the limitations of this work in three reflections. The first is 
about the conditions in the setting of the research. The second makes some 
considerations about the conceptual underpinnings of the work. The third and last is 
concerned with the quality of the research in itself. 
 
9.3.1 About the Setting 
How appropriate was the setting for my research? Regarding the amount of relevant 
data to work with, it can be noticed that the use of methodologies in the setting was 
limited. Additionally, most of the work in the first months of my involvement was 
used by TOP for reporting, not intervening. Most of the data gathered at the beginning 
was not very relevant to my problem. However, there were some advantages in this. 
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One is that I could deal with intention without being overwhelmed at the same time by 
intervention.  Second is that the limited examples allowed me a more precise focus, 
again without being overwhelmed. 
 
My setting was also an advantage regarding the body language. In the field I did not 
pay much attention to it. Although my philosophical and theoretical framework of 
Language Games and Relevance Theory can deal with this aspect, I did not explicitly 
take them into account for analysis.  I focused mainly on the audio recordings of the 
sessions, so the visual aspects of the paralinguistic communication were left outside.  
 
Although I was also present taking notes, from my perspective important gestures 
were few.  It could have been a limitation of the observer, but also is a condition of 
the setting. In general the situations involved seated people talking around a table. 
Consequently, the body language was controlled by the physical disposition of things. 
Hence, the amount of data for the analysis was again attenuated. 
 
9.3.2 Conceptual Underpinnings 
If I were starting this research today, perhaps I would like to put more emphasis on 
collective intentionality. This is because part of my answers at the end show that 
intentions were emergent, and I am convinced that there is an important role for the 
social interactions. However, this does not demerit my findings. 
 
My search focused on how the actor/practitioner was affecting methodologies, and I 
think that my account of how that is done is a plausible one. So the problem of the 
collective intentionality is perhaps more an issue for further research and a different 
research problem. 
 
A more problematic issue for my framework is emotion. My underpinning theories do 
not deal directly with the issue. For example, in Relevance Theory the mechanism is 
cognitive. One can use the mechanism saying that under certain emotion some ideas 
gain strength and are more relevant than others.  
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However, to really overcome the theoretical limitation, I think that it would be 
interesting to consider Maturana’s (1988) work on consensual domains that 
intertwined reason and emotion. Another option could be Damasio (2000; 2004) 
whose work discriminates the roles of emotion and reason in decision making. This 
can be considered as another future research topic. 
 
My last consideration is about power. I consciously avoided the topic in my research 
and in my interactions with my participants, although they were constantly demanding 
power inclusion.  I considered that my topic was polemic enough without further 
complicating the issues in the setting. I am not denying that power was important. In 
fact, I consider that power seems directly linked to some of the roles of intentions, 
such as how the actions of the actors are caused, guided and sustained.  
 
If I were to explore the connections of power and what I just presented I would follow 
Foucault (1982). He shows how power is linked with communication. Additionally, 
his notion of how some actions induce other actions mirrors the process of using 
intention to produce effects among the participants in an interaction. 
 
9.3.3 The Quality of the Research Process 
In general it can be argued that the research’s own nature (about intention) pushed me 
on the self-reflective practice. Additionally, because I acted under some guidance of 
Action Research, I was having a good deal of participation and peer review of my 
ideas by a group of qualified researchers (see Chapter Five). This fulfils important 
conditions for the validity of the research such as creating a convincing account 
incorporating different perspectives, ability of the researcher to pass as a member and 
the validation of the analysis by the judgement of the participants (2000). 
 
Guba and Lincoln (2005) propose the idea that caring about the quality of the research 
is a question of wanting to know if we have such confidence in the findings that we 
can act based on them. I want to examine briefly the implication of this to my thesis.  
 
I am confident that I have shown a plausible way in which intentions work. I feel that 
this was also plausible for my participants, to the extent that they used them. Based on 
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this, more flexible and creative uses of methodologies are possible. This also lets me 
reinforce the idea that actor and ethics are fundamental in intervention processes and, 
consequently, in methodology use. 
 
Regarding the use of these ideas to produce accounts and produce new methods and 
methodologies, I am confident enough to think that they are worth application.  The 
particular articulation of ideas is novel for the field of MS/ST. In this scenario what 
they require is more research to strengthen a nascent approach. 
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Appendix 1: Consent for Participation 
 
Research Agreement 
 
Consent to participation in the research “Practitioner’s Intentions in 
Intervention Methodologies” 
 
I have been given and have understood an explanation of this research project.  I have 
had an opportunity to ask questions and have them answered to my satisfaction.  I 
understand that I may withdraw myself or any information I have provided from this 
project (even before data collection in completed), without having to give reasons and 
without penalty of any sort. 
 
I understand that I will be assigned a pseudonym for use in any published work, 
unless I give specific permission for my name to be used.  I understand that only the 
researchers will have access to information obtained, except in its published form.  
Organisations will not be named in publications, except with the written permission of 
the Chief Executive of that organisation. 
 
I understand that the university retains insurance cover against claims relating to 
harm, loss or damage suffered by participants in research projects as a result of any 
negligent act, error or omission by or on behalf of the university. 
 
I agree to take part in this research. 
 
   
Participant’s name  Researcher’s name 
   
Participant’s signature  Researcher’s signature 
   
Date  Date 
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Appendix 2: Letter Presenting the Project to the Participants 
 
 
April 4/2006 
 
Dear TOP Team, 
Re: PhD project “Practitioner’s Intentions in Intervention Methodologies” 
 
As you know I am enrolled for a PhD degree at Victoria University in Wellington.  
My research will require some fieldwork, which I would like to carry out with your 
research group.  The research is subject to approval by the Victoria University Ethics 
Committee.  
 
 This research considers how various contextual factors including the purposes and 
intentions of the practitioner (or actor), can alter the rationality and application of the 
intervention methodologies and techniques used. 
 
Frequently the management science/systems thinking literature asserts that an 
intervention methodology and/or technique should only be used in a technically 
‘correct’ way.  However I want to investigate whether there are alternative ways of 
using methodologies and/or techniques that are appropriate given different sets of 
circumstances.  I am therefore interested in investigating a more flexible approach in 
carrying out interventions. 
 
As philosophical and theoretical frameworks, I am planning to use the notion of 
language games in Wittgenstein’s philosophy; pragmatic philosophy; language 
pragmatics; and boundary critique. 
 
This research will use methods that involve ethnography, participant observation and 
interviews in which I will observe, take some notes and do some recordings. There is 
also an Action Research component that will involve feedback and discussions with 
the participants and the group.   
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In the interviews, in the first instance I will ask you some questions about your 
background and about your familiarity with various methodologies.  I will also ask 
about your philosophy concerning interventions, for example the ethical and aesthetic 
aspects.  Next I will be looking at how methodologies are used, for example how you 
choose one over another and what purposes are being pursued for that particular use. 
 
These basic questions will evolve as the research unfolds. 
 
The collected information will be kept in digital format under password protection for 
three years after the conclusion of the research.  At the end of this period it will be 
electronically wiped.  
 
 
Besides the information will be use for publication in academic or professional 
journals, academic or professional conferences and the thesis required for aspiring to 
the PhD degree. 
 
Please, if you have any questions or comments about this project I am happy to 
respond to these.  Contact details are below. 
 
Kind regards, 
 
 
Jorge Ivan Velez-Castiblanco 
PhD Researcher  
Victoria University of Wellington 
Jorge.Velez@vuw.ac.nz 
 
 
Professor John Brocklesby 
PhD Supervisor  
Victoria University 
John.Brocklesby@vuw.ac.nz 
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Appendix 3: Interviews First Round 
How interventions are informed? 
• This requires asking about the academic background 
• Professional background (arrival to intervention) (methodologies preferred) 
• Theoretical background 
• Experience (what is an ideal situation, what is a flawed situation) 
• Ethical position 
• Aesthetics  
• Cultural position (especially this is a bicultural country?) 
 
Human Dimension 
• Purpose of HD 
• Purpose of case studies 
• Purpose National review 
• Purpose Lit review 
• Can a map be designed? 
• How are you planning to arrive there? 
• What methodologies can be use? Methods? 
• Match pairs – Lit review framework 
 
 264 
 
Appendix 4: Interviews Second Round 
 
Diagram used in the interview for making sense of the plot of the project 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Like 
*Desire 
*Motivation 
*Skill 
*How 
*Who 
(External, 
Internal, 
interaction)
 
  
 
*Why / 
Reasons 
*Elegant Vs 
Messy 
 
*Power 
relations 
 Sessions   
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Knowledge 
*Believes 
*Knowledge 
*Plan 
*Ethics-
Agency 
 
Methodologies  
- Systems 
- Public health 
- TOC 
- Simulation 
 #14 Review of the 
subproject advance  
 
 #15 Designing questions to 
interview participants 
 
 #28 Designing First 
Workshop GWC 
 
 #29 Polishing First 
Workshop GWC 
 
 #30 Pre – First Workshop 
GWC 
 
 #31 Debrief First 
Workshop GWC 
 
 #35 Evaluation on 
Workshops 
 
 #36 Designing Second 
Workshop 
 
 #37 Polishing Second 
Workshop 
 
 #38 Nitty Gritty Workshop 
2 
 
 #39 Content Issues Part 1 
of 2: Subproject GWC 
 
 #43 Designing Workshop 3  
 #44 Preparing Advisory 
Meeting, Part 1 of 4: 
Subproject GWC 
 
   
   
 Problems-Challenges  
 Difficulties – Frustrations 
Alternatives why no? 
Turning points 
Coherence-Harmonizing 
Luck 
Wayward chains 
Control 
 
Māori World view 
What is next? 
Evaluation 
 
 
 
General questions:  
 What happened inside the GWC workshops? 
 Aids used? 
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 How different was the workshop from the actual planning? 
 Facilitation style? 
 Do the team agree on the purposes for the GWC? 
 What path of action to choose? It will be possible to arrive there? 
 Is the purpose the same as the beginning?  
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Appendix 5: Soft Systems Methodology 
This is an overview of the Soft Systems Methodology using textual citations from the 
book “Soft Systems Methodology in Action” (Checkland & Sholes, 1990). It deals 
with three areas: 1) the constitutive rules, 2) the epistemology use to guide and make 
accounts of the process and 3) a SSM model that represents the way to map SSM 
experiences. 
 
1) Constitutive rules (Checkland & Sholes, 1990, p.286) 
 
(1) SSM is a structured way of thinking which focuses on some real-world 
situation perceived as problematical. The aim is always to bring about what 
will be seen as improvements in the situation, and this is true whether or not 
the work done is part of normal day-to-day managerial work.  
 
(2) SSM’s structured thinking is based on systems ideas, and its whole process 
has yielded an explicit epistemology. Any account of work which lays claim 
to being SSM-based must be expressible in terms of that epistemology 
whether or not SSM language was used as the work was done. The 
epistemology is summarized in [2) SSM’s Epistemology]. (‘Expressible in 
terms of’ does not mean that the whole process has to be followed each time 
SSM is used. But whatever gets done must be describable using the language 
of [2) SSM’s Epistemology] regardless of the scope of it.) 
 
 
(3) The full claim “SSM was used” (implying some version of the approach as a 
whole) ought to refer only to instances in which the following guidelines were 
followed. 
(a) There is no automatic assumption that the real world is systemic. If 
part of the real world is taken to be a system to be engineered, then that 
is by conscious choice. 
(b) Careful distinction is made between unreflecting involvement in the 
everyday world (the unfolding flux of event and ideas) and conscious 
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systems thinking about the real world. The SSM user is always 
conscious of moving from one world to the other, and will do so many 
times in using the approach. 
(c) In the systems thinking phase, holons are constructed. (These will 
usually take the form of purposeful ‘human activity systems’ which 
embody the four basic ideas: emergent properties, layered structure, 
process of communication and control) 
(d) The holons are used to enquire into, or interrogate the real world in 
order to articulate a dialogue, discourse or debate aimed at defining 
changes deemed desirable and feasible. 
 
(4) Since SSM can be used in many different ways in different situations, and will 
in any case be interpreted somewhat differently by each user, any potential 
use of it ought to be characterized by conscious thought about how to adapt it 
to a particular situation. 
 
(5) Finally, and again because SSM is a methodology, not technique, every use of 
it will potentially yield methodological lessons in addition to those about the 
situation of concern. The methodological lessons may be about SSM’s 
methodology framework of ideas, or its processes, or the way it was used, or 
all of these. The potential lessons will be always there, awaiting extraction by 
conscious reflection on the experience of use. 
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2) SSM’s Epistemology (Checkland & Sholes, 1990, pp.288–289). 
 
Real world The unfolding interacting flux of events and ideas experienced as 
everyday life 
Systems thinking world The world in which conscious reflection on the ‘real world’using 
systems ideas takes place.  
Problem situation A real-world situation in which there is a sense of unease, a feeling 
that things could be better than they are, or some perceived problem 
requiring attention.  
Analyses One, Two, Three Analysis One: examination of the intervention or interaction in terms 
of the roles; ‘client’ (caused the study to take place), ‘problem solver’ 
(undertakes the enquiry) and ‘problem owner’ (plausible roles form 
which the situation can be viewed, chosen by the problem solver’). 
 
Analysis Two: examination of the social (cultural) characteristics of 
the problem situation via interacting roles (social positions), norms 
(expected behaviour in roles) and values (by which role-holders are 
judged). 
 
Analysis Three: examination of the power-related (political) aspects of 
the problem situation via elucidation of the ‘commodities’ of power in 
the situation.  
Rich pictures Pictorial/diagrammatic representation of the situation’s entities 
(structures), processes, relationships and issues.  
Root definitions Concise verbal definitions expressing the nature of purposeful activity 
systems regarded as relevant to exploring the problem situation. A full 
RD would take the form: do X by Y in order to achieve Z.  
CATWOE Elements considered in formulating root definitions. The core is 
expressed in T (Transformation of some entity into a changed form of 
that entity) according to a declared Weltanschauung, W. 
C(custumers): victims of beneficiaries of T. A (actors): those who 
carry out the activities. O (owner): the person or group who could 
abolish the systems. E: (the environmental constraints which the 
system takes as given).  
The 5Es Criteria by which T would be judged: Efficacy (does the means 
work?); Efficiency (are minimum resources used?); Effectiveness 
(does the T help the attainment of longer term goals related to O’s 
expectations?); Ethicality (is T a moral thing to do?); Elegance (is T 
aesthetically pleasing?).  
Conceptual model The structured set of activities necessary to realize the root definition 
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and CATWOE, consisting of an operational subsystem and a 
monitoring and control subsystem based on the Es.  
Comparison Setting the conceptual models against the perceived real world in 
order to generate debate about perceptions on it and changes to it 
which would be regarded as beneficial.  
Desirable and feasible 
changes 
Possible changes which are (systemically) desirable on the basis of the 
learned relevance of the relevant systems, and (culturally) feasible for 
the people in the situation at this time.  
Action Real-world action (as opposed to activity in conceptual models) to 
improve the problem situation as a result of operation of the learning 
cycle for which this epistemology provides a language.  
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3) “The System to use SSM which maps all the experiences of using it” 
(Checkland & Sholes, 1990, p.294) 
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Appendix 6: Data Catalogue 
While in the field I gave three feedback sessions and attended a total of 43 work 
sessions. I am calling a session a chunk of time without breaks to work on an issue. 
Basically, a session corresponds to one recording. The amount of time devoted to 
these sessions varies from a minimum of 17 minutes to a maximum of 2hours 40 
minutes. The typical session was about 1 hour. Sometimes they decided to spend a 
day’s work discussing the project. In these occasions, I have from 3 to 5 recordings 
that I count as different sessions. 
 
From the 43 sessions, 12 were specific to the GWC, and the other 31 sessions were 
dedicated to the project as a whole. I also conducted a total of 10 interviews. These 
were open interviews ranging from one hour to 1 hour 40 minutes. At the beginning, I 
interviewed every member of the team. Later I conducted a second set of interviews 
limited to those people working on the GWC project. The total recording time of 
interviews plus feedbacks and sessions was about 64 hours. The table at the end of 
this appendix specifies all the sessions that I recorded. The types of meetings recorded 
were: 
 
 PFA: Project for analysis, a kind of meeting usually involving all the 
participants. 
 VWM: Values in Water Management, a meeting involving one of PFA’s sub 
projects. 
 GWC: The Groups for Water Caring subproject was the focus of my research. 
 Interviews: individual interviews with the participants. 
 Feedback: Sessions in which I presented my views on TOP from the point of 
view of my research. 
 
Apart for all this data, from which there is a “hard” record, I also attended some 
meetings that fell out of my negotiated boundary of research. Consequently, I was not 
allowed to take notes or produce recordings. They included 2 whole day meetings 
with the Advisory Group and 5 reflective practice sessions. 
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Session Date Type of 
Meeting 
Attendants Notes 
#1 2005-10-05 PFA Mark, Frederick, Gillian, 
William, Barbara, Dianne, 
Wanda, Grace and Jorge 
Negotiating the research 
with the group and 
preparations to meet the 
Advisory Group 
#2 2006-02-22 PFA Wanda, Grace, Dianne, Mark, 
Barbara, Frederick and Jorge 
Methodological issues - 
how to compare different 
case studies? Part 1/5 
#3 2006-02-22 PFA Wanda, Grace, Dianne, Mark, 
Barbara, Frederick and Jorge 
Methodological issues - 
how to compare different 
case studies? Part 2/5 
#4 2006-02-22 PFA Wanda, Grace, Dianne, Mark, 
Barbara, Frederick and Jorge 
Methodological issues - 
how to compare different 
case studies? Part 3/5 
#5 2006-02-22 PFA Wanda, Grace, Dianne, Mark, 
Barbara, Frederick and Jorge 
Methodological issues - 
how to compare different 
case studies? Part 4/5 
#6 2006-02-22 PFA Jorge, Barbara, Grace, Wanda, 
Frederick, Mark and Dianne  
Methodological issues - 
how to compare different 
case studies? Part 5/5 
#7 2006-03-06 PFA Wanda, Frederick, Mark, Grace, 
Dianne, Jorge and Barbara 
Preparing Advisory 
Group meeting Part 1/2  
#8 2006-03-06 PFA Wanda, Frederick, Mark, Grace, 
Dianne, Jorge and Barbara 
Preparing Advisory 
Group meeting Part 2/2  
#9 2006-03-30 PFA Grace, Wanda, Frederick, Mark 
and Jorge 
Questionnaire to Evaluate 
Workshops  
#10 2006-03-30 VWM Grace, Wanda, Frederick, Mark 
and Jorge 
Designing Survey Values 
in Water  
#11 2006-03-30 PFA Wanda, Jorge, Frederick, Miller, 
Laura, Dianne, Mark and Grace 
Preparation for Advisory. 
Rehearsal Objective One 
and Comparison 
Methodology comparison 
of case studies  
#12 2006-03-30 PFA Mark, Grace, Wanda, Miller, 
Laura, Dianne and Jorge   
Planning a Paper base on 
TOP’s work 
#13 2006-04-05 PFA Mark, Grace, Frederick, Jorge 
and Dianne 
Preparation for Advisory. 
Rehearsal Objective Two 
#14 2006-04-19 Subproject 
GWC 
Hannah, Dianne, Frederick and 
Jorge 
Review of the subproject 
advance  
#15 2006-05-02 Subproject 
GWC 
Hannah, Dianne and Jorge Designing questions to 
interview participants 
#16 2006-05-05 Feedback Jorge, Grace, Barbara, Hannah, 
Dianne, Mark, Gillian, 
Frederick, Wanda and William 
Feedback about objective 
1 and the oral and written 
culture in the group 
#17 2006-05-30 Interview Mark Overview of the project 
#18 2006-06-08 PFA Mark, Grace, Dianne, Hannah, 
Wanda and Jorge 
Annual Reporting to 
FRST Part 1/3 
#19 2006-06-08 PFA Mark, Grace, Dianne, Hannah, 
Wanda and Jorge    
Annual Reporting to 
FRST Part 2/3 
#20 2006-06-08 PFA Mark, Grace, Dianne, Hannah, 
Wanda and Jorge    
Annual Reporting to 
FRST Part 3/3 
#21 2006-06-26 Interview Frederick    Interview 1.  Profile 
#22 2006-06-27 Interview Hannah    Interview 1.  Profile 
#23 2006-07-06 Interview Wanda    Interview 1.  Profile 
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#24 2006-07-13 PFA Wanda, Grace, Hannah, 
Frederick, Mark, Barbara and 
Jorge    
Methodological Issues 
#25 2006-07-13 PFA Wanda, Grace, Hannah, 
Frederick, Mark, Barbara and 
Jorge    
Leadership and 
Management 
#26 2006-07-13 PFA Wanda, Grace, Hannah, 
Frederick, Mark, Barbara and 
Jorge    
Data Analysis 
#27 2006-07-14 Interview Dianne    Interview 1.  Profile 
#28 2006-08-10 Subproject 
GWC 
Hannah, Frederick and Jorge    Designing First 
Workshop GWC 
#29 2006-08-17 Subproject 
GWC 
Dianne, Frederick, Hannah and 
Jorge    
Polishing First Workshop 
GWC 
#30 2006-08-18 Subproject 
GWC 
Hannah, Frederick and Jorge    Pre - First Workshop 
GWC 
#31 2006-08-18 Subproject 
GWC 
Frederick, Hannah and Jorge    Debrief First Workshop 
GWC 
#32 2006-08-21 PFA Barbara, Mark, Grace, Hannah, 
Dianne, Frederick and Jorge    
Integrating the data from 
the different case studies 
Part 1/2 
#33 2006-08-21 PFA Barbara, Mark, Grace, Hannah, 
Dianne, Frederick and Jorge    
Integrating the data from 
the different case studies 
Part 2/2 
#34 2006-08-22 Interview Barbara    Interview 1.  Profile 
#35 2006-08-30 Subproject 
GWC 
Hannah, Mark and Jorge    Evaluation on Workshops 
#36 2006-08-30 Subproject 
GWC 
Wanda, Frederick, Dianne, 
Hannah, Mark and Jorge    
Designing Second 
Workshop 
#37 2006-09-08 Subproject 
GWC 
Hannah, Dianne, Frederick and 
Jorge    
Polishing Second 
Workshop 
#38 2006-09-15 Subproject 
GWC 
Hannah, Dianne, Frederick and 
Jorge    
Nitty Gritty Workshop 2 
#39 2006-09-28 PFA Hannah, Wanda, Grace, Dianne, 
Mark, Jorge and Barbara 
Content Issues Part 1 of 
2: Subproject GWC 
#40 2006-09-28 PFA Hannah, Wanda, Grace, Dianne, 
Mark and Jorge    
Content Issues Part 2 of 
2: Case Studies and 
Objective 2 
#41 2006-09-29 Feedback Jorge, Grace, Taker, Note, 
Frederick, Dianne, Barbara, 
Hannah, Miller, Laura,  Mark, 
Wanda, Gillian, Manager and 
William 
Feedback based on 
communicative intention 
and boundary. 
 
#42 2006-10-05 Interview Grace    Interview 1.  Profile 
#43 2006-10-10 Subproject 
GWC 
Hannah, Frederick and Jorge    Designing Workshop 3 
#44 2006-10-12 PFA Frederick, Barbara, Dianne, 
Hannah, Mark, Grace and Jorge    
Preparing Advisory 
Meeting, Part 1 of 4: 
Subproject GWC 
#45 2006-10-12 PFA Wanda, Frederick, Barbara, 
Dianne, Hannah, Mark, Grace 
and Jorge    
Preparing Advisory 
Meeting, Part 2 of 4: 
Subproject VWM 
#46 2006-10-12 PFA Frederick, Barbara, Dianne, 
Hannah, Mark, Grace and Jorge    
Preparing Advisory 
Meeting, Part 3 of 4: 
Subproject Bio-solids 
#47 2006-10-12 PFA Frederick, Barbara, Dianne, 
Hannah, Mark, Grace and Jorge    
Preparing Advisory 
Meeting, Part 4 of 4: 
Dissemination 
#48 2006-11-08 Interview Frederick    Interview 2.  Intentions 
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on Subproject GWC 
#49 2006-11-13 PFA Frederick, Barbara, Mark, 
Grace, Dianne, Hannah, Wanda 
and Jorge    
Process Meeting Part 1 of 
4: Subproject GWC 
#50 2006-11-13 PFA Frederick, Barbara, Mark, 
Grace, Dianne, Hannah, Wanda 
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